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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
The balance of payments of a nation may be defined 
as a system of accounts of economic transactions in which 
the accounting entity is a country and the entries refer 
to transactions between residents and institutions of 
one country and residents and institutions of the rest 
of the world.^ Economic transactions must be used in 
the broad sense to include all transfers of goods, ser­
vices, and capital funds. These transfers are of physi­
cal goods as well as of ownership of financial and other 
assets.
Each country's foreign trade and payments are 
its main economic contact with other nations; a country's 
balance of payments is dependent not only on its own 
domestic policies but also on the policies of other 
countries.
This study will analyze, in general, the balance
1There are exceptions to this rule, such as the 
treatment of immigrants' belongings and that of gold 
when transferred from domestic production to the central 
bank.
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of payments problems confronting the United States between 
the years 1962-6?» and, specifically, the effects on the 
balance of payments of controls on direct investment 
abroad.
The United States has had deficits almost con­
tinuously since the end of World War II. Until 1958, 
however, the deficits were not of much concern due mainly 
to the high demand for U.S. dollars in Europe and the 
rest of the world. In fact, U.S. dollars became an 
international reserve to most countries; and, thus, 
despite the large amount of foreign aid given by the 
United States through the Marshall Plan and other aid 
projects, even the sum of deficits during this period 
was low. The United States continued to maintain large 
gold reserves, and deficits did not greatly affect the 
country’s foreign exchange reserves; they merely added 
to international liquidity and encouraged more inter­
national trade. Since 1958, the annual deficits have 
increased from year to year, reaching a peak in the years 
1962-64. The demand for dollars in many countries was 
less than the supply, and many European countries 
accumulated large reserves, part of which they converted 
to gold. With this situation of countries not wishing 
to increase their dollar holdings but desiring to exchange 
these holdings for the decreasing gold reserves of the 
United States, the nation was faced with a new problem--
3
the elimination of the deficit in its balance of pay­
ments .
The United States, as a key currency country, 
is interested in achieving and maintaining equilibrium 
in the international payments balance together with 
continuing to perform its duties as a key currency 
nation with a transaction currency. All policies effected 
to achieve this goal should avoid any restrictions or 
controls on free movement of goods and capital between 
nations. However, in persuing this goal, with the appro­
priate fiscal and monetary policies, the country must 
aim for domestic stability and growth as well as inter­
national trade.
The questions of international trade and the 
balance of payments are not only matters of flexible and 
competitive cost and price structure in the production 
and distribution of goods and services but also are the 
fulfillment of governmental obligations and political, 
military, and social aspirations. In spite of a large 
surplus in the trade balance for many years, the United 
States had a deficit in the over-all balance because of 
military and economic foreign aid programs and the out­
flow of private capital.
The net loss of funds as the result of the defi­
cit is measured in various ways, the two now officially 
used (which will be explained later) being the "official
4
settlement" and the "liquidity" measurement. Between 
i960 and 1966, the country experienced a deficit of #12.3 
billion based on the official settlement measure, and 
#16.7 billion based on the liquidity concept. Taking 
the years 1962-66, the amount would be $7*2 billion 
based on the official method, and #10.4 billion accord­
ing to the liquidity model. The loss of gold for the 
period I96O-66 was #7.2 billion, and for the shorter 
period, 1962-66, only #3.8 billion. In the same period, 
it should be remembered, holdings of foreign assets by 
U.S. citizens increased by a much greater amount than 
did the deficit, including the loss of gold. However, 
most U.S. assets are direct investments and other long­
term claims, whereas foreign claims upon the United 
States are short term and mainly liquid in form.
There have been many attempts in recent years 
to blame certain sectors of the economy for the deficit 
in the balance of payments. One common point of view 
is that the deficit is due to excessive governmental 
expenditures abroad in military and economic assistance 
as well as to U.S. foreign military costs. In some years 
the expenditure for assistance ran as high as #6.0 billion, 
but a large part of this assistance was in goods and 
services and not in outflow of capital. Another view 
blames the deficit on the private industrial sector 
where the outflow of capital exceeded #6.0 billion
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annually in recent years. But here again the earnings 
of such investments are growing yearly and are one of 
the reasons that the United States has a trade surplus. 
Also, part Of the outflow is in the form of exports 
which improves the nation's position.
As seen, it is difficult to cite one sector as 
the only source of blame for the deficit. Government 
expenditures are made, in many cases, to defend national 
freedom where private industry as well as the rest of 
the economy benefit from them.
The following statistics illustrate the urgency 
of the current problem facing the United States. In 
1956, total liquid assets held ÿÿ foreigners were $l4.6 
billion, and U.S. gold stock was $22.1 billion. By 
the end of I966, foreign liquid claims were $27.9 billion, 
of which $l4.7 billion were in official hands and $13.2 
billion were in private hands. The U.S. gold reserves 
declined to only $13.2 billion. The problem of rise in 
liabilities to foreigners and the decline in the official 
reserves emphasizes the importance of bringing the balance 
of payments into equilibrium.
In order to solve the deficit problem, the United 
States had both short- and long-term policy patterns to 
follow. The short-term measures included restrictions 
on duty-free goods permitted to returning tourists, 
giving tied foreign economic assistance, the Interest
6
Equalization Tax (lET), and various voluntary programs. 
These short-term policies were intended to help improve 
the U.S. position until the time when long-term solu­
tions for the problem could be adopted.
The long-term solution to the balance of payments 
deficit had to be designed in such a way that it took 
into account the special role of the U.S. dollar as a 
key currency and added to free-world security, trade, 
and development. While achieving approximate balance, 
all adjustments had to consider the political, military, 
diplomatic, and economic needs of the country. The 
U.S. dollar is a reserve currency to many nations and 
is the keystone of the international monetary system on 
which all the trade of the free world is based. The 
outflow of capital from the United States helps many 
under-developed countries to sustain some rate of growth 
and in some cases is their only source of foreign exchange,
Taking these factors into consideration, the 
long-term objectives have been aimed toward reaching a 
position of equilibrium and building confidence in the 
dollar as a reserve currency and international monetary 
unit. To attain this goal, however, the cooperation of 
business and other developed countries is needed in 
addition to government action.
Any long-term solution must be based on the 
following U.S. commitments and responsibilities:
1. The United States must continue to export 
government capital for bilateral economic 
asslstanco, and contributions to multilateral 
development assistance institutions,
2. The United States must continue defense 
expenditures abroad for mutual security in 
the free world.
3. The United States must continue, over time,
to export private capital. This is practical; 
it is sensible; it is necessary. Moreover, 
the dividends and royalty receipts for past 
investments must be continued to be brought 
home--and in increasing amounts--to reward 
the stockholders and benefit the balance of 
payments.
4. The United States must continue to discharge 
its World-Wide responsibilities to the inter­
national monetary system through its reserve 
currency and transaction currency roles.
For the fulfillment of these conditions and 
improvement of the balance of payments without any 
restrictions on trade or capital movements the United 
States will have to increase its exports and earn more 
foreign exchange than it currently earns. By increasing 
her trade surplus the United States would be able to 
continue to give aid and export capital and still achieve 
equilibrium in the balance of payments.
Wavs of Measuring Deficit and Surplus
The best means of measuring a deficit or surplus 
in the balance of payments has been the subject of
Henry H. Fowler, A World Monetary System for a 
Greater Society of Nations, Treasury Department News 
Release, F-847, March 17, I967, Washington, D.C.
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argument during the last few years. The measurement 
is very important because it is an international indi­
cation of the country's economic position and is a base 
for further economic policy decisions.
In balance of payments accounting debits must 
equal credits, by definition. But for analytical pur­
poses there are some accounts which may be designated as 
balancing the account, and by placing them below or 
above the line a deficit or a surplus may be determined. 
The measurement of balance of payments deficit or surplus 
is a matter of analysis and not of accounting.
The United States has additional problems not 
facing other countries because it is a key currency 
country and is a banking center for all of the free 
world.
Since one determines what is a deficit or a 
surplus only by selected transactions, there is a cru­
cial choice to determine what these transactions should 
be. The choice must be made in such a way that it has 
an analytical interpretation to show to what extent there 
is disequilibrium in the international economic position. 
The old general approach to the balance of payments 
divides all accounts into substantive or autonomous and 
compensatory or balancing accounts. By this method or 
approach the first grouping is the current account, 
unilateral transfers, and selected capital movements.
9
The compensatory accounts are the transactions under­
taken to finance the first group, and they usually are 
placed below the line.
Because of the difficulty of defining autono­
mous or compensatory transactions during the 1950's, 
the Commerce Department used the basic balance and 
overall balance concepts in order to determine deficit 
or surplus in the balance of payments. The basic balance 
includes the transactions which respond to long-term 
economic forces; these transactions are the net of cur­
rent accounts, transfer payments, and any long-term 
capital movements. All other transactions, including 
changes in official holdings, are short-term capital 
movements and are placed below the line. Many econo­
mists objected to this approach on the ground that some 
nominally short-term capital movements are actually 
long-term in nature since they may be increases in trans­
actions or working balances, or short maturity loans 
which will automatically be renewed.
Since the late 1950*s, the Department of Com­
merce has used the "balance on regular type transactions" 
or "overall balance" to measure surplus or deficit.
This means of measurement includes, above the line, the 
basic balance, U.S. short-term capital movement (net), 
short-term commercial and brokerage liabilities (net) 
and errors and ommissions. Many economists, including
10
the Bernstein Committee, criticized this approach.^
They charged that the official presentation overstates 
the payment deficit and that the Commerce Department 
uses a stricter method than any other nation when it 
treats any inflow of short-term foreign private capi­
tal as a settlement item, which is financing the deficit, 
rather than an ordinary capital inflow which is reducing 
the deficit. But outflows of U.S. short-term private 
capital are treated as regular transactions that increase 
the deficit. The commerce Department reply was that the 
United States occupies a special position as the world's 
key currency country which put upon it more obligations 
and, hence, the stricter standard.
In 1965, the Department of Commerce started to 
use a new concept of measurement, the "liquidity balance." 
This method of measurement includes, above the line, all 
of the transactions of the "regular type" and adds 
special governmental transactions. The liquidity bal­
ance measures as deficit or surplus all changes in U.S. 
official reserve assets and liquid liabilities to all 
foreigners, private and institutional. Official reserves 
of the United States include official holdings of gold 
and foreign exchange and the net position of the United
"Bernstein Committee," The Balance of Payments 
Statistics of the United States, A Review and Appraisal, 
The Bureau of the Budget, April I965, pi 109•
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States 'fith the International Monetary Fund which is
the "gold tranche" position with the Fund. Liabilities
of the United States to foreigners are: all short-term
liabilities to private individuals and institutions
reported by U.S. banks, plus all foreign holdings of
marketable or convertible U.S. Government securities.
All other items are above the line. Thus, a deficit in
the nation's balance of payments, according to this method
of measurement, is any decrease in U.S. official reserve
assets plus any increase in liquid liabilities to for- 
1exgners.
The Commerce Department's argument for using 
this method is that the Unitdd States has a special role 
as a key country of the world and that it is the only 
country which is committed to gold convertibility. 
Therefore, the United States should keep its payments 
accounting on a conservative basis : "Hope for the best
but be prepared for the worst." This approach assumes 
that the main purpose of balance of payments accounting 
is to see the relationship between current liabilities 
and current assets available to meet them. All foreign 
holdings are assumed to be potentially redeemable in gold 
by taking into account the fact that liquid dollar holdings
Thomas E. Davis, "Measuring a Deficit or Surplus 
in the U.S. Balance of Payment," Monthly Review (Kansas 
City Federal Reserve Bank, September-October, 1966), p. 15»
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of private foreigners may be easily sold to their central 
bank which in turn could present them to the U.S. Treasury 
to be redeemed in gold.
Findings of the Bernstein Committee 
The Bernstein Committee gave the major objections 
to, and criticisms of, the aforementioned Department of 
Commerce approach. The first objection is that all 
changes in liabilities to other than monetary authori­
ties represent ordinary capital movement and should be 
treated as such. Second, it is quite difficult to deter­
mine the character of U.S. Government non-marketable, 
medium-term, convertible securities as to whether they 
are liquid or non-liquid. Third, in the asymmetrical 
treatment of short-term private capital flow, according 
to this treatment, changes in U.S. liquid liabilities 
to private foreigners are placed below the line, while 
changes in U.S. private capital claims on other nations 
are placed above the line. The Department of Commerce 
justifies the use of this method with the argument that 
this country has corresponding asymmetries in the real 
world. The U.S. liquid liabilities are considered to 
be a potential threat to the U.S. stock of gold, but 
U.S. private capital claims on other countries are not 
readily available to U.S. authorities for use in defend­
ing the dollar. The United States does not have exchange
13
controls, and only official reserves are regarded as 
available to defend the dollar. The Committee's answer 
to this argument is that a large part of private foreign 
claims against the United States is really a liability 
to U.S. residents or banks and is not likely to be with­
drawn. An example of this is that when a U.S. bank lends 
money to a foreigner a part of the sum is required to be 
placed on deposit at the bank and cannot be withdrawn.
A further example is that when a U.S. resident deposits 
funds in a foreign bank, these funds are not apt to be 
used in claiming U.S. gold because the funds are liabil­
ities of the bank to thi# citizen. Thus, not all short­
term liquid claims are really potentially dangerous to 
U.S. gold stock. The Bernstein Committee concluded 
that the main purpose of measuring the balance of pay­
ments surplus or deficit is to indicate the extent of 
any disequilibrium which may exist in the country's 
international transactions, and especially to measure 
the gap between normal supply and demand for foreign 
exchange which must be filled by the monetary authority 
if it is to keep the parity of the money. An increase 
in assets in this country by foreign holders does not 
necessarily mean a position of disequilibrium and the 
liquidity concept has no precise meaning.^
"Bernstein Committee," The Balance of Payments 
Statistics of the United States, A Review and Appraisal. 
The Bureau of the Budget, April 19^5 » p% 109•
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As an alternative approach the Committee proposed 
a new concept--the "official settlement"--which it believed 
to be the most useful measure of deficit and surplus.
This approach treats all foreign private claims in the 
United States, liquid or non-liquid, as ordinary capital 
inflows. Only the change in U.S. reserves, along with 
claims of foreign official authorities, would be considered 
as indicating surplus or deficit. The Committee Report 
emphasizes that the key to arranging balance of payments 
presentation is the responsibility of the official author­
ities to keep their currency stable. In following this 
responsibility the authorities gain or lose reserve 
assets and change the size of their liabilities to other 
countries' monetary authorities. In determining whether 
a country is in equilibrium, attention must be paid to 
the changes in its international reserves of gold, con­
vertible currencies, position with the International 
Monetary Fund, and the liabilities to foreign official 
authorities. Those liabilities may be liquid or non liquid.
The reason short-term claims should be viewed as 
capital inflow is that when the United States has short 
claims on foreigners it counts this as capital outflow; 
short-term claims against the United States should be 
treated in the same way and should be counted as capital 
inflow. The motivations affecting short-term capital 
flow are the same for private citizens of the United
15
States as well as for those of other countries. Such 
treatment of short-term capital flows will eliminate 
some bias in the direction of enlarging the reported 
U.S. deficit.
The official settlement approach treats errors 
and ommissions as unrecorded private capital movements, 
and they are therefore placed above the line.
The reason for proposing that all changes in U.S. 
liabilities to foreign official monetary authorities 
without regard to their maturity or liquidity be classi­
fied as settlement items below the line is that these 
assets are held as part of the international reserve of 
these countries, and any change of these reserves would 
affect the balance of payments position.
The main criticism of the official settlement 
concept is that in most countries private claims of their 
citizens are closely related to central bank policies.
In many of them the commercial banks are owned or con­
trolled by the central bank, and some exchange control 
exists in most countries. In many cases monetary author­
ities will encourage commercial banks or private citi­
zens to hold liquid dollar assets rather than exchange 
them for local currency by agreeing to pay higher interest 
rates and promising to cash them at a future date at a 
more favorable exchange rate. Another important argument 
against using the official settlement is that such an
16
accounting of the balance of payments deficit may endan­
ger the international position of the U.S. It would 
postpone very important signals warning of trouble in 
its transactions with the rest of the world. Short­
term liabilities might build up around the world and 
would not be noticed until after they had been moved to 
central banks and presented to the United States in 
exchange for gold.
Four different concepts of measurement have 
been discussed which can be employed to present deficit 
or surplus in the balance of payments; yet there is no 
easy answer as to which is the best method. Each has 
advantages and disadvantages, depending upon the specific 
problem it attempts to analyze.
The "basic transaction" approach should be used 
as a basic starting point for analysis, using the other 
approaches for special problems. In this paper the 
figures of all four approaches will be given, with more 
emphasis on those used by the Department of Commerce.
Any deficit, however measured, does not imply 
that the United States has a reduction in total foreign 
net assets. Throughout the years when there have been 
deficits, total foreign assets plus gold and international 
reserves of the United States have increased. The change 
has come mainly in the composition of these assets. Since 
1950, total U.S. assets abroad increased many times more
17 , '
than the decline in gold stock and increased claims by 
foreigners. During this period, the United States has 
had deficits for all years except 1957 when it had a 
small surplus. Total deficits for the years 1950-65» 
based on the "regular transaction" approach, amounted 
to $33.3 billion. During this time U.S. long-term 
assets and credits abroad increased from $28.3 billion 
to $91.1 billion, and short-term assets increased from 
$1.8 billion to $13.3 billion. Foreign investment in 
the United States increased from $8.0 billion to $26.4 
billion in long-term assets and from $9.6 billion to 
$32.5 billion in short-term assets. Even with the 
decrease in the gold stock and its deficit in the balance 
of payments, total U.S. international assets and reserves 
increased by $24.2 billion (Table 1).
During the period 1962-65, the United States 
continued to increase its assets abroad. This increase 
was much greater than the increase in the assets of 
foreigners in the United States. The total increase of 
U.S. assets abroad during this period was $31.4 billion, 
or an average increase of $7.9 billion a year. The total 
increase of foreign assets and investment in the United 




NET CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL ASSETS AND RESERVES 
OF THE UNITED STATES FROM 1950 TO I965 
(million U.S. dollars)
Type of Assets 1950 1965 Change
Liquid
U.S. gold holdings
IMF gold tranche position 
and holdings of con­
vertible currencies
22.8 13.8 - 9.0
1.4 1.6 + .2
Short-term claims of the 
United States, private 
and government 1.8 13.3 +11.5
Short-term claims of 
foreigners on the 
United States





Long-term assets and credit 
abroad 28.3 91.1 +62.9
Long-term assets and credit 
by foreigners in the 
United States 8.0 26.4 -18.4
Net change in long-term 
assets and credits +44.5
Total change in liquid and 
non-liquid international 
assets of the United States 
for 1950-19Ü5 +24.2
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Cur-
rent Business, September I966
a v < 
, p. 40.
CHAPTER II
THE DEFICIT IN THE UNITED STATES BALANCE 
OF PAYMENTS, 1962-6?
Due to the construction of the balance of pay­
ments, no deficit or surplus is possible from the account­
ing approach, but, as shown in this paper, there must be 
an analysis in order to measure a deficit or a surplus 
in the balance of payments. All four concepts of the 
balance of payments that have been discussed are alike 
in the sense that all of them show deficits in the bal­
ance eaoept in the "official settlement" in I966. Accord­
ing to the "basic balance" approach, the cumulative 
deficit for the period 1962-6? is $12.0 billion (Table 
2 ); according to the "balance of regular transaction" 
approach, it is $1?.5 billion; the "official settlement" 
shows $10.8 billion; and the "liquidity balance" shows 
$13.9 billion (Table 4). (All four balances are shown 
in Appendix 1.)
The United States used several methods to finance 
the deficit during this period. Most important was the 
sale of gold. Between I962 and I96?, the United States
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TABLE 2
UNITED STATES BALANCE OF PAYMENT, 1962-6?, ON "BASIC" TRANSACTION CONCEPT
(million U.S. dollars)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Export of Goods and Ser­
vices (excluding trans-
fer under military 
grants) 30,278 32,339 36,958 38,993 43,039 45,756
Imports of Goods and 
Services -25,148 -26,442 -28,468 -32,036 -37,937 40,989Balance of Goods and 
Services 5,130 5,897 8,490 6,957 5,102 4,767
Private Capital Account 
net ’- 2,604 - 4,283 - 4,031 - 4,4l4 - 1,710 - 4,324
I. U.S. direct invest­
ment (- 1 ,522) (- 1 ,981) (- 9,421) (- 3 ,300) (- 3 ,543) (- 3,020)
2. Other long-term 
investment (sec­
urities ) (- 830) (- 760) (- 524) (- 1 ,015) ( 427) ( 250)
3» Long-term banks 
and private claims (- 252) (- 542) (- 1 ,086) (- 99) ( 1,4o6) (- 1,0?4)
Private Remittance and 
Government Pensions 757 867 879 994 - 1,010 - 1,276Government Accounts - 3,449 - 3,460 - 3,664 - 3,612 - 3,609 - 4,369
1. Non-military grants 
and long-term 
credit (- 4,048) (- 4,104) (- 4,244) (- 4 ,293) (- 4 ,415) (- 5,344)
2. Scheduled repay­
ment of long-term 
credit (- 599) (- 644) (- 580) (- 681) ( 806) ( 975)
Basic Balance - 1,680 - 1,713 84 - 2,063 - 1,227 - 5,202
Sources; U.S. Department of Commerce, Snrvev of Current Business, June I966, 
p. 30 (Years I962, I963, 1964); March 196?, pp. 21-23 (Years I965, 
1966); March I968, pp. 23-25 (Years I966, I967).
o
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lost $4.0 billion in gold (Table 3), and during the same 
period the U.S. IMF gold tranche position^ declined from 
$1.69 billion to $0.42 billion at the end of I967. The 
rest of the deficit was financed by increases in liabil­
ities to foreigners. Most of the gold purchasing during 
the last few years was done by one country--France.
Other countries which purchased a sizeable amount were 
Spain, Germany, and Austria.
During the years 1962-1964, the average deficit 
on the liquidity basis was $2.5 billion; in I966 it was 
reduced to $1.3 and $1.4 billion, respectively. During 
1962 and 1963 the balance of payments deficit, as measured 
by the liquidity balance, was about the same. While the 
deficit in I963 exceeded that in I962, $0.5 billion, it 
mainly reflected a lower level of special receipts from 
foreign governments. The primary difference between I962 
and 1963 was the composition of financing the deficits. 
Whereas reduction in the international monetary assets
IMF Gold Tranche Position: The amount by which
a member's quota exceeds the Fund holdings of its currency. 
Each member of the IMF has a quota in the Fund that is 
computed in relation to the GNP and foreign trade of the 
member. The quota is paid 25 percent in gold and 75 
percent in the member's currency. (When the foreign 
reserves of the member are low, it may pay less in gold 
because it has the choice of paying 10 percent of its 
reserves or 25 percent of the quota--whichever is smal­
ler. ) The amount of gold that the United States deposits 
with the Fund plus the amount of its currency that other 
members borrow (if any) are part of the U.S. reserves 
and are called the gold tranche position.
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TABLE 3




Liquidity 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Gold 16.9 16.1 15.6 15.5 l4.l 13.2 12.1
Fund Gold
Tranche
Position 1.7 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.4
Foreign
Exchange 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.3 2.3
TOTAL 18.7 17.3 16.8 16.7 15.4 14.8 14.8
Source: International Monetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics. May I968, Vol. XXII, 
No. 5.
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of the country had accounted for more than three-fourths 
of the total in I962 (Table 3), and the increase in 
liquid liabilities to foreign monetary authorities 
accounted for the rest, these proportions were approxi­
mately reversed in I963» Compared with the two previ­
ous years, the main developments in 1964 were the high 
balance of trade and services surplus, which reached 
$8.5 billion, and an unexpectedly large outflow of capi­
tal that reached $6.5 billion. Otherwise, the balance 
of payments remained essentially the same, and the defi­
cit was $2.8 billion as in the previous year. In I965 
and 1966, the deficit measured on this basis declined 
to #1.3 and $1.4 billion, respectively. This decline 
came at a time when military expenditures increased 
because of the war in Viet Nam. The structure of the 
balance of payments during these two years differed from 
that of previous years. The surplus on goods and ser­
vices dropped sharply in I963 and continued to deteri­
orate in 1966. Net outflows of private capital declined 
from the high levels of 1964 to lower levels comparable 
to the early 1960's.
One of the reasons for the improvement in 1965 
and 1966 was the impact of the February I965 program on 
commercial bank lending abroad. Claims reported by U.S. 
banks abroad changed favorably by about $2.5 billion 
between 1964 and I965, and there was an additional
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improvement of $0.2 billion in I966. For 1966, the cur­
rent account balance continued to shrink, and expendi­
tures for the war in Viet Nam continued to rise. How­
ever, the tight money situation and higher yield on U.S. 
securities attracted huge sums of foreign capital. The 
U.S. banks attracted deposits through their foreign 
branches for use in the domestic credit market, and 
long-term foreign investment in the United States 
increased by $2.0 billion--one of the largest increases 
since the end of the Second World War. In addition, 
because of the voluntary program, net outflow of capi­
tal to finance direct investment abroad decreased in 
1966, and the additional capital needed by U.S. compan­
ies was borrowed abroad. Most of the borrowing was in 
the form of long-term security issues, particularly 
convertible bonds.
Still another factor operating in 1966 was the 
high pressure on sterling during the summer, which forced 
the Bank of England to defend its currency by selling 
dollars for which U.S. banks abroad were bidding. Since 
these liquid banking funds continued to be liquid claims 
against the United States, they did not affect the 
liquidity balance but improved the official settlement 
balance.
Despite a balance of payments surplus of $0.2 
billion, based on the official settlement, the United
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States lost #0.6 billion in gold and had a deterioration 
in its IMF position, which amounted to an additional #0.3 
billion. Foreign exchange holdings of convertible cur­
rencies increased that year by #0.5 billion.^
The U.S. balance of payments showed appreciable 
deterioration in 1967» The deficit measured by liquidity 
balance amounted to #3.6 billion, three times higher 
than 1966, and, as measured by official settlement, it 
deteriorated from a surplus of #0.2 billion in I966 to 
a deficit of #3.4 billion in 196?. Some unfavorable 
conditions such as the war in Viet Nam, which existed 
in 1966 and continued in I967, and new developments such 
as the war in the Middle East, Expo '67, and the devalu­
ation of sterling caused the balance of payments deteri­
oration. The slower domestic economic growth helped to 
improve the balance of trade, but the easing of monetary 
conditions in the United States caused a reverse in the 
favorable flows of capital in I966, making them unfavor­
able in 1967.
The liquidity measures deficit could have been 
substantially larger in I967 if foreign official agen­
cies had not invested over #1.0 billion in non-liquid 
U.S. Government liabilities and in long-term deposits 
and certificates of deposits in U.S. banks.
^U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business. January I967, pp. 24-25.
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Additional factors In the adverse balance of 
payments development during that year were the result 
of a net Increase In U.S. Government credit abroad and 
higher outflows of private capital.
Despite the sharp balance of payments deteriora­
tions, U.S. official holdings of International reserves 
did not change In 196? (Table 3). Gold assets declined 
by about #1.2 billion, but foreign exchange of converti­
ble currencies Increased by #1.0 billion, and the Fund 
gold tranche position Improved by #0.1 billion. There­
fore, the liquidity deficit for the year was financed 
through an Increase of #3*5 billion In liquid dollar 
liabilities, of which #2.1 billion was to official agen­
cies.
In order to see how Important the claims of 
foreign countries are to the United States as a key cur­
rency center. It Is only necessary to use as an example 
the year 1965» The deficit of both measurements, the 
liquidity and official balances, was #1.3 billion, but 
net sales of gold by the United States were #1.7 bil­
lion, of which #260 million represented a transfer to 
the IMF to enlarge Its quota. In 1964, the deficit 
was #2.8 billion on the liquidity basis and #1.5 billion 
on the official settlement basis, but the sales of gold 
was only #0.1 billion (Charts A and B).
As mentioned previously, the difference between
CHART A




I960 *61 *62 *63 *64
Source: Office of the Secretary of the Treasury.
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I960 ’61 *62 *63 *64
Source : Office of the Secretary of the Treasury.
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liquidity and official settlement balances Is In the 
various Items each one Includes, above and below the 
line. The deficit on the liquidity balance was almost 
always larger than the official mainly because foreign 
private liquid capital Is a settlement item and appears 
below the line, as do changes In non-liquid liabilities 
to foreign monetary authorities. In the official set­
tlement balance the last two items are above the line 
and are not included as part of the deficit. The reason 
the outflow of gold In 1965 was larger than the two 
deficit measurements was that foreign countries cashed 
all their claims for gold, including the additional 
amounts of Increases in the U.S. convertible currencies 
and position with the IMF.
It should be remembered that the balance of pay­
ments deficit during the late 1940's and the 1950's was 
necessary in order to provide international liquidity 
to support free world trade and economic growth. The 
deficit during that time showed the strength of the 
economy and helped to increase American assets abroad 
(Table l). Since 1958, the amount of deficit has 
increased sharply while the U.S. stock of gold has 
declined--a fact that has caused a loss of confidence 
in the dollar. If a new international liquidity system 
is not established in the near future, the United States 
will have to continue operating with a small deficit
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each year in order to supply the needed additional 
international currency for expanding trade.
Balance of Trade
The balance of trade continued to show an 
excellent record during the period 1962-67» During the 
1950's the excess of exports averaged $2.8 billion a 
year. In the period 1962-6?1 the surplus averaged $4.7 
billion annually* Total exports of merchandise increased 
from $20.6 billion in I962 to $30.5 billion in I967, or 
an increase of approximately 50 percent. Total imports 
of merchandise in the same period increased from $l6.2 
billion to $2?.0 billion, or an increase of 68 percent. 
But the greatest increase of imports came in I966, 
because of the unusually large rate of growth in the 
domestic economy which sharply increased the demand 
for goods.
Exports of goods and services increased from 
$30.3 billion in I962 to $45.8 billion in 196?» Total 
imports of goods and services increased from $25.1 bil­
lion to $40.1 billion, or an increase of 60 percent 
against a 50 percent increase in exports. In absolute 
terms, the United States had an increase of $15»5 bil­
lion in exports and $15»0 billion in imports; so the 
trade surplus was larger in I966 than I962.
The main reason for the increased surplus in the
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services account during this period was the increasing 
returns of direct investment which rose from $3.1 bil­
lion in 1962 to $4,5 billion in I967, an increase of 
approximately 50 percent. All other income on the ser­
vice account is more or less offset by the expenditures 
on travel (Table 4 ).
The surplus in the balance of trade rose sharply 
in the years 1962-64, then dropped to a lower level in 
the years I965-67. The drop in surplus was primarily 
for two reasons: (1 ) a sharp increase in imports caused
by the rapid economic expansion and great pressure on 
domestic resources; (2) the increase in the cost of the 
war in Viet Nam. Trade surpluses reached a peak of 
$8.5 billion in 1964, but declined to $4.8 billion in 
1967 (Table 4).
Total merchandise imports as a percent of gross 
national product between I962 and 1964 was less than 
3 percent, but it rose to 3»2 percent in I963, 3.5 per­
cent in 1966, and 3-9 percent in I967. Total imports of 
merchandise in 1964 was $l8.6 billion, and by I967 the 
total was $27 billion, an increase of $8.4 billion, or 
approximately 45 percent. Total exports of merchandise 
in 1964 was $25.3 billion and in I967 it rose to $30.5 
billion, an increase of $5.1 billion or approximately 
20 percent (Table 4). The composition of imports changed 
in the period 1965-67 due to the rapid economic expansion





UNITED STATES BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1962-6? 
(billion U.S. dollars)
Type of Transaction 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
12. Special U.S. Gov. 
transactions^ 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
1 3 . 'Over-all liquid­ity" balance 2.2 - g_._z — 2.8 I ,-3 - 1.4 — 3.6
Plus : Foreign 
private liquid 
capital, net 0.2 0.7 1.6 0.1 2.4 1.6
Less : Increase in 
non-liquid liabili­
ties to foreign 
monetary authori­
ties 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.8 1.3
l4. Balance on of­
ficial settle­
ment 2.7 - 2,0 - . 1 ^ - IrA 0.2 - 3.4
Gold (decrease-) 0.9 0.5 0.1 1.7 0.6 1.2
Convertible cur­
rencies (de­
crease - ) - 0.1 — 0. 2 - 0.3 - 0.5 - 1.0
IMF gold tranche 
position 
(decrease - ) 0.6 0.3 — 0.1 0.5 - 0.1
Foreign monetary 
official claims 
(increase - ) 1.2 1.7 1.4 0.1 - 0.8 - 3.5
Sources: Economie Reports of the President, I965,
p. 164; 1966, p. 18I; 1968, p. 167. U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business, June I966, March I967, March 
I96Ô , Seiptember I968.
NOTE: Detail will not necessarily add to totals be­
cause of rounding.
^Excluding transfers under military grants.
2Includes non-scheduled repayments of U.S. Gov. loans 
and change in non-liquid U.S. Gov. liabilities.
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in the U.S. While in 1964 only about 3 percent of 
domestic capital requirement was imported, it increased 
to 9 percent in I963, and to over 12 percent in 1966.^ 
Analysis of the U.S. competitive position is a 
rather difficult task--data are usually ambiguous and 
incomplete. However, some broad concludions can be 
reached, especially when comparisons are made of inter­
national trends in labor costs per unit of output.
During the period I96O-65, the unit labor cost in manu­
facturing industries declined slightly, and in the econ­
omy as a whole increased very little--less than 0.5 per­
cent (Table 5)- In all of the larger European countries 
labor costs in manufacturing have risen, especially 
during the years I962-65 (Table 6 ). In the United 
States in I966, average wage settlements were sharply 
higher as compared with previous years, and the gain in 
productivity continued to increase as before. Therefore, 
the unit labor cost in the private economy rose by 3*6 
percent. This trend continued in I967, with labor unit 
costs increasing by 4.5 percent in the entire private 
sector and by 5 percent in manufacturing industries 
alone. Since mid-1965, the U.S. competitive position has 
ceased to improve and seems to have been deteriorating 
since I967.




CHANGES IN COMPENSATION, PRODUCTIVITY, AND UNIT 
LABOR COST IN THE PRIVATE ECONOMY, I96O-I967
Percentage Change per Year 
1961 to 1965 to 1966 to
1965 1966 1967
Total private:
Average hourly compensation 4.4 6.9 6.0Output per man-hour 3.8 3.1 1.4Unit labor cost 0.5 3.7 4.5
Private nonfarm
Average hourly compensation 4.0 6.0 5.8
Output per man-hour 3.5 2.6 0.9Unit labor cost 0.5 3.4 4.8
Manufacturing
Average hourly compensation 3.6 4.9 6.1Output per man-hour 4.6 2.2 0.9Unit labor cost -1.0 2.7 5.1
Source: Economic Report of the President, I968, p. 111.
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TABLE 6
UNIT LABOR COST IN MANUFACTURING--UNITED STATES 
AND MAJOR FOREIGN COMPETITORS 1
(1961 = 100)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 19672
United States 99 98 98 97 99 104
Canada 99 100 100 95 99 -----
France 107 112 118 119 116 —  —
Germany 107 111 111 117 123 --
Italy 108 118 124 122 118 ——
Japan 108 113 111 118 125 -----
United Kingdom 104 102 103 109 ll4 —  —
Sources: Economic Report of the President, I968,
p. 111.
U.S. Treasury Department, Maintaining the 
Strength of the United States Dollar in a 
Strong Free World Economy. Washington, D.C.,
1968, p. 65.
1 National Currency basis.
2 For 1967, data available only for the United 




The outflow of U.S. private capital increased 
during the period 1962-67» with total capital outflow 
for this period reaching $27.9 billion. Capital outflow 
fluctuated from a low of $3.4 billion in I962, to a high 
of $6.5 billion in 1964, and down to $5*5 billion in 
1967. The larger part of this capital outflow was 
long-term and direct investment which partially helped 
to increase U.S. exports. The other part was short­
term, liquid capital which was added to the growing 
private and official holdings of U.S. liquid assets of 
foreign countries. Some of these funds were exchanged 
for U.S. gold, but the rest of it continues to be a 
potential threat for this country's foreign reserves. 
Many economists and government officials main­
tain that the outflow of private capital is really 
larger than the given figures. These economists add 
the errors and ommission figures ($3.9 billion for the 
years I962-67) to the outflow of private capital. In 
1964 alone, this figure reached a peak of $1.2 billion.^ 
To reduce the amount of capital outflow, in 
July 1963 the Congress imposed an Interest Equalization 
Tax (IET) on foreign securities sold in the United States
Frederick L. Deming, The International Monetary 
Payment System. Department of the Treasury Press Release 
F-678, October 31, 1966 (Washington, D.C., I966).
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by the developed countries, other than Canada. The 
main purpose of this tax was to compensate for the 
interest rate differential between the United States 
and other countries by increasing the cost to borrowers 
from other industrialized countries when raising long­
term capital in the United States. This tax had the 
desired effect, and since I963, most of the foreign 
securities sold in the United States have been Canadian 
and those of developing countries. However, direct 
investment and bank lending abroad increased sharply 
in 1964 and I965 but leveled off in I966 after the 
voluntary program of restriction had been adopted by 
government and business (Table ?)•
Flows of capital into the United States also 
fluctuated widely between 1962 and 196?* There was an 
increase from #1J1 billion in 1962 to #1.9 billion in 
1964, then a Recline to #0.3 billion in 1965, and a 
sharp increase to #4.1 billion in I966 (Table 8 ). A 
marked difference exists between the periods I962-65 and 
1966 through 1967» Prior to I966, inflow of long-term 
capital was relatively low, and it increased sharply 
in 1966 and I967. Partially responsible for the increase 
were the large foreign purchases of U.S. securities 
which were sold abroad by American corporations for 
their domestic subsidiaries for the purpose of financing 
direct investment in other nations. The other account
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TABLE 7
TRANSACTION IN U.S. PRIVATE ASSETS ABROAD 
(million U.S. dollars)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Total U.S. Pri­
vate Foreign 
Investment -3,430 -4.456 -6 ,_5̂ _ -j_:Z92 -4,213 -5 ,5P4
Direct invest 


























































Sources; U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Cur- 
rent Business June I966, pp. 24-2$; March 
1966, p. 19; September I968, p. 31.




TRANSACTION IN FOREIGN ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
EXCLUDING U.S. RESERVES LIABILITIES 
TO FOREIGN OFFICIAL AGENCIES 1
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Foreign Assets in the 
U.S. Excluding U.S.
Reserves Liabilities I.080 1,315 1.936 309 4.094 3.253
Non-liquid foreign 
assets (escept
reserves) 2iZ 696 382 1?8 1,710 1,803
Direct investment 132 - 5 - 5 57 86 153
U.S. securities 
other than Treas­
ury issues 134 282 - 84 -357 909 994
Long-term U.S. lia­
bilities reported
by banks 5 62 237 203 976 965
Other liabilities 
reported by U.S. 
private residents





ties 864 386 463 197 67 451
Less: Non-liquid U.S. 
liabilities to 
foreign offi­
cial agencies 254 - 7 303 100 802 1,274
Liquid foreign assets
(except reserves) 313 619 1,554 131 2.384 1,451
Held by:
Foreign commercial
banks -I38 470 1,454 I16 2,697 1,265
Other foreign resi­
dents 140 385 343 306 212 394
International Organ. 211 - 236 - 243 -291 - 525 - 208
Sources : U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Cur­
rent Business, June I966, pp. 24, 30; March 
1968, pp. 23, 25; September I968, pp. 31» 
33.
1 Minus signs indicate outflows; positive figures 
represent inflows.
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which increased sharply was the long-term U.S. liabili­
ties reported by banks. This development was due to the 
high interest rate that prevailed in I966, of which many 
international organizations took advantage by purchasing 
time deposit certificates and other time deposits as 
temporary investments of funds.
The tight monetary condition in the United 
States in I966 also was reflected in the movement of 
U.S. liquid liabilities held by foreigners. This condi­
tion resulted in a shift of liquid U.S. assets from 
foreign official agencies (especially Britain) to foreign 
commercial banks (mainly foreign branches of U.S. banks) 
and then transferred for lending in the United States 
(Table ?).
Government Accounts 
Government accounts consist mostly of net mili­
tary expenditures abroad and foreign aid programs.
Foreign aid is divided into two parts : military assist­
ance and economic assistance.
Military expenditures abroad are intended pri­
marily to maintain U.S. military establishments in NATO, 
Japan, and Southeast Asia. Net expenditures overseas on 
these military commitments in the years I962-67 amounted 
to $l4.8 billion (Table 9 ). Gross military expenditures 
are higher, but they have been reduced by receipts from
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TABLE 9
UNITED STATES MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND RECEIPTS 
OVERSEAS, ENTERING BALANCE OF PAYMENT ACCOUNTS 
BY AREA, 1962-1967
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Total Expenditures, net 2.2 2.1 2.1
Expenditure by Areas, gross 3.0 2 ^ 2.8 li2 iLil
Western Europe 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6Canada —  — 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2Japan 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5Other, Asia and Africa 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.3 1.8All other —  — 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
Less: Military Sales OiZ 0^2 0^2 0.8 0.8 LiA
Western Europe 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.9Other 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3
Sources; Federal Reserve Bulletin. April I967, P»
525.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Cur­
rent Business. June 1966, pp. 25> 36-38; 
March I968, pp. 30-32.
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military sales. These expenditures directly affect 
the U.S. balance of payments because these funds are 
transferred to residents and governments of foreign 
countries. The amount of military expenditures during 
this period exceeded the deficit in the balance of pay­
ments on liquidity or official settlement basis.
Military expenditures abroad between 1962 and 
1966 would have been much higher if special efforts 
had not been made by the U.S. Government to purchase 
large quantities of American goods instead of lower cost 
foreign goods for military use; also, the NATO allies 
were persuaded to buy more American-made hardware. How­
ever , the war in Viet Nam increased considerably the 
U.S. purchases of foreign goods and services in Asia. 
Another factor that lowered the net governmental out­
flow of capital was the agreement reached with the gov­
ernments of France, Italy, and Germany to repày, ahead 
of schedule, loans owed to the United States.
Under the economic foreign aid programs gross 
government grants and loans amounted to approximately 
$24.5 billion from I962 to I967, including shipments 
under the Food for Peace Project. All but $2.0 billion 
of the foreign aid program was tied to purchases of 
goods in the United States or was for Food for Peace 
shipments and thus did not affect the balance of pay­
ments adversely.
kk
In addition to economic aid, about #9«5 billion 
was given as military grants. However, these grants were 
given in the form of goods and services and did not 
involve any outflow of dollars.
Total U.S. foreign assistance (economic and 
military) in this period averaged $5.6 billion a year, 
and of this figure only $0.6 billion involved dollar 
outflow. An additional sum of $0.5 billion annually 
went abroad for pensions and other transfers (Table 10).
Overseas military expenditures by the United 
States were the principal cause of the U.S. Government 
dollar outflow, with about two-thirds of the total out­
flow being spent for military commitments around the 
world. For the period under discussion, these expenditures 
amounted to $l4.5 billion, or $2.4 billion annually.
Total outflow of dollars on government accounts 
averaged $2.7 billion annually. For the years 1962-65, 
the sum was $2.4 billion a year; for I966 and I967, it 
was $3.4 billion a year (Table lO).
The annual deficit on the regular transaction 
basis for the years 1962-67 averaged $2.9 billion.
During this period U.S. Government transactions induced 
an outflow of $2.7 billion annually, or slightly more 
than 90 percent of the deficit.
TABLE 10
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ABROAD, 1962-6?
(million U.S. dollars)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
I. Military Expenditures,
net 2,304 2 ,2?9 2,08? 2,115 2,906 3,100
A. Military expendi­
ture 2,961 2,936 2,834 2,945 3,735 4,340
B. Military sales
contract - 657 - 657 - 74? - 830 - 829 -l,24o
Military Grants of 
Goods and Services 1,539 1,562 1 ,340 1,628 1,002 905
Government Grants,
Capital, and other
Transfers. net 3,108 ltl.92 4 ,039 ?,92.8 4,093 5x1.22A. U.S. Government
grants 1,919 1,917 1 ,886 1 ,800 1,915 1,800B, Long-term loans 2,007 2,187 2,358 2 ,493 2,602 3,544C. Loans in foreign
currencies and
short-term assets 245 44l 19 - 16 265 153D. Pensions and other
transfers 349 4l4 482 584 582 667E. Interest payment.
net - 132 97 - 3 - 21 44 — 26F. Repayments on
credits -1,280 -1,070 - 703 - 902 -1,227 - 981Scheduled (- 599) (- 644) (- 580) (- 681) (- 799) (- 975)Non-scheduled (- 681) (- 326) (- 123) (- 221) (- 428) (- 6)
VJI
TABLE 10 (continued)
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ABROAD, 1962-67
(million U.S. dollars)
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
IV. Total Government 
Expenditures, net
(l - II - III) 6.951 7.633 7.466 7.681 8.001 9.164
V. Estimate Transactions 
Involving No Direct 
Dollars Outflow from
the United States 4.788 5,299 4.918 5.197 4.876 5.366
A. Military grants 1,539 1,562 1,340 1,628 1,002 905
B. Grants and capital 3,249 3,737 3,578 3,569 3,874 4,46l
Net Outflow of Dollars on 
Government Accounts
(IV - V) 2,163 2,334 2,548 2,484 3,125 3,798
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, June
1966, pp. 28, 29, 33; March I967, pp. 19, 23; March I969, 
pp. 30, 37.
International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payment Yearbook.
Vol. A, Washington, B.C. (U.S. , pp. 1  ̂ 4 , 5).
CHAPTER III 
ADJUSTMENTS IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
The classical method of adjusting the balance of 
payments is to cause a decline in income, costs, wage 
rates, and prices in the deficit country in relation to 
the surplus countries. Such a change in relative prices 
and costs can be brought about by a change in the exchange 
rate of the currency of the deficit country relative to 
the currencies of the surplus countries, or by real 
changes of money income, prices, wages, and costs.
Under the gold standard, these changes came auto­
matically as a result of gold flows between countries. 
Today, when no countries are on the gold standard, the 
changes of income, interest rates, prices, and costs 
are much more difficult. The rigidity of downward move­
ments of wages and prices and the commitment of the dif­
ferent governments to keep their nations at full employ- 
ment--as nearly as possible— makes the automatic process 
of adjustment unworkable. When a country has a deficit 
it can, to some extent, persuing the proper policies, 




In today's world, when most countries experience 
some inflation each year, if a deficit country can keep 
its costs and prices stable or keep them rising at a 
lower rate than those of the surplus countries, the 
deficit country will improve its competitive position 
and its balance of payments situation. Also the com­
petitive position improves when wages increase less than 
productivity so that prices remain stable.^
Some types of disturbances or disequilibrium 
require different kinds of adjustment than others.
The most dangerous imbalance for a country develops 
when the "basic balance" is persistently and substan­
tially in deficit. Equilibrium in a basic balance can 
be defindd as a situation where "total receipts at a 
given rate of exchange are equal to total payments on 
the current, unilateral transfer and long-term capital 
movement accounts."
The persistent structural disequilibrium in the 
balance usually is caused by real changes in supply or 
demand conditions affecting the international economic 
position of the country. Some of the many reasons why
International Monetary Arrangements : The Prob­
lem of Choice, Report on the Deliberation of an Inter­
national Study Group of 32 Economists, International 
Finance Section (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University 
Press, 1964), p. 25.
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a nation finds itself in such a position are; destruct­
ion of resources during a war; changes in taste by other 
countries toward a specific commodity; technological 
advancement that replaces a major export commodity of a 
country; or any other change in the comparative advan­
tages of the country. This type of disturbance cannot 
be financed by limited reserves over a long period and 
requires a major adjustment which will reallocate resources 
or change the price and cost structure of the country.
The typo of adjustment which the country can make will 
be discussed later in this chapter.
The second type of disturbance may result from 
an excess of monetary expansion and price increases in 
one country in relation to other countries. Such a 
development will bring about two results: (1) demand
for imports in the country will increase because t^ey 
are now relatively cheaper; (2) exports from the country 
will decrease because they are more expensive.
At present, when all currencies are "pegged," 
this type of disturbance will persist until the country 
makes a major adjustment, such as a change in exchange 
rates (devaluation), or a restraint of monetary expan­
sion. The kind of adjustment that should be made will 
depend upon the size of the deficit, the reserve posi­
tion of the country, and its ability to secure inter­
national credits.
^0
A third type of disturbance is the "temporary" 
disturbance, which is caused by unexpected events and 
which often may be eliminated after a short period. 
Examples of such events are crop failure in a particu­
lar year, minor adjustments in production capacity, out­
flow of short-term capital because of different interest 
rates, and cyclical recessions. This type of disequi_ 
librium needs no special adjustment, such as changing 
relative costs or exchange rates, and could be financed 
from reserves or short-term loans.^
There is a fourth type of disturbance which is 
somewhat different from the others; it is the easiest to 
eliminate by economic measures but is difficult to cope 
with from the political viewpoint.
For the last fifteen years, this type of dis­
turbance has been characteristic of the United States, 
which has had a large surplus on its current accounts 
but has sustained a deficit caused by outflow of private 
long- and short-term capital and government expenditures 
abroad for military commitments and political objectives.
The weakness in the U.S. balance of payments 
during the last few years has not been a structural weak­
ness in the trade balance nor in the balance of goods and 
services. The country had a strong competitive position
^International Monetary Arrangements; The Prob­
lem of Choice, pp. 43-44.
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with a surplus on the trade accounts, and unit labor 
cost increases were lower than in most industrial 
countries. The deficit was caused, as mentioned earlier, 
mainly because of large defense commitments and military 
expenditures which, from a strictly economic point of 
view, were unnecessary but politically were a must. 
Government foreign assistance programs (economic and 
military) were largely "tied" and did not adversely 
affect the balance of payments. Private capital outflows 
in the long run are necessary and productive; they 
supply needed capital, technology, and know how to other 
countries and earn foreign exchange which improves the 
balance of payments position of the host and investor 
countries.
Any adjustment requiring restrictions on mili­
tary expenditures would be politically inadvisable for 
the near future, and restriction on capital movement is 
a short-term solution when a long-term solution may be 
vitally needed. Together with these two factors, any 
change in income levels or interest rates, may not be 
in the best interest of the domestic economy or of a full 
employment and growth policy. Such a disturbance creates 
the difficult task of combining international economic 
and political goals.
It is clear that today an automatic adjustment 
process seldom takes place. Governments must develop
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effective policies for restoring any necessary equilibrium 
in their external balances. Yet, in developing such 
policies, political or economic obstacles may arise.
Because of political factors, many deficit coun­
tries do not take the appropriate measures or take only 
partial measures to correct imbalances. Policies that 
are deflationary in nature are always unpopular, and 
only when there is a national crisis are these measures 
taken.
Surplus countries, in many cases, do not take 
appropriate measures to correct any imbalance that cre­
ates a surplus. The need for action is not immediately 
imperative, and they can be more discriminating in their 
choice of policies. Such countries would prefer that the 
deficit nations take deflationary actions rather than 
institute more inflationary courses of action themselves. 
Their policies tend to be those which are the most tol­
erable politically. For the deficit nations, regardless 
of political acceptability, international reserves will 
one day be depleted (even with new reserves creation), 
and the needed adjustments eventually will have to be 
made.
The difficulty faced when economic measures 
must be taken is that improvement of external balances 
may work contrary to domestic economic goals. In the 
case of a country having a deficit in the balance of
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payments linked to excessive domestic demand and infla­
tionary pressures, the choice of policy would be rela­
tively easy; a single policy could reduce domestic 
demand and correct the external deficit. The situation 
is much more complex in a country which faces unemploy­
ment and a lack in demand, together with a deficit, or 
in a country which has an inflationary pressure with a 
surplus in the balance of payments. In such cases the 
goals of the domestic economy have definite priority, 
and no country is willing to take action that will sacri­
fice domestic goals. No one argues that such a stand 
is unreasonable; nevertheless, there is a problem of 
imbalance in the external accounts, and some adjustment 
must be made to correct it, however painful it may be.^
The report by Working Party No. 3 of the Economic 
Policy Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooper­
ation and Development concerning the balance of payments 
adjustment process which was published in August of I966, 
recognized the aforementioned problem as well as the 
difficulties of governments in adopting policies that 
are consistent on both the international and domestic 
levels and that at the same time are satisfactory to other 
governments of the world. The report stated:
Milton Gilbert, Problems of International Mone­
tary Systems, International Finance Section, No. 53 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, I966),
p. 6 .
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In concluding its report the Working Party would 
wish to stress once again the inherent difficulties 
faced by governments in managing their economies in 
ways both satisfactory to their own countries and 
consistent with the aims of their neighbours. These 
difficulties spring from the imperfections of fore­
sight and of the instruments at governments' disposal 
and from the complexity of the objectives of modern 
economic policy.
Nevertheless, there is equally clear scope for 
improving on past performance; and the ways in which 
the Working Party believes this might be done have 
been outlined in this report. Continued progress 
is required on several fronts, in particular: clearer
formulation of balance of payments aims; early identi­
fication and better diagnosis of payments problems; 
enlargement and increased selectivity in the instru­
ments of economic policy; more timely action to cor­
rect inappropriate demand levels, competitive posi­
tions, and capital flows ; and a further strengthening 
of the process of international consultations. More 
fundamentally, it requires a common will on the part 
of the co-operating national authorities to give 
proper weight to the need to maintain or restore 
equilibrium in the external accounts of their coun­
tries. It is the belief of the Working Party that 
governments, by agreeing to take part in consulta­
tion procedures indicated in this report, will be 
able materially to improve the effectiveness of the 
balance of payments^adjustment process as it applies 
to their countries.
Different measures of adjustment should be taken 
when different international monetary systems exist. This 
study concentrates mainly on the present system where 
all currency rates are "pegged" in relation to gold and 
dollars--the international money--and to a lesser extent, 
the English pound.
A country may adjust its balance of payments
Working Party No. 3, The Balance of Payments 
Adjustment Process, Organization for Economic Co-opera­
tion and Development, August I966, p. 29.
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disequilibrium in five general ways: (1) changing the
interest rates; (2) changing the rate of exchange;
(3 ) change in income levels; (4) changes in the price 
level; and, (5 ) combinations of the first four adjust­
ments or parts of them. All of these possibilities are 
workable in a country where market forces can operate 
freely and where no excessive government restrictions 
or controls exist.
Changes in exchange rates are also a question 
of governmental policy and international agreement.
Under the International Monetary Fund agreement the rate 
of exchange is "pegged" and not allowed to fluctuate 
more than 1 percent below or above the fixed rate. Any 
change of consequences must have the approval of the 
Fund authorities. The new "pegged" rate usually will 
be established where, it is hoped, the country ultimately 
will have an external equilibrium that is consistent 
with domestic goals.
Changes in income and price levels will not come 
about automatically but will be developed by the govern­
ment in order to make an adjustment in external equilibrium. 
The nature of the steps taken depends mainly on the level 
of employment in the couhtry as well as on its rate of 
growth. Generally, it is understood that a deficit nation 
should take deflationary steps in order to import less 
and to be more competitive in the world market so that
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exports will increase. Surplus countries should take 
expansionary or inflationary steps in order to increase 
imports and decrease their interest rates so that capi­
tal will flow to other countries. Today, a surplus 
country can have an equilibrium and serve the interna­
tional community best by encouraging the outflow of capi­
tal for investment in underdeveloped nations.
Most adjustment in the balance of payments in 
this complex world requires some kind of international 
cooperation. Each country contemplating any change in 
its course of action should be aware of the effects 
upon other nations. A surplus country is usually quite 
slow in taking steps to correct the situation, and in 
many cases, the steps taken are based only on national 
interests and domestic goals, without any consideration 
of the balance of payments.^
For the adjustment mechanism to be devised 
properly, it is first necessary to recognize the kind 
of disturbance that exists. If it is a temporary situ­
ation, no major adjustment is needed; short-term measures 
should be taken by the government instead. Exchange 
reserves or international loans may finance the country's 
external equilibrium for a short period. When distur- 
banced persists, major adjustments must be taken, such as:
Max J. Wasserman, Charles W. Hultmun, and Zsoldos 
Laszlo, International Finance (New York: Simmons-Board-
man Publishing Co.), p. 139»
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changing cost and price relationships between different 
goods, reallocation of resources, shifts of supply and 
demand for goods, or changes in exchange rates.
All types of adjustments should be initiated as 
quickly as possible after the disturbance occurs, and 
most should be completed in the shortest possible time. 
Attention should be given to minimizing the loss of 
income and employment, and the maintenance of economic 
growth. During the time that the adjustment takes place 
an adequate supply of foreign exchange should be avail­
able to the country from other countries or international 
2organizations.
2The studies made by the Group of 32 and Working
3Party No. 3 concerning the process of adjustment in 
the balance of payments brought up the complex character 
of present day adjustments. Most of today's governments 
are first of all committed to full employment, reasonable 
price stability, equal distribution of income, and 
acceptable growth rate. The governments of the more 
developed industrial countries also have international 
political commitments such as foreign aid, military
^International Monetary Arrangements; The Prob­
lem of Choice, p. 102.
2International Monetary Arrangements: The Prob­
lem of Choice, p. 102.
3The Balance of Payments Adjustment Process.
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expenditures, and free capital movement. Thus, govern­
ments must follow policies which will enable them to 
achieve most of the aforementioned objectives. The 
theory that any restrictions on current account trans­
actions are undesirable and should be eliminated is 
widely accepted. In fact, any restrictions on inter­
national commerce should be short-term devices and should 
be short lived. The process of adjustment by governments 
in both surplus and deficit nations should be carried 
out by fiscal and monetary policies that indirectly 
will influence prices and income; the only influence 
by government ôn.trade should be through general poli­
cies rather than specific restrictions.^
All suggestions that have been made by the Council 
2of Economic Advisors and special study groups can be 
summarized in this way: (l) All countries should clearly
spell out their balance of payments aims, trying to 
adopt policies of mutual benefit to their own countries 
and to the world economy. (2) The responsibility of 
adjustment should be shared by both surplus and deficit 
countries. (3) Countries should use a wide range of 
policies, both general and specific. They also should 
place a large emphasis on fiscal policies and a lesser
^Frederic L. Deming, The International Monetary 
Payment System, p. 11.
2Economic Report of the President, 1966, p. 152.
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emphasis on monetary policies in order to achieve 
internal economic balance because direct influence on 
international transactions is greater when a monetary 
policy is followed. (4) The proper policy and combina­
tion of policies depend on the particular situation of 
each country, and no one policy can be appropriate for 
all. (5 ) All countries should take into account the 
impact of their policies on other countries. There is 
a need for consultation between countries when monetary 
policies are used, especially when changes of interest 
rates are involved.^
Short- and Long-Term Approaches 
in the United States
Short-term Adjustments 
Short-term devices should be used only to control 
a deficit during a special period of disturbance or to 
hold out until long-term adjustments have been effected. 
In the United States it has been recognized that the 
deficit in the balance of payments is a problem which 
must be solved and that it can be solved only through 
effective long-term measures. The solution to the prob­
lem requires cooperation of government, private industry, 
and other nations.
^Economic Report of the President, January I967,
p. 187.
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*1In general, restrictions on trade accounts 
should be avoided* If such restrictions on trade are 
imposed, they must be approved by the International 
Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), Where such measures are unavoidable, 
they should be temporary and used only in specific situ­
ations where quick results are essential. At the same 
time long-range measures to correct the situation should 
be taken.
Imposing restrictions on the service accounts is 
a more widely used practice than is imposing restrictions 
on other accounts. Many nations impose restrictions on 
traveling abroad or on the amount of earnings which 
foreign companies can take out of the country. Restric­
tions on repatriated earnings may be justified more 
often in underdeveloped countries, but even then such 
restrictions should be removed as soon as possible.
In principle, it is agreed that a high degree 
of freedom of capital movement is desirable, but the 
majority of countries realize that in the event of 
balance of payment trouble restrictions on capital 
movement are justified. Such restrictions need not 
always be direct but may be applied through monetary 
and fiscal policies. In the United States short-term 
measures to correct a deficit are concentrated most often 
on private and government capital accounts.
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Emphasis should be made again that the United 
States is using short-term, temporary measures as hold­
ing operations to keep its deficit under control during 
the period of special commitment in Southeast Asia and 
during the period required to realize the benefits of 
its long-term program.^
United States Short-term Program 
In the early 1960's the U.S. Government initi­
ated a program to eliminate the deficit in the balance 
of payments. In a message to Congress in I961, Presi­
dent Kennedy requested and Congress approved: reduction
of duty-free allowances, reduction of government expendi­
tures abroad, a study of tax laws to ascertain whether 
capital outflows were a result of attempt to avoid pay­
ing taxes in the United States, and other various measures 
One measure taken by the United States to prevent 
a higher deficit in the balance of payment during the 
period under study was the imposition of the Interest 
Equalization Tax (lET)^ in mid-1963- This tax came 
after a sharp increase in the issue of new foreign 
long-term securities in the United States and the pur­
chase of foreign securities abroad by U.S. citizens.
Joseph W. Barr, Remarks on International Coop­
eration. Treasury Department, F-99^, April 20, 1965 
(!Washington, D.C., I965), p. 4.
2A more detailed explanation of the IET can be 
found on pages 71-72.
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There is some explanation for this increase in capital 
outflow. The U.S. economy usually generates a large 
volume of savings, sustains low interest rates, and 
has very efficiently organized capital. In Europe the 
capital market is small and not very efficient. Besides, 
the European governments rely more on monetary policies 
to fight inflation, causing higher interest rates which 
in turn drive many European companies to borrow more 
easily and less expensively in the American market.
The interest equalization tax increases the interest 
rate paid by the borrower, but does not add income to 
the lender. Thus, the tax makes it more expensive to 
borrow in the United States and more or less equalizes 
the rate of interest between the United States an'd Europe.
After the JET had become effective, the sale of 
foreign new securities in the United States declined, 
but other kinds of capital outflow increased, especially 
bank lending. Bank loans increased from $1.5 billion 
in 1963 to $2,5 billion in 1964. In February I965, most 
bank loans for more than one year to borrowers in devel­
oped countries were made subject to the lET.
The lET helped to eliminate part of the capital 
outflow from financial institutions in the United States. 
However, all banks and financial institutions were asked 
to observe appropriate "guide-lines" in connection with 
their foreign operations in order to restrain some of the
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short-term loans. This program was to be coordinated 
by the Federal Reserve System and called for monetary 
cooperation. The guide-lines suggested that total out­
standing loans to foreigners should increase by no more 
than 5 percent in I965 over what they had been in 1964. 
Priority for loans was to be given to export credits 
and loans to underdeveloped countries. Banks were also 
requested not to increase their holdings of deposits 
abroad and to attempt to reduce them. Most of the 
banks recognized the importance of the program and coop­
erated to the fullest extent, knowing that the alterna­
tive to cooperation might be mandatory controls or even 
a possible collapse cf the international monetary system.
The other short-term measure which caused a 
great deal of controversy was the voluntary program 
initiated to reduce direct investment outflow. This 
voluntary program was executed by a group of American 
companies and the Department of Commerce. This restraint 
of investment abroad applied to all developed countries 
with the exception of Canada. The goals, desirability, 
and success of the program will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter 4.
United States Long-term Program
In the long run the equilibrium in the U.S. 
balance of payments will be influenced by various factors.
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such as the increase in productivity, stability of prices, 
technological progress, and the rate of growth. The same 
developments in other countries will also affect the U.S. 
balance of payments. The economy of the United States 
must have such an advantage in competitive position that 
its exports and earnings on past investment will be suf­
ficient to finance new investment, payments for military 
expenditures, military and economic aid, and imports.
As discussed earlier, all the short-term adjust­
ments were aimed at holding the U.S. deficit temporarily 
in balance until long-range measures could be effected.
Any long-term adjustments, of course, cannot yield results 
quickly. The long-term balance of payments objective of 
the United States is to reach and sustain the degree of 
equilibrium necessary to preserve confidence in the 
stability of the dollar as a transaction and reserve 
currency.^
A long-range program must be based on the con­
tinuation of an open and competitive market and on 
international cooperation. No restrictions should be 
imposed in the long run which might be damaging to the 
increase in trade or to the development of other countries. 
The United States is the leading economic power of the
Speech by Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the 
Treasury, Treasury Department, F-84?, March 17, 1967, 
Washington, D.C., p. 10.
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world and has a substantial advantage in technology and 
management skills. Many of these factors can be trans­
ferred to other countries only through the export of 
capital--both private and governmental. The United 
States also has an efficient capital market which can 
supply the capital needs of other nations, especially 
those that are underdeveloped. However, it must take 
into account policitical and military necessities which 
require large expenditures for the defense of the free 
world. The cooperation of other countries is needed 
for the success of this program: Since it is a respon­
sibility of the surplus industrial countries to help the 
United States, they should share in the expenditure for 
mutual security, growth of underdeveloped countries, and 
the stability of the current international system.
Specific steps to implement this program have 
been taken during the last few years, with the main 
emphasis on increasing exports. Relative prices and 
cost stability are preconditions, and a better use of 
economic resources and an increase in productivity are 
also determining factors. The Commerce Department inten­
sified its promotional efforts by opening special U.S. 
trade missions in many countries and by furnishing infor­
mation to American businessmen concerning the supplies 
needed. The United States takes an active part in com­
mercial trade fairs where large numbers of people are
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able to see what this nation can offer them. Special 
studies are being made on the potential growth of foreign 
markets and the share of these markets that U.S. exports 
can gain.
The Export Import Bank simplified its lending 
and discount procedures and increased the amount of 
loans and guarantees available to American exporters. 
AID-financed imports formerly were handled through the 
funds of the Export Import Bank; but now all the funds 
are available to private exporters, and AID uses addi­
tional funds.
Currently the U.S. Government has under review 
the relationship between exports and taxes in the United 
States and abroad. If the conclusion is reached that 
U.S. exporters are at a disadvantage, appropriate 
measures should be taken to correct this.
The United States, with its advanced technology 
and food surpluses, has a large market for agricultural 
products; new agreements with European countries (such 
as the Kennedy Round of negotiation to reduce tariffs 
on a list of various products) will increase agricultural 
exports. The demand for agricultural produce throughout 
the world is almest unlimited in relation to this coun­
try's capacity to produce, and the United States already 
is assuming its share of feeding many nations--a role 
that can be increased by commercial sales.
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Other long-term measures include the encourage­
ment of travel to the United States by foreigners.
This country has inexpensive facilities to accommodate 
large groups of tourists during the summer ; even uni­
versity dormitories could be filled with young foreign 
travelers. A special travel task force is currently 
working on this problem, and specific recommendations 
should be forthcoming soon.
The government is trying to encourage foreign 
nations to develop their own capital markets which in 
turn could supply their own necessary funds without 
such great dependence on the capital market of the 
United States. In the last few years American companies 
have begun to borrow more and more in the European 
markets and thus to increase the capacity of that mar­
ket. The Asian Development Bank is another example of 
this effort, whereby the industrial countries contributed 
a large share of the money and the underdeveloped coun­
tries of the region contributed part of it.
Increased income from direct investment abroad 
is a vital part of the long-term program to improve the 
U.S. balance of payments. The current voluntary program 
never tries to cut off the outflow of the investment 
overseas; it only tries to moderate the outflow to 
developed and oil-producing countries. American com­
panies should seek more profitable investments than in
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the past--more earnings should return home. In addition, 
one must remember that the U.S. military abroad are 
there to defend all Americans, including private busi­
nessmen, and, therefore, that the business community 
should carry part of this burden.
An effort should be made to sell more long-term 
securities abroad. The sale of corporate shares and 
bonds could be a very important export of this country.
The United States has the most developed stock exchange 
and capital market in the world, and it can arrange these 
transactions. Securities of the U.S. Government are a 
good, dependable investment which can be used as a part 
of the foreign exchange reserves of other countries and 
which, furthermore, will produce income on these reserves.
Some steps have been taken to reduce capital 
outflow from foreign aid and military expenditures.
Other governments have been asked to share part of the 
burden of military expenditures. Germany, among other 
nations, agreed to buy military hardware and long-term 
securities for equal amounts of U.S. military expendi­
tures in Germany. Foreign aid assistance is given by 
the export of goods and services rather than by the 
export of capital, and in the future more effort will 
be made to give assistance by teaching foreigners needed 
skills by bringing them to this country.
Some economists have suggested that a change in
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the international monetary system and an additional cre­
ation of reserves may solve our balance of payments 
problem. The U.S. official view is that a reform in 
the monetary system will not solve the problem of 
deficit but that only long-term, effective measures can 
do this. However, the creation of additional reserves 
would give this country the time to put such a long-term 
program into effect. (A more detailed discussion of 
this subject is persued in the next section.) In rela­
tion to this problem, the possible help of a reformed 
international monetary system to the balance of payment 
adjustment process brought out two opposing points of 
view, one from the deficit countries and one from the 
surplus countries. The one that is characteristic of 
the deficit nations (mainly the United States and England) 
is that the balance of payment deficit usually can be 
corrected only over a long period of time, particularly 
when the surplus countries do not take any measures to 
assist them in the adjustment process. The deficit 
countries say that any measures which interfere with 
internal domestic goals are a wrong choice of priori­
ties and that any measure which leads to deflation and 
unemployment cannot be tolerated. These countries are 
reluctant to use any mandatory controls in trade or 
capital movements or a change in exchange rate. Thus, 
it can be seen why the process of adjustment seems to be
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a long-time process to them. When the process of adjust­
ment is a long one and deficits continue for some time, 
there Is a definite need for more borrowing facilities 
and international reserves.
The countries having surpluses in their balance 
of payments are taking the following view: All of this
argument about additional reserves is only an excuse 
for not promptly taking needed measures. The deficit 
countries must use more monetary and fiscal policies to 
put the adjustment process into action and not be over­
concerned with domestic priorities. Many of the surplus 
countries have already an inflationary pressure in their 
economy and do not want to increase this pressure, espe­
cially when the deficit countries do not take the needed 
corrective measures. They prefer that some of the defi­
cit countries put controls on the outflow of capital 
(mainly the United States) which may eliminate their 
deficit. Their conclusion is that international reserve 
creating facilities should be limited. If these facil­
ities are not limited, the surplus countries will con­
tinue to finance the deficit countries, and the latter 
will never erase their deficits.^
The United States, with a gross national product 
of over $750 billion should easily manage a trade surplus
^Milton Gilbert, Problems of International Mone­
tary Systems, p. 4.
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of 8 or 9 billion dollars a year. Consequently, it 
should be able to fulfill its commitments abroad and 
to supply the needed capital to underdeveloped coun­
tries without a deficit in the balance of payments.
In order to solve the problem the United States 
must continue to implement its long-range program, which 
is the only way of reaching an equilibrium in the balance 
of payments consistent with the goals set.
The Present International Monetarv System. Proposed
Plans for Its Improvement add Their Possible 
Effects on the U.S. Balance of Payments
During the past few years there has been growing 
dissatisfaction with the current international monetary 
system. Many economists assert the necessary--even 
urgent--need for reform, and several plans have been 
submitted by international monetary experts. Some of 
these proposals are radical, calling for the creation 
of a completely new system, while others are suggestions 
on how to improve the present system and add to inter­
national liquidity.
The present system is based on the International 
Monetary Fund which can lend foreign exchange to coun­
tries for a short period but does not have the power to 
create new reserves. The United States and Britain, as 
key currency countries, add to world reserve supplies 
by means of increasing their short-term liabilities.
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They are willing to increase their liabilities, and the 
central banks of other countries are willing to hold 
these reserves within some limits. Gold, as a source 
of increasing international reserves, has been declining 
in importance for the last few years. Private demand 
for hoarding, jewelry manufacture and industrial use 
increased in the last few years. Gold production was 
not large enough to supply these needs and official 
holdings of foreign exchange is replacing gold as inter­
national reserves. In I966, gold holdings of free world 
governments actually declined by #950 million, and in 
1967 they further declined by #1.4 billion. U.S. deficits 
are not automatically increasing world reserves as had 
been the case since the end of World War II. In I966, 
dollar holdings, as official reserves of other countries, 
actually decreased by #1.5 billion, when the surplus in 
the U.S. balance of payments, based on official settle­
ment, was only #0.2 billion. The main reason for this 
development has been the conversion of dollars into 
gold by foreign countries, notably Francé. France, by 
using her dollars to buy U.S. gold, is decreasing the 
reserves of the United States but at the same time is 
not increasing her own reserves, only changing their 
composition; and so total world reserves decline.
Many economists believe that liquidity is ade­
quate for the present but that a shortage will develop
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in the near future, since the supply of new gold avail­
able for addition to official reserves is already very 
small and the United States cannot continue indefinitely 
running deficits to supply dollars. As international 
trade volume increases, the need for reserves will be 
greater than the present system can supply.
The function of international reserves in the 
present system is to give the countries of the world 
the means to keep a stable exchange rate with the free­
dom to pursue their international and domestic economic 
goals.
International liquidity is needed for more than 
one reason. The most important and basic need is for 
a medium of exchange in international trade; if the world 
is to continue to have multilateral trade in increasing 
quantity, there must be enough liquidity to make it 
successful. The need for money in this case is the same 
as in domestic economy. When production and trade 
increase, the supply of money must increase to accom­
modate the increase in the volume of trade. In inter­
national trade a type of money acceptable to all is 
needed, as are gold and dollars at present.
The second purpose of international liquidity 
has already been mentioned: that governments should
hold reserves in order to keep their exchange rates 
stable and to provide breathing space in the event of
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difficulties in the balance of payments. These reserves 
must be sufficient for a short term while governments 
take other measures to restore balance of payments 
equilibrium.
An effective international monetary system 
must have a built-in mechanism for regular increases 
in reserves. As the volume of trade increases from 
year to year the system must supply additional liquidity. 
In summary, any new or reformed international monetary 
system will have these objectives:
Exert corrective discipline upon individual coun­
tries that are in sustained deficit or sustained 
surplus ; assume an ample supply of money and credit 
for the customary transactions among traders and 
banks throughout the world; provide the credit 
needed to cushion or avert unduly abrupt corrective 
changes; and maintain sufficient monetary reserves 
(including facilities for lending and borrowing them) 
to meet continuing growth of official requirements 
as. trade and payments expand within and aihong the 
countries of the world.^
The discussions about reforms in the international 
monetary system began in 1958» when most European coun­
tries returned to convertibility. In the years following 
World War II, most countries rebuilt their economies 
and any kind of help given by the United States was 
welcome. During the 1950*s, the dollar was of great 
strength with a massive backing of gold reserves. Most
^Robert V. Roosa, Monetarv Reform for the World 
Economy (New York: Harper and Rowe, Publishers, I965),
P • 13 •
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nations were more than willing to accept dollars in 
order to build up their economies and their reserves, 
and dollars, therefore, became a type of reserve along 
with gold. Since I96O, the situation has changed 
drastically. The United States has run larger deficits 
than European countries have needed to build their 
reserves with the result that their excess holdings of 
dollars have become a threat to the external stability 
of the dollar. Now it is clear that the dollar cannot 
continue to be the only increment to world liquidity 
besides gold and that somehow a new policy must be found. 
Any such arrangement must add to world liquidity as con­
ditions require, but the purpose of new reserves would 
not be to solve basic disturbances in the balance of 
payments of any nation. A prerequisite for the success 
of a new system is that the United States solve, by 
other means, its own balance of payments deficit.
A continuation of a deficit in the U.S. balance 
of payments without any change in policy may bring the 
present system to a state of collapse. A chain reaction 
could start, and only strict controls could stop it if 
the United States continues with deficits. Many private 
holders of dollars would try to dispose of them, and the 
U.S. Government would be forced to sell gold in order to 
keep the exchange rate of the dollar stable. But an 
increase in the sale of gold would make the ability of
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the United States to defend the dollar doubtful, and 
some governments would try to cash their dollars into 
gold. Thus, the United States wouXd have two choices. 
First, to increase the price of gold which would mean 
the devaluation of the dollar. Such a step would not 
solve the U.S. deficit problem but would only postpone 
it for a short period and would result in a loss of 
confidence in the United States by other countries.
The countries that would gain most are the gold-producing 
countries--Russia and South Africa. Countries that had 
faith in the United States and held dollars would be the 
ones to lose. All nations would follow the United States 
in devaluation with a possible period of world-wide com­
petitive devaluation in which no one would gain. The 
other choice would be to abandon the gold exchange stan­
dard, in which case the present monetary system would 
côllapse. The majority of the countries of the free 
world realize what the alternatives are unless a new 
workable arrangement is established soon, and they are 
cooperating in the search for an improved system.
Various Suggested Plans for Improvement 
Because of the numerous suggestions for improving 
the international monetary system, it is not possible to 
cover all of them in this paper. Some of these plans 
have been offered only in order to solve the existing or
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potential liquidity shortage; others include proposals 
for improving the mechanism for adjusting balance of 
payments disequilibrium. One thing is clear: Any
changes in the present system must take into accouht 
not only theoretical economic factors but also political 
implications and their acceptability to most countries 
through negotiation and compromise.
Basically there are two types of plans which 
currently are being considered and discussed the most; 
both of them use the price mechanism and market forces. 
One is based on the continuation of fixed exchange rates 
and the gold-exchange standard. The other is the "float­
ing" or "flexible" exchange rate. The pure flexible 
exchange system, if accepted, would solve the problem 
of international reserves as well as the problems of 
disturbances in the balance of payments. There is a 
third type of plan which combines the first two and is 
known, among other names, as the "crawling peg" and the 
"wider band." These last two plans make use of more 
flexible exchange rates but require the intervention of 
government in the market and the use of reserves.
Special Drawing Rights (SDR)
The creation of new international reserve assets, 
the Special Drawing Rights (SDR), was proposed by the 
staff of the International Monetary Fund aitid was approved
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at its annual meeting in I967 in Rio de Janeiro. In 
March I968, the Stockholm Conference of Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors of the ten major industrial 
nations reached an agreement on an amendment to the IMF 
articles which would make it possible to activate the 
plan after ratification by sixty-seven member countries 
which have at least 80 percent of voting power.
In the proposed Special Drawing Rights, inter­
national reserves would be created for the first time 
by a deliberate decision and not by the unpredictable 
supply of gold and balance of payments deficits of the 
key currency countries. Currently when nations make 
use of the facilities of the IMF and borrow convertible 
currencies, new reserves are being created. However, 
when these loans are repaid, international reserves 
are being destroyed. The creation of new international 
reserves according to the SDR plan would be based on 
the collective judgement of many countries and the 
global needs for new reserves.
The creation of SDR's will not solve persistent 
balance of payments deficits of any country, including 
the United States, but it will enable nations to utilize 
a longer period cf time in which they could take necessary 
steps, compatible with their domestic economic policy 
goals, to improve their balance of payments positions. 
Furthermore, creation of new reserves by this system
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would make it possible for all countries to increase 
their international reserves without causing other 
countries to lose part of their reserves.
Allocation of the SDR's would be made only to 
Fund member countries based in relation to their exist­
ing quotas. The decision as to the amount of reserves 
to be created and in what intervals they would be allo­
cated is left to the IMF with approval of 85 percent 
of the voting powers. The SDR's could be used uncon­
ditionally whenever a country had balance of payments 
problems or losses of reserves. However, surplus coun­
tries with a strong balance of payments position would 
be obligated, when designated, to accept SDR's in exchange 
for convertible currencies up to a point where their SDR 
holdings were equal to the amount of their allocated 
quota, plus twice that amount. No country could use 
its Special Drawing Rights to amounts higher than 70 
percent averaged over a period of five years. The value 
of Special Drawing Rights is fixed in terms of gold, 
and user countries would be required to pay a low interest 
rate on their drawings. Countries which are drawn upon 
would earn interest. The International Monetary Fund 
would maintain and operate the new facility.
The new reserve facility is being created for 
the purpose of making new liquidity available when needed 
and only indirectly would help countries with balance of
8o
payments problems. The SDR's are not intended, nor 
should they be expected, to solve the U.S. balance of 
payments deficit. On the contrary, this problem is cur­
rently the main barrier against activation of the pro­
posed plan. Some major countries have objections to 
the Special Drawing Rights as long as the U.S. payments 
deficit persists at the current level. Opponents and 
proponents of the SDR agree on one fact--that in no way 
would the new facility solve this deficit problem. Even 
if $10 billion were to be created in the first five 
years or $2 billion each year, the U.S. share of it 
would be somewhat less than $0.5 billion, hardly enough 
to cover the large deficits of the last few years. 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler made clear 
the position of the United States regarding the crea­
tion of new reserves and the U.S. balance of payments;
The idea that the United States looks for reserve 
creation as a means of solving balance of payments 
deficits . . .  ours or any other country's . . .  is 
false. The obvious fact is that such abuse of the 
new asset would quickly weaken, and soon destroy, 
its usefulness as a monetary reserve. It should be 
abundantly clear to all that we would not seek the 
means to create reserves only to destroy the useful­
ness of the new assets. . . .  the problem of arriv­
ing at a sustainable payments equilibrium position 
(in the United States balance of payments) now lies 
chiefly in the transition to long-term from short­
term measures for dealing with our foreign exchange 
balance.1
U.S., Treasury Department, A World Monetary 
System for a Greater Society of Nations, F-847, March 17, 
19^7 (Washington, D.C., 196?)•
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At the Annual Meeting of the International Monetary 
Fund in September 1969» the participating countries 
decided to allocate special drawing rights at a value of 
#9.5 billion over the period 1970-72--S3•5 billion in 
the first year and $3.0 billion in each of the following 
years. On January 2, 1970 the new scheme was activated 
and allocations were made to all of the participating 
countries that had ratified the agreement.
Flexible Exchange Rates
Economists gradually are accepting the fact that 
a flexible or floating exchange rate system would be the 
most appropriate system to lessen the conflict between 
domestic economic policies and balance of payments 
objectives. However, such a system involves a differ­
ent kind of economic cost which most government offi­
cials and international traders are not willing to 
accept. The chief cost would be the discouragement of 
international trade and investment because of the risk 
involved when exchange rates are fluctuating and 
unpredictable. Another important factor, advanced by 
opponents of a floating exchange rate, is the argument 
that an inflationary bias is built into such a system, 
when balance of payments restraints do not exist.
Finally, in the post World War II period international 
trade and investment were advanced rapidly and contributed
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to economic growth and prosperity. Thus, the current 
system, with minor adjustment, is preferable to that of 
the post World War I period when a flexible exchange 
rate system existed among the major European countries 
together with severe price inflation. This situation 
led to the establishment of the inconvertible paper 
money standard with exchange controls accompanied by 
competitive depreciation and commercial warfare. Of 
course, this policy was useful in preventing losses of 
foreign reserves, but it did little to correct the 
basic weaknesses in the balance of payments and it 
drastically reduced world trade.
Proponents of the flexible exchange rate system, 
on the other hand, argue that the current monetary sys­
tem has gone from one crisis to another during the 
past few years and that most of the advantages of this 
system are lost due to increased control and trade bar­
riers imposed on movement of goods and capital. Trade 
barriers, tariffs, quotas and border taxes presently 
imposed are more of a deterrent to an increase in world 
trade than is the possible loss which would be the result 
of risk involved in a fluctuating exchange rate. More­
over, the allocation of resources in the world would be 
more efficient if all controls were removed and a free 
exchange rate established.
A flexible exchange rate would enable governments
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•to carry out their domestic economic policies without 
sacrificing part of them because of balance of payments 
difficulties. In a country such as the United States 
where the foreign trade sector is only about 3 percent 
of GNP, balance of payments considerations should not 
carry much weight when the choice of proper domestic 
policies, compatible with full employment and economic 
growth, are to be made.
There is no empirical evidence or convincible 
theoretical argument which can prove that a flexible 
exchange rate system would reduce or hinder growth in 
international trade and investments. On the contrary, 
the additional cost would be small, except during a 
period of foreign exchange crisis and a large disequi­
librium in the balance of payments. However, the possi­
ble reduction in tariffs and other imposed controls 
existing today would reduce the costs of goods. In the 
case of tariff or trade barriers, the additional costs 
fall only on the consumer, not on the exporter; the 
additional costs of exchange rate risk fall on the 
exporter or importer, and only indirectly on the con­
sumer.^ Therefore, in the last analysis, the cost to 
the consumer would be almost the same under either system
Anthony Lanyi, The Case of Floating Exchange 
Rates Reconsidered. Essays in International Finance,
No. 72, February I969 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni­
versity Press, 1969), p. 4.
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of exchange rates. From the experiences of some coun­
tries in the 1950*s, it is quite clear that a system of 
free exchange rates would not affect to a large extent 
the flows of goods and capital investments. The exten­
sive investment of capital in Latin America by U.S. 
companies, especially in Brazil, is only one example. 
Another is a Canadian experience between 1950 and 1962, 
when, during that period of flexible exchange rates, the 
country's international trade doubled and direct invest­
ment by foreigners nearly tripled.^
In addition to the greater costs because of risk 
involved, the most important drawback to a flexible 
exchange system is the speculation in the foreign 
exchange market that may arise as a result of adopting 
such a system. The speculation may destabilize the 
exchange rates in many cases and cause them to fluctu­
ate widely even when the country's balance of payments 
position is essentially stable. In order to guard 
against such a possibility, some prominent economists 
recently have suggested the adoption of a new system 
which comprises both the current "pegged system" and 
the "fluctuating system." This is the "wide band" sys­
tem, or the modification of it--the "crawling peg" sys­
tem.
George W, McKenzie, "International Monetary 
Reform and the 'Crawling Peg,'" Review (Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, February I969), p. 22.
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The "Wide Band" System 
The need for greater flexibility in exchange 
rates led to the proposal of the "wide band" system, 
which would not basically change the present system but 
would merely increase the fluctuation margin from the 
current 1 percent to 4 or 5 percent on either side of 
parity. The central banks of all countries would be 
required to intervene in the foreign exchange market in 
case the exchange rates reached the outer limits as is 
the case today. Wider bands would also divide the cost 
of adjustment more equally between the deficit and sur­
plus countries. The wider the bands, the greater the 
risks and disadvantages of freely fluctuating rates, 
but also the greaterÜhe amount of balance of payments 
adjustment possibilities without affecting the domestic 
economy. Also it would reduce the amount of reserves 
needed to be held in order to finance short-term balance 
of payments disequilibrium. The Sub-committee on Inter­
national Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic 
Committee of the United States Congress^ and Dr. Fritz 
Machlup strongly advocate this system.
My prescription is for a widening of the margin of 
permissible deviations from par values--the so- 
called band proposal. Under the present rules of
U.S., Congress, Next Steps in International 
Monetarv Reform, Report of the Subcommittee on Inter­
national Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic 
Committee, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., I968.
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the Fund, deviations of exchange rates in the free 
markets are limited to 1 per cent of parity in each 
direction. The limitation ought to be changed to 
permit wider deviations, perhaps 5 per cent up and 
down. Variations of exchange rates of this order 
of magnitude would allow the adjustment mechanism 
to operate on the international flows of goods and 
services. No government would have to take unpopular 
action; supply and demand would be allowed to deter­
mine exchange rates within the fixed limits; and any 
variations within these limits would reverse them­
selves when conditions change.
The main disadvantage of this system is that
there is no provision for change if larger exchange
rate adjustments are needed. A modified system--the
"crawling peg" system--was proposed to eliminate this
problem.
"The Crawling Peg" System 
Under this system the changes of parity would be 
made in one of two ways, either discretionary or automatic, 
In the discretionary method the government would adjust 
its exchange rate up to a maximum limit of about one- 
half percent per month. This change could be repeated 
each month until the desired effects were attained; the 
timing of such changes would be left to individual gov­
ernmental discretion. The second plan, the "crawl," 
would be automatic and not under the control of any gov­
ernment. The daily parity of exchange rate would be the
Fritz Machlup, The Transfer Gap of the United 
States. Reprints in International Finance, No. 11, 
October I968 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1968), p. 238.
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average of exchange rates over a certain previous period 
of time.^ If the trend in the exchange rate of a coun­
try were up, so would be the parity rate crawl, and vice 
versa. This system is really an extention of the "wide 
band" proposal because "crawling peg" changes would be 
dependent upon the width of the band, or the different 
period of calculating the moving average. The "crawling 
peg" system would also ensure many opponents of a fluc­
tuating exchange rate system that runaway waves of com­
petitive depreciation would not occur. The advantages 
of such a system are summarized in an article by George 
W. McKenzie appearing in the Review of the St. Louis 
Federal Reserve Bank:
On the other hand, a system of crawling exchange 
rates renders monetary policy effective without capi­
tal controls. In fact, to assure that this is the 
case, it is necessary to reduce impediments to the 
free international flow of capital. Equally impor­
tant is that this system enables long run balance- 
of-payments adjustments through greater exchange 
rate flexibility. The increased flexibility does 
not mean instability, however, for the exchange rate 
will be free to vary, or "crawl," only within bounds 
predetermined by the IMF.
The last two systems--"wide band" and "crawling 
peg" systems--are the two which may be accepted by poli­
ticians. These systems, to some extent, contain part of
^George W. McKenzie, "International Monetary 
Reform and the 'Crawling Peg,'" Review, p. 20.
2George W. McKenzie, "International Monetary 
Reform and the 'Crawling Peg,'" Review, p. 23.
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the old "peg" concept together with a freely fluctuating 
rate within boundaries set by governments through the 
International Monetary Fund. The two systems would 
enable more freedom in pursuing domestic economic objec­
tives and in maintaining equilibrium in balance of pay­
ments for a longer period. The "crawling peg" system, 
in contrast to the "wide band" system, would allow for 
greater change in exchange rates over the long run and 
would move with the trends of balance of payments devel­
opments as a result of change in prices, imports, exports, 
and capital flows. This system of a "crawling peg" 
together with the activation of the Special Drawing Rights 
scheme seems to be the best answer to the balance of pay­
ments and liquidity problems existing in today's world.
^George W, McKenzie, "International Monetary 
Reform and the 'Crawling Peg,"' Review, p. 23.
CHAPTER IV
DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD AND THE VOLUNTARY PROGRAM
Various Capital Restriction Plans That Lead 
to the Voluntary Program
As discussed previously, the United States has
sustained balance of payments deficits since the years
immediately following the Second World War, but the
problem has become severe only during the 1960's. In
1961, when the largest U.S. payment deficit since the
war was recorded, the new Kennedy Administration launched
its initial attack on the problem. In his message of 
1February I96I, President Kennedy took the following 
steps to study and correct the situation;
1. Additional funds for the Export-Import Bank 
to finance exports.
2. Survey to increase farm exports.
3. Negotiation to reduce tariff and other bar­
riers on U.S. exports.
4. Programs to attract more tourists to the
U.S., Department of the Treasury, Maintaining 
the Strength of the United States Dollar in Strong Free 
World Economy, A 1968 Program Report (Washington. D.6.: 




5« Reduction of duty-free allowances for Ameri­
can tourists, from #500.00 to #100.00.
6. Tax law examination to prevent movement of 
American capital abroad as a means of tax 
avoidance.
7. Reduction of government expenditures abroad-- 
military and civilian.
8. Request for change in the Federal Reserve Act 
to permit payments of higher interest rates 
to foreign monetary authorities for special 
securities issued.
Despite the initiation of this program, the defi­
cit in the balance of payments on "regular" transactions 
came to #3.1 billion in I96I and #3*6 billion in 1962.
The largest increases in the outflow of capital in these 
years and in the first half of I963 were in new foreign 
securities flotations in the United States. They more 
than doubled between 196I and 1962, from #0.5 billion 
to #1,1 billion, and reached an annual rate of #1.9 
billion during the first half of I963. Private short­
term capital movement and errors and omissions (considered 
by many to be short-term capital movement) were also high 
at that time; they were #2.4 billion in I962 and #1.8 
billion in I963.
In order to cope with this development, President
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Kennedy advanced another program in hla message of July l8, 
1963*^ The main feature of the new program was the intro­
duction of the Interest Equalization Tax (lET), which, 
as originally proposed, raised by the equivalent of 1 
per cent per annum the cost to foreign industrial nations 
of borrowing in the United States. Canada and, to a 
leaser extent, Japan were exempt from this tax. The 
reason for imposing the tax was because the high level 
of interest rates abroad was causing many foreign com­
panies to borrow in the United States. The IET reduced 
the interest rate differential by increasing the cost of 
borrowing long-term (one year or more) capital in the 
United States. The tax exempted direct investment abroad 
and export credits to underdeveloped nations. The ori­
ginal law was to have expired on December 31» 1965» but 
was later extended to July 31, 196?» and then to July 3I, 
1969, with a new provision which gave the President dis­
cretion to alter the rates of the tax from zero to an 
annual rate of 1.5 percent.
Additional provisions of the program included an 
increase in the amount of aid given to foreign countries 
which was tied to expenditure in the United States; 
negotiation with allies for advance payment on military 
purchases, prepayment of debt by foreigners, and the sale 
to foreign monetary authorities of medium-term U.S.
^Ibid., p. 56.
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securities. In July I963* the Federal Reserve also took 
the important step of increasing its discount rate by
0.5 percent in order to cut down short-term capital out­
flow while maintaining adequate domestic credit.
The limited effects of the IET did not solve the 
problem of a continued deficit in the balance of payments. 
The increase in the IET did reduce sharply the flotation 
of foreign securities in the country in the second half 
of 1963, but the outflow of capital changed its form to 
a large increase in long-term bank credit to foreigners, 
from $100 million in I962 to over $700 million in I963, 
most of which came toward the end of the year.
Notwithstanding all the measures taken in 1963, 
the deficit on "regular" transactions was $3.3 million 
and that on "over-all liquidity" balance was $2.7 mil­
lion. Toward the end of I963 and at the beginning of 
1964, some of the measures taken by the Government seemed 
to be obtaining results. However, events changed for 
the worse during the second half of 1964, and even with 
the record surplus of $8.6 billion in the balance of trade, 
an unexpected outflow of private capital reached new heights 
and nullified the current account surplus. Total net out­
flow of private capital for 1964 was over $6.5 billion as 
compared to $4.5 billion in I963 and approximately $3.4 
billion in I962. In the last quarter of 1964 alone, it 
was $2.0 billion, or an average annual rate of $8 billion.
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Long-term investment accounted for $4.2 billion out of 
$6 billion net outflow in 1964. (Errors and omissions, 
which are primarily private capital outflow, accounted 
for an additional $1.1 billion in 1964.)
Most of the increase in private long-term capital 
outflows during these years was to Japan, Western Europe, 
and Canada (Table 11). (The major recipient of short­
term credit extended to foreigners by U.S. banks during 
this period was also Japan, who received over one-half 
of it.) This growth of U.S. private capital outflow is 
easily explained. One reason was the rapid growth of 
income in Western Europe, Canada, and Japan and their 
increased demand for manufactured goods. Other reasons 
were the development of the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
whereby internal tariff walls almost disappeared at the 
same time that external tariffs remained at the same 
level or higher; wages in these countries were lower 
than in the United States, and the rate of return on 
investments was much higher. Many companies invested in 
developing new sources of raw materials which were less 
costly than in the United States. Another important 
factor was the highly developed capital market in the 
United States and the availability of large funds with 
lower interest rates than in Europe which caused foreign 
borrowers to borrow in the United States and American
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TABLE 11
NET OUTFLOW OF UNITED STATES PRIVATE LONG-TERM
CAPITAL BY AREA, 1961- 1967




Abroad 2.6 ia 4̂ ia
Direct





rowed abroad) (1.6 ) (1.7) (2.0) (2.4) (3.4) (3.1) (2.8)
Other Long­
term 1.0 1.2 1.7 2.0 1.1 0.3 1.3
By Area :
Western
Europe 1.1 1.1 1.7 1.9 1.4 1.5 1.5
Canada 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.3
Latin
America 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6
Other 0.6 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.3 0.4 0.9
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Cur­
rent Business, June 1966, March 196?» and 
March 1968.
^ Excluding undistributed profits of subsidiaries.
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capital to move abroad in search of higher returns.
Again, it is important to note that the net addi­
tion to U.S. long-term assets abroad increased in 1963 
and 1964 more than the entire deficit--"over-all" or 
"regular type"--in the balance of payments. All other 
capital outflow, including foreign aid programs, mili­
tary expenditures abroad, and short-term capital move­
ments, were more than covered by the current account sur­
pluses, Thus, a conclusion may be reached which views 
the deficit during these years as an exchange of liquidity 
for long-term external assets.
The February 1965 and Subsequent Voluntary Programs
Description of the Program 
The unprecedented expansion of U.S. private capital 
outflow in the second half of 1964 and in early I965 
raised the deficit to a new level, and in order to achieve 
a substantial reduction in the U.S. deficit. President 
Johnson issued a new balance of payments program on 
February 10, 1965.^ This program was to be temporary in 
nature and was mainly to serve the purpose of (l) a psy­
chological effect in order to strengthen the dollar in 
the exchange market and increase the willingness of
U.S., Department of the Treasury, Maintaining 
the Strength of the United States Dollar in Strong Free 
World Economy, A 1968 Progress Report (Washington, D.C.: 
December 19^8j, p. I58.
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foreigners to hold it and (2) to "buy time" while other 
steps were being taken to bring the balance of payments 
into equilibrium. The United States was interested in 
reverting to a completely free capital market where 
capital outflow was allowed and d,esirable, but in the 
short run the Government felt that it must take these 
steps with the clear intention of minimizing any adverse 
effects on other countries, especially those who were 
dependent on U.S. capital or who had balance of payments 
difficulties of their own.
This program was different in one respect from 
previous government programs in that it was an arrange­
ment of voluntary restraints on all forms of investment 
and spending abroad by U.S. residents, particularly in 
the developed nations. Although it was voluntary and 
depended on the cooperation of business, it established 
a system of specific quotas for spending and targets for 
investment. As others before it, this program had special 
guidelines for banks, non-bank financial institutions, 
and business enterprises. In addition to the voluntary 
restraint, it added the application of the lET to bank 
loans over one year in maturity.
Before engaging in a detailed description, analy­
sis, and evaluation of the voluntary program section con­
cerned with direct investment abroad, it would be worth­
while to describe the other parts of the program.
97
The Guidelines for Banks^
The main objective of the restrictions outlined 
for U.S. banks by the Federal Reserve Board was to limit 
bank loans to foreigners to a maximum of 105 percent of 
the amount outstanding by the end of 1964. Banks which 
already had exceeded that amount were expected to cut it 
back to their target as soon as possible. Within the 
framework of the ceiling, the banks were requested to 
give priority to the financing of exports, loans to under­
developed countries, and insofar as possible, special con­
sideration to loans for Japan, England, and Canada. U.S. 
banks with branches abroad were to include any investment 
in those branches as part of their lending abroad. Branches 
of foreign banks in the United States also were requested 
to cooperate with the main spirit of the program.
2The Guidelines for Non-bank Financial Institutions
Non-bank financial institutions include insurance 
companies, mutual funds, commercial finance companies, 
investment firms, and charitable organizations. All 
these institutions with holdings exceeding $500,000 in 
foreign loans came under the special guidelines. In 
general, the guidelines were similar to those for the 
commercial banks but took into account any special
^Ibid., pp. 159-60. 
^Ibid., p. l60.
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peculiarities and differences of these institutions.
All liquid funds abroad were to be reduced to the 
smaller of the amounts which were outstanding at the 
end of 1963 or 1964. All investments or credits maturing 
within ten years from the date of acquisition could not 
expand by more than 5 percent over the amount at the end 
of 1964. Long-term securities (more than ten years) did 
not have any special ceilings, but the institutions were 
expected to follow the same priorities that were set forth 
for the commercial banks.
The Guidelines for Business Enterprises^
The direct investment guidelines were the most 
important par# of the voluntary program. Direct invest­
ment outflow reached #2.4 million in 1964 and #1.2 bil­
lion in the first quarter of I965.
With the announcement of the new program it 
was foreseen that changes in investment plans could not 
occur overnight. The Secretary of Commerce thus urged 
U.S. companies to curtail investments insofar as possi­
ble as well as to try to raise funds abroad as a means 
of financing a large share of such investments. The 
guidelines also called on the business community to 
increase its contributions to the balance of payments,
^U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business. March I965, p. 23.
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with specific requests being made to more than 600 chief 
executives of large corporations. Initially, the requests 
were for improvement of contributions to the balance of 
payments by 15-20 percent. Within the framework of the 
general guidelines, no specific mandates were made, 
and the individual companies were to achieve the goal at 
their own discretion. There was, however, an individual 
target with respect to repatriation of liquid assets 
abroad; liquid assets remaining abroad were no more than 
the amount outstanding at the end of 1963» Some "key" 
recommendations called for postponement of marginal 
projects in developed nations; more borrowing abroad to 
finance investment; expansion of exports; and accelera­
tion of repatriation of income from the developed nations. 
Corporations were also asked to direct their investments 
to underdeveloped nations rather than to industrial 
countries. In order to follow through on the program, 
the Secretary of Commerce requested all companies to 
provide reports on the following activities;
1. Exports to all countries.
2. Capital transactions with affiliates and other 
long-term capital movement in the developed 
countries.
3. Earnings on direct investment and other 
activities in the developed countries.
4. The balance of credit from the aforementioned
100
transactions in 1964 and estimates for 1965»
5» Short-term assets held abroad by the parent 
company and by the affiliates.
Parts of the program were modified by the end 
of 1965, and new targest were set for I966.
The Program in I965 
The results of the February I965 program were 
quick and decisive: The Government received favorable,
cooperative response from the financial community. An 
inflow of bank loans, repatriation of money market invest­
ment by U.S. enterprises, and other short-term capital 
inflow brought a balance of payments surplus of $247 mil­
lion in the second quarter of 1965» compared to the $701 
million deficit in the first quarter (over-all liquidity 
basis). The short-term capital inflow was largely respon­
sible for this improvement since it changed from a net 
outflow of $2.0 billion in 1964 to a net inflow of $0.9 
billion in 1965. These developments caused a reduction 
in the over-all liquidity” balance of payments deficit —  
from $2.8 billion to $1.3 billion in 1965» and based on 
the "official reserve transaction” the balance of payments 
deficit declined from $1.5 billion in 1964 to $1.3 billion 
in 1965.
The direct investment outflow, which represents 
the most important element of the plan, was the slowest
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to respond to the voluntary program. The companies that 
participated in the program (402 firms in I965) more 
than met their goal of 10 percent of increased earnings 
in net foreign exchange^ by reaching 12.2 percent 
(Table 12). However, the private sector's transactions 
in long-term foreign assets increased its deficit from 
#4.4 billion to #4.5 billion, and direct investment 
deficit increased from #-2.435 billion in 1964 to #3.366 
billion in I965 (excluding reinvestment of funds borrowed 
abroad) (Table 11).
Even with the reduction in the size of the defi­
cit to about one-half the size of the annual average in 
the last three years of the period, it remained a con­
siderable distance from the aim of payments equilibrium. 
On November I9, 1965, in a joint press conference with 
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Governor of the 
Federal Reserve, the Secretary of Commerce announced a 
new plan to reorganize the direct investment guidelines 
without disruptive and expensive consequences and urged 
intensification of the business community’s efforts to 
improve its contribution to the balance of payments in
1966.
^U.S., Department of Commerce, Office of the 
Secretary, Press Release, May 11, I966.
TABLE 12
SUMMARY OF TRANSACTIONS REPORTED BY 402 COMPANIES PARTICIPATING IN THE 











































Countries 154 172 18 11.7 33 29 (4) -12.1 121 143 22 18.2
TABLE 12 (cont)
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(64) 2.7 (540) (836)(296) 54.8 (1 ,843) (1,611) 232 -12.6
372 n.a. 13 80 67 515.4 (16) 289 305 n.a.
Balance of 
Credits
(Actual) 11,160 12,525 1,365 12.2 2,179 2,450 271 12.4 8,981 10,075 1,094 12.2
*Except for exports which are to all countries, the data reflect transactions with the fol­
lowing countries only: Australia, Austria, Bahama, Belgium, Bermuda, Denmark, France,
Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Luxembroug, Monaco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Republic of South Africa, San Marino, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
n.a. = not^applicable
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Office of the Secretary, Press Release, May 11, I966. 
Replies from 402 of the companies participating in the 1965 Voluntary Program.
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The Program in I966
In general, the program for 1966 placed special 
emphasis on cutting direct investment abroad and recom­
mended a specific target for each group of corporations 
and individuals. This program was meant to improve the 
results of I965 by encouraging business enterprises to 
maximize their contributions to the balance of payments 
by expanding exports, minimizing holdings of liquid 
assets abroad, financing expansion by borrowing abroad, 
and maximizing repatriation of income from abroad.
In his letter to the chief executives of companies 
participating in the program. Secretary of Commerce 
Connor said:
In order to make the program more effective, and remain 
voluntary, I am asking each chief executive:
- to maximize his company's over-all contributions 
to the balance of payments in I966 through a variety 
of means ;
- to moderate the outflow of funds from the United 
States for direct investment in developed countries;
- for the two years I965 and I966 combined, to 
keep the total of such investment within 90 percent 
of the amount for the three years 1962-64. We will 
be glad to discuss any special problem that this 
formula may raise.
- to provide us with statistics for recent years, 
and projections for I966, related to selected for­
eign transactions , quarterly reports during 1966 are 
also requested;
- to give, with each quarterly report, the per­
sonal appraisal of the chief executive as to how his 
company is progressing toward its over-all target for
1966 ;
- to name an alternate, familiar with company 
policy, who could be available for periodic consultation.
^Letter from Secretary of Commerce Connor to 
Chief Executives, December 8, I965.
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For the purpose of this program direct investment 
was defined as net outflow of funds from the United States 
plus the undistributed profits of affiliates abroad. The 
limit of investment for the two years I965-66 to 90 per­
cent of the amount for the three years 1962-64 permitted 
the business community to increase investments abroad 
with U.S. funds by about 35 percent above the annual 
average during the base period. The expected result of 
the modified program was an increase of #1.3 billion in 
the surplus of total direct investment income over direct 
outflow in 1966 compared to 1965* The main reason for a 
three-year base period was to equalize the opportunity 
for all companies which for some reason had not invested 
or which had invested large amounts in any particular 
year; also, by combining I965 and I966, greater flexibil­
ity was given to companies which had been very cooperative 
in 1965# The program for I966 was also expanded to cover 
additional companies not under the program in I965.
The U.S. business community continued to cooper­
ate in 1966, and the reduction in outflow of capital for 
direct investment was substantial, largely due to the 
financing of such investment by borrowing abroad.
Another contributing factor was the large inflow of for­
eign capital which was without precedent since the end 
of the Second World War. Net outflow of direct investment, 
excluding undistributed profits of subsidiaries but
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including reinvestment of funds borrowed abroad (because 
of the balance of payment accounting system these bor­
rowed funds appeared as inflows and outflows), increased 
to #3.5 billion from $3.4 billion in I963. However, in 
1966 U.S. companies borrowed abroad $445 million as com­
pared to $52 million in 1965»
The over-all contribution made by these compan­
ies to the balance of payments rose substantially, from 
$14.5 billion in I965 to $16.3 billion in 1966--or an 
improvement of approximately 12 percent (Table 13)• 
Geographically, the greatest improvement was in direct 
investment outflow to Western Europe. Nevertheless, even 
with the improvement in the balance of payments and the 
accumulation of a small surplus on "official reserve" 
basis, the over-all liquidity basis deficit continued to 
be large. In fact, since it was slightly higher than in 
the year before, the Administration announced in December 
1966 the extention of the voluntary program through I967, 
especially in view of the continuation of foreign exchange 
costs as a result of the conflict in Viet Nam.
The Program in 1967 
The 1967 program announced by the Secretary of 
Commerce called for companies to raise their net contri­
bution to the balance of payments by an estimated $2.0 - 
$2.5 billion as compared to I966. As before, the over-all
TABLE 13
RESULTS UNDER THE I966 VOLUNTARY PROGRAM COMPARED WITH PROJECTIONS 
BY COMPANIES AT IHE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR 













































































1961 Projected Actual Projected Actual Projected Actual
5» Other Long-term 
capital trans­
actions 46 (35) (55) (81) (101) n.a. n.a.
6. Total trans­
actions 14,062 15,022 15,831 960 1,819 6.8 12.9Less: Capital 
outflows to 
less developed 
countries (436) (572) (372) (136) '64 13.2 -14.7
Total transactions 
in the overall im­
provement goal 14,498 15,594 16,253 1,096 1,755 7.6 12.1
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Office of the Secretary, Press Release.
•^se of funds obtained through foreign sales of securities issued by special U.S. 
incorporated companies or through long-term loans from foreign banks, etc., to all types 
of U.S. incorporated companies.
HOœ
n.a. = not applicable.
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contribution comprised the exports of these companies 
(but not imports), repatriation of profits from direct 
investment, other kinds of earnings, net movement of 
capital, and other transactions.^
The more specific limitations on direct invest­
ment capital transfers (capital outflow to affiliated 
companies and reinvested earnings of those affiliates) 
to developed countries as well as to some mineral-pro­
ducing nations were similar to those of I966. The tar­
gets for 1967 were based again on the average of 1962-64 
and took into account the combined investment activity 
of 1966 and 1967.
The limit of investment for the two year period 
1966 and 1967 was requested to be 80 percent of the 
amount for the three years 1962-64; it permitted the 
business community to increase investment abroad with 
U.S. funds by about 20 percent above the annual average 
during the base period. The amount that could be invested 
in 1967 was determined by subtracting the I966 amount 
of investment from the two year total (the I966 program 
permitted 90 percent for the same base period).
As a result of the voluntary program and an 
appeal made in the middle of the year by the Secretary 
of Commerce, direct investment capital outflow declined.
^U.S*, Department of Commerce, Office of the Sec­
retary, Release No. G-66-222, December 13, I966.
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In comparison to previous years, the main decline in 
the direct investment capital outflow was to Canada and 
Latin America. Outflows to Europe increased slightly, 
however, and there was a sharp increase in outflows to 
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, as well as to 
developing nations in Asia and Africa (especially to 
oil-producing countries). Also, although the direct 
investment outflow declined in I967, total investment 
abroad remained very high, mainly due to the large 
amount (approximately $1.5 billion) borrowed abroad by 
U.S. companies and their affiliates. Other factors, 
however, also contributed to the increase in long-term 
capital outflow that resulted in a large deficit in I967 
and occasioned the introduction of the mandatory program
in 1968.
The Administration's Justification for the Program 
Private capital outflows from the United States 
have played a most important role in the expansion of 
world trade since the end of World War II. The United 
States was a major source of capital supply to the free 
world, and U.S. direct investment abroad helped spread 
technological advances and management skills around the 
world. The returns from these investments were beneficial 
to the investors and to the U.S. balance of payments. 
However, in the 1960's the large outflows of private
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capital were a major contributing factor to the U.S. 
balance of payments deficit. During this period the 
net private international investment position of the 
United States (mainly non-liquid long-term investment) 
grew remarkably, but short-term liquid liabilities to 
foreigners increased substantially and posed a threat to 
U.S. gold reserves and to the international monetary 
system.^
The average annual private capital outflow during 
1960-62 was about $3«5 billion, increasing to #4.5 billion 
for 1963, and to more than #6.5 billion for 1964.
Actually, in the last quarter of 1964 it reached an 
annual rate of #9 billion. Direct investment capital 
was to a great extent responsible for the trend: in
the late 1950's these outflows averaged about #1.3 bil­
lion annually, but rose to #1.7 billion in I962, to 
almost #2.0 billion in I963, and to #2.4 billion in 1964.
The shapp increase in private capital outflows 
plus a shapr increase in military expenditures abroad 
(a factor which was recognized by the Government) ulti­
mately led to the introduction of a voluntary restraint 
system. And, because the authorities understood the 
nature of investment abroad and the significance to the
U.S., Department of the Treasury, Maintaining 
the Strength of the United States Dollar in a Strong 
Free World Economy, A 1968 Progress Report (Washington, 
D.C,: December 1968), pi 25•
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balance of payments of long-term returns on investment, 
the decision was to make the program one of voluntary 
restraint that would moderate the outflow of direct 
investment capital rather than to impose mandatory con­
trols .
When introducing the voluntary restraing program 
the Administration emphasized that not only would it be 
voluntary but also that it would be short term in dura­
tion (only until the long-term measures that had been 
instituted began to be effective). The Secretary of the 
Treasury said many times that in the given circumstances 
no other choice was available and that if the program 
were to continue for a long period its effects on the 
balance of payments would be harmful rather than helpful. 
In fact, that the Administration was sensitive to intro- 
ducint any type of restraint was brought out by Secre­
tary Fowler :
There is no question that this course, through 
the voluntary program, requires us to restrict pri­
vate new or additional business and financial activ­
ities which in normal times we would consider highly 
desirable. There is no question that such new or 
additional business and financial investment abroad 
pays excellent dividends to our future balance of 
payments position.
In fact, more than a third of the balance of 
payments gains made since 196O under our first two 
balance of payments programs reflect increasing 
returns from such activities. Such returns, however, 
are realized only in the long run. But ours is a
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short-run problem confronting us novr--this year.. .
Thus, It is evident that the Administration recognized 
the role of long-run direct investment.
During 1964-65* since the earnings from direct 
investment remitted to the United States were equivalent 
to about 15 percent of all export receipts, the program 
clearly emphasized temporary restraints. The program 
was purely voluntary: There were no mandatory restrict­
ions "but we are confident that most companies will in
2fact cooperate." Business was not asked to cease all 
new investment, only to postpone unessential expansion, 
particularly in Western Europe where net outflows had 
increased from #?25 million in I96I to $1.2 billion in
1964. The companies were encouraged to finance expansion 
in Europe with funds raised in the local markets, not in 
the United States. No restraints were requested on 
investments in the underdeveloped countries; on the 
contrary, such investment was encouraged.
The Government did not accept the views expressed
U.S., Congress, Senate, Balance of Payments -
1965. Hearings, before a subcommittee of the Committee 
on Banking and Currency, Senate, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 
May 17, August 3, 5 * 17» and I8, 1965, pt. 2, p. 959.
2U.S., Department of Commerce, Direct Investment 
and the Balance of Payments, by Andrew F. Brimmer, Assist­
ant Secretary of Commerce, Press Release, April 20, I965.
^Ibid.
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by many businessmen that restrictions on direct invest­
ment abroad would not help the balance of payments 
deficit in the short run. The Government clearly felt 
that direct capital outflows, especially those going to 
Europe, contributed to the payments deficit. The returns 
of such outflows would be gradual with a payback period 
of 8 to 15 years depending on the particular case, but 
the problem of the deficit had to be solved immediately.
The period of 8 to 15 years required for direct 
investment outflow to repay itself in balance of payments 
terms was based on a model prepared by the Department of 
the Treasury which was presented in the hearings before 
the Committee of Finance of the United States Senate.^
The model measured the impact of direct investment abroad 
on the balance of payments when all inflows of capital, 
which are related to a given capital outflow, are taken 
into consideration. It showed that capital outflows to 
Canada and Western Europe exceeded inflows and that there 
had been a cumulative deficit in these regions for many 
years.
In the spring of I968 the Treasury Department 
published another study prepared by professors Gary Huf- 
bauer and Michael Adler; it measured the impact of 
overseas manufacturing investment on the U.S. balance
^Hearings before the Senate Committee of Finance, 
87th Cong., 2nd sess., April 2, I962, p. 2l4.
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1of payments. This study reinforced the conclusion 
reached in previous studies by the Treasury Department 
that the full payback period of overseas direct invest­
ment in manufacturing in balance of payments terms would 
take between eight and ten years, (The length of the 
period depends on given assumptions.)
In arriving at the final results presented in 
Table l4, Hufbauer and Adler took into consideration a 
wide range of factors and parameters based on actual 
data for the years 1962-65» Some factors measured were 
the following: investment, sales generated, income
remissions, future repair parts and equipment, royalties 
and fees, import effects, and export displacement. The 
empty spaces in the table are significant and mean that 
according to the assumptions underlying this model, the 
direct investment never pays itself back in balance of 
payments terms.
The cases of Classical and Anticlassical assump­
tions usually apply to countries where capital is very 
scarce and where if U.S. companies did not invest, no 
investment would be made, thus necessitating these coun­
tries to continue importing the needed goods. In such 
cases any investment by U.S. companies would displace
Michael F. Adler and Gary C, Hufbauer, Overseas 
Manufacturing Investment and the Balance of Payments, Tax 
Policy Research Study No. Ï (Washington, D.C.: Depart­
ment of the Treasury, I968).
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TABLE 14











Latin America — -
Europe 18.8 7.5Rest of world - 22.2
World - -
Reversed classical assumptions :■
Canada 10.2 10.2
Latin America 9.8 9.8




Latin America ■- -
Europe - 10.8
Rest of World — —
World - -
Source: Ibid., pp. 67-68, Tables 5-13 and 5-l4.
—  The recoupment period represents the number of 
years required for a direct investment outflow to produce 
a cumulative balance of payments surplus equal to itself. 
These periods are based on "single injection" model.
2—  The effect of exports displacement caused by 
sales of U.S. subsidiaries abroad were changed slightly 
causing an adjustment in the recoupment period.
Classical assumptions. Without the foreign 
investment there would be more U.S. domestic investment 
and no substitute investment in the host country.4—  Reversed classical. Without foreign investment 
by the U.S. company there would be more U.S. domestic 
investment and some other non-U.S. company will invest in 
the host country.
— Anticlassical. If the U.S. company did not invest 
in the host country, there would be no substitute invest­
ment in either the United States or the host country.
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export from the United States and other countries, and 
the assumption would hold true only until the countries 
in question could generate needed capital or until some 
other foreign companies invested.
In the case of the Reversed Classical Assumption 
the recoupment period is much shorter because it is 
assumed that if an American company would not invest, 
a local or another foreign company would; thus the market 
would be lost for American exports anyway. This assump­
tion applies to a large extent to Europe and other 
industrial countries where capital is not as scarce as 
in the developing countries. The column of adjusted 
recoupment period gives shorter recoupment periods 
because of changes in the export displacement parameter. 
In the first column sales of U.S. subsidiaries abroad, 
to the extent to which exports are displaced, effect 
only U.S. exports. In the adjusted column sales of U.S. 
subsidiaries abroad not only displace American exports 
but also displace exports from other countries and reduce 
sales of native firms which produce the same kinds of 
goods.
From all three cases it is possible to conclude 
that the impact of direct investment abroad on the U.S. 
balance of paymehts becomes positive in a shorter period 
when an American company builds a plant abroad which 
otherwise would be constructed by a non-U.S. company.
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Europe and the industrial countries, therefore, are the
places where recoupment periods are the shortest.
The study discussed above received criticism
from many quarters, especially from the National Foreign
Trade Council, Machinery and Alliéd Products Institute,
and Professor J, N, Behrman. All of them disputed the
basic assumptions of the study as well as the data used.
Their criticism will be discussed in more detail in a
later section of this chapter.
Worthwhile noting is that in the mid-1960’s, a
similar study was undertaken and published in England--
the Reddaway Report.^ The main conclusion of the report
was that it would take between six to ten years before
an investing country would recover the balance of payments
loss involved in making foreign investment.
Despite the conclusion of the Hufbauer-Adler
study, it is argued by most experts on the subject that
the payback period of direct investment abroad is between
2six and eight years. Even Mr. Adler in a later article 
agreed that the average payback period for the world as 
a whole is about eight years, with a longer duration for
William Brian Reddaway, Effects of U.K. Direct 
Investments Overseas, Final Report (Cambridge. England : 
Cambridge University Press, I96Ô).
^Walter S. Salant, et al.. The United States Bal­
ance of Payment in 1968 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, I963).
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Canada and the developing countries and a shorter duration 
for Europe and other industrial nations,^ In his testimony 
before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, the 
Director of the Office of Foreign Direct Investment of 
thé U.S. Department of Commerce said that the period of 
paybacks on direct investment is not as long as the 
Treasury Department suggested. However, it is longer 
than the period suggested by many leaders of the business
• j. 2community.
The aim of introducing the voluntary program was 
not to curtail or reduce the level of foreign expansion 
by U.S. companies abroad but to curb outflows from the 
United States to finance such expansions. While it is 
true that these outflows would contribute positively in 
the U.S. balance of payments position in the long run by 
the middle 1970's, it was hoped that by then this prob­
lem would have been solved. However, the problem of 
deficit has remained current, and it is not sensible to 
allow these outflows to contribute to a present deficit 
in order to realize benefits far in the future.
As an answer to the many leaders of the business
Michael F. Adler, "The H i ^  Cost of Foreign 
Investment Restraints," Columbia Journal of World Busi­
ness . Vol. Ill, No. 3 (May-June 1968), p. Ô1.
2Hearings before the Subcommittee of International 
Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic Committee of 
Congress, 91st Cong., 1st sess. , January 1968, p. I98.
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community who argued that income from current investment 
was much larger than the annual capital outflow and there­
fore that investment abroad should be encouraged as in 
the past rather than curtailed. Treasury spokesmen said 
that such a comparison was misleading,^ the common error 
being that a comparison is made between two types of flow 
that actually are unrelated. In reality, the income 
earnings and other receipts of a given year are generated 
by investment over a number of past years, and hence are 
not the result of the outflow of the current or previous 
year. Also, an important element inevitably excluded, 
because it could not be readily measured, was the value
of sales abroad by foreign subsidiaries which actually
2displaced U.S. exports.
Views of the Business Communitv 
For many years American direct foreign investment 
had been regarded by U.S. authorities as highly desirable 
because it contributed to a better equilibrium in the bal­
ance of payments and, even more important, because it con­
tributed U.S. managerial skills and new technology to the 
countries of the free world. Encouragement to export 
capital is quite natural for the United States being the
U.S., Congress, Senate, Revenue Act of 1962. 
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance, 8?th 
Cong., 2nd sess., April 2, 1^62, pt. 1, p. 173-
^Ibid.
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richest country in the world as well as one where huge 
amounts of savings are generated every year.
When President Johnson announced his voluntary 
program in February I965» the leaders of American indus­
try pledged their full cooperation. The program of 
restraint was accepted with some reservations, but it was 
hoped that it would be eliminated after a year or two. 
However, the choice was that if the program were not 
accepted voluntarily it would have to become mandatory. 
Despite the imposition of voluntary controls on capital 
movements, the deficit on the balance of payments continued 
and amounted to about $1.3 billion for I965, $1.4 billion 
for 1966, and $3.6 billion for 196?.
Increasing evidence has shown that short-term 
arbi;ferary solutions cannot solve the deficit problem.
Many items in the balance of payments are so closely 
related that curtailing outflows does not necessarily 
improve the balance. The outflow of capital to subsidi­
aries abroad usually reduces exports in the short run 
and curtails the inflow of funds in the form of dividends 
in the long run. Another short-term effect of the prohi­
bition on capital outflow in the form of investment abroad 
would be in increase in the interest rate abroad as a 
result of American companies borrowing there, thus encour­
aging short-term capital outflow from the United States in 
order to take advantage of the relative change in interest
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rates. Because of the scarcity of capita in Europe and 
higher interest rates paid by American companies, some 
foreign investors in the United States sell their securi­
ties in order to obtain funds to buy new foreign issues 
which pay higher interest rates; this to some extent 
causes a drain on the U.S. balance of payments.
A more basic question is the desirability of 
capital movement to the location of highest return. The 
United States for many years was the champion of free 
enterprise and free movement of resources. A basic econ­
omic principle is that if capital is free to seek the 
highest possible return without any interference, returns 
to all factors of production will increase because total 
output will be at a maximum. This is as true of capital 
flows between countries as it is for flows within a country.
The imposition of controls, even voluntary ones, 
on a segment of the balance of payments implies that pri­
vate investment abroad is the main cause of the deficit.
Such a view was rejected outright by the business commu­
nity, which, from all the Department of Commerce publica- 
2tions, considers it very clear that the U.S. payments 
deficit stems from government expenditure abroad (which
Kenneth W. Dam and L. B. Krause, Federal Tax 
Treatment of Foreign Income (Washington, D.C.: The Brook-
ings Institution, 1964).
2U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business, various issues.
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the Government hopes to cover by surpluses generated in 
the private sector). The validity of this argument is 
upheld when it is considered that U.S. military expendi­
tures in Europe and the costs of the conflict in Viet 
Nam are two prime causes of the balance of payments defi­
cit. Therefore, it would benefit the balance of payments 
if the Government were to curtail such expenditure rather 
than to impose voluntary controls on direct investment.
Reasons for, and Desirability of,
Direct Investment Abroad
In general, direct investment abroad is undertaken 
because it provides better opportunities for higher profits 
than alternative means available to investors. Although 
most companies prefer to produce for export at home because 
of the greater risks and management difficulties involved 
in producing abroad, there are many situations in which 
production abroad is necessary. For example, the extract­
ing industries must invest in the countries where raw 
materials are found because they need the raw materials 
for their own production process or because they control 
or own the distribution and marketing of a given resource. 
Construction, utilities, trading companies, and other 
service enterprises are limited in the scope of their 
activities on foreign sites, and no export substitution 
can take place of local investment. When an American firm 
receives a contract to build and operate a dam or a highway.
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it must export capital from the United States. The 
returns can be quite lucrative, but any benefit to the 
balance of payments would be gradual. Construction of 
distribution and retail systems for petroleum products 
in Entiope requires large outlays of capital that cannot 
be replaced by exports from the United States.
Many activities of U.S. companies abroad must be
performed at the specific time they are needed or they
would either not be performed at all or would be taken
over by competitive firms. This was well expressed by
a spokesman for the International Telephone and Telegraph
Corporation before a Congressional Committee Hearing;^
. . .  If foreign subsidiaries sell less abroad as a 
result of capital outflow restraint, the gap will be 
filled largely by our foreign competitors, not by 
U.S. exports. This is quite obvious in the particu­
lar case of ITT, because many of our customers are 
official bodies which will not buy products manufactured 
outside their countries. But, given the competitive­
ness of rival enterprises abroad, the case also applies 
generally. (Hearings, p. 2969)
Additional reasons for investment in foreign coun­
tries are the policies of foreign governments, such as: 
investment incentives, various import duties, quotas, 
and other barriers which would make it impossible to 
export from the United States to these nations. However, 
if U.S. subsidiaries are producing within a country or
U.S. Congress, Senate, Revenue Act of 1962, 
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th 
Cong., 2nd sess., April 24 and 25, pt. 6, p. 2969.
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area, such as the EEC and the BETA, their products can 
move anywhere within the tariff walls without having to 
pay duties. Many developing countries with smaller 
markets are encouraging the establishment of a limited 
number of industries in various fields and are giving 
these industries total protection against competition 
from import. In such cases the choice is to invest or 
to lose the market; no U.S. export can replace investment 
in these countries. Other countries introduce exchange 
controls and special incentives to encourage foreign 
capital. To forego investment when the opportunity arises 
often means losing the market permanently.
Among the many economic factors that make invest­
ing abroad so enticing is the obvious one of lower produc­
tion costs, which can result from lower costs of raw 
materials, labor, power, transportation and insurance, 
taxation, and proximity to markets, or any combination of 
these. Taxation incentives and tariff barriers are deter­
mining factors in many cases. In some countries production 
costs are much higher than in the United States, but because 
of the protective barrier of high tariff and import 
restrictions, the rate of earnings is much higher.
Market potential and the level of income also 
are factors that command attention in the investment deci­
sion. In some countries the current demand for a given 
product does not justify an immediate investment, but the
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market's potential rate of growth makes it necessary to 
invest immediately rather than to fill the demand by 
exporting from the United States because competitive 
enterprise from other countries might enter the market 
and thus render it a complete loss to U.S. export.
An additional approach to the problem of U.S. 
direct investment abroad (with special emphasis on the 
voluntary restraints) was developed in a special study 
made by three economists for The National Industrial Con­
ference Board.^ The main theme of the study is that volun­
tary capital restraint would be more damaging than bene­
ficial to the balance of payments and that the investing 
process is quite involved as well as dependent on long­
term planning. Basically, the decision to invest abroad
is made on the possibility of improving earnings, but
three principal factors, which often are in conflict, 
must be taken into account: the elements of finance,
production, and marketing. According to the findings 
of the study, the marketing strategy was clearly the 
most important element in the investment decision. Even 
when businessmen decide to expand or to undertake new ven­
tures, they do so in order to maintain their over-all
competitiveness and their earning ability more than for
Judd Polk, Irene VT. Meister, and Lawrence A. 
Veit, U.S. Production Abroad and the Balance of Payments; 
A Survey of Corporate Investment Experience (New York:
The National Industrial Conference Board, I966).
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the purpose of producing an additional profit line. In 
contrast to what is generally believed, a declining profit 
rate may, in many cases, cause a rise in investment 
rather than a decline or abandonment, especially when 
it is required to safeguard current market position and 
long-term plans.
When a private company is required to base its 
investment decisions on foreign exchange implications and 
not on business or market conditions, it necessarily must 
be at the expense of maximizing profits. However, the 
decision to invest is not based exclusively on foreign 
exchange considerations; it must also respond to demands 
for a product in many foreign countries and adapt itself 
to many institutional, legal, and economic conditions.
Such investments may not be foreign exchange earners in 
the short-run but in the long run will bring back foreign 
exchange which many times exceeds the original outflow. 
Continuing investment abroad is measured by the companies 
as related to their entire position in the market, not 
just marginal earnings of the new investment. For a 
petroleum company, for example, it would be useless to 
continue investing in the developing countries of Asia 
and Latin America if it could not invest at the same 
time in Europe in order to build a distribution and 
retail sales system which would enable the sale of addi­
tional products. Moreover, in the event of a demand for
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such a distribution system in which the U.S. company 
were not the supplier, the competitive companies of other 
nations would take over the existing market and sometimes 
even the share of the American company.
The study concludes that any growth of business 
is organic, not incremental. In order to remain competi­
tive and maintain current rates of profit, businesses 
must expand and keep their share of the market ; otherwise 
the rate of earnings would fall significantly. In con­
trast to the organic approach takenby private business, 
the Government approach to investment is basically incre­
mental. This incremental approach sees any investment 
merely as an addition to existing investment. Therefore, 
new investments undertaken would generate new profits 
without any relation to old investments and profits.
If companies were to postpone new investments, they would 
sacrifice only the loss of additional earnings. From 
such a point of view, the voluntary program to restrain 
investment abroad would make some sense, provided that 
the current rate of remitted earnings was no more than 
7 or 8 percent. By curtailing additional outflows of 
capital only this amount would be sacrificed, and about 
92-93 percent in foreign exchange would be saved. For 
the companies the sacrifice would be even less because 
they can invest the same amount in the United States and 
their loss would be only the difference between the rate
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of profit at home and abroad.
Contrary to the "incremental" approach, the "organic" 
approach considers all actual or planned investment as 
necessary to maintain the earning capability of the com­
panies; for, failure to supply new investment when needed 
would cause not only a loss of additional earnings but 
would decrease the rate of profit and, in some cases, 
would cause a loss of total earnings. Many businessmen 
say, "to stand still is to lose," and then build new facil­
ities. Such expansion usually increases the over-all 
efficiency of the existing plants. Many of the large 
firms are multi-national in character, and their decisions 
to expand are made in response to greater demand, which, 
for political reasons, cannot be supplied by exports from 
the United States or elsewhere. Hence, they are forced 
to invest more abroad in order to keep the market. Under 
the "organic" concept of investment, added investment or 
new expansion is treated as it normally is by producers-- 
as being in the nature of improvement of existing struc­
ture, and their relationship to earnings is that of the 
whole investment structure to total earnings.^
The foreign investment of the private sector is 
much greater and more complicated than it appears in the 
balance of payments accounts. In the 1960's the average
^Ibid., p. l43.
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outflow of capital for direct investment was between 
$2 billion and $3 billion annually, and capital inflow 
of dividends fluctuated between $3 billion and $5 billion 
annually.. By the end of 19^7 > total direct investment 
alone amounted to $59*3 billion, accounting for about 
#120 billion in annual output. Such magnitude of produc­
tion, which surpassed the production of most countries 
in the world, had a great effect on world patterns of 
production and trade. The larger part of this produc­
tion, especially in manufacturing, has been in Europe 
and Canada, and it has influenced the level of output 
and income in these areas which in turn has effected 
the demand for U.S. exports. Yet this has not been seen 
in the balance of payments accounts.
In the last few years, at least for the United 
States, the main economic tie with other countries has 
been production abroad--the principle vehicle by which 
U.S. industry responds to the increasing demands of 
other countries. Goods continually move between the 
United States and other nations, but the expanding produc­
tion stimulated by movement of capital is by far more 
responsible for higher output and income than the average 
exchange of goods. The additional contribution of direct 
investment to the economies of foreign countries is indeed 
vast. American subsidiaries abroad usually are techno­
logically more advanced, operate more efficiently, and
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pay higher wages than the local firms. In addition, they 
pay royalties and taxes and make a large contribution to 
the foreign exchange earnings of the host countries and 
the United States. In many of the developing nations the 
desire and need to import is limited only by the ability 
to borrow and earn foreign exchange. Such earnings, 
therefore, are immediately spent on imports. In the 
case of most Latin American countries it means additional 
imports from the United States.
An investment abroad increases production not 
only by the amount of the investment but is multiplied 
due to the multiplier effect. Since imports increase 
as the level of GNP increases, the impact of the invest­
ment on additional U.S. exports would be substantial, 
especially when the marginal propensity to import by 
the European countries is much higher than that of the 
United States.^
In view of the aforementioned motives and incen­
tives for foreign investment, the business community 
did not expect the Treasury Department's argument that 
investment abroad was a cause of the U.S. balance of 
payments deficit in the short run and long run. On the 
contrary, the business community as a whole, and particularly
Rudolf R. Rhomberg and Loretta Boissonmeault, 
Effects of Income and Price Changes on the United States 
Balance of Payments. International Monetary Fund Staff 
Papers, Vol. XI, No. 1 (March 1964).
132
the 700 or 800 companies which invest abroad, have been 
the main contributors to a surplus in the current accounts, 
and their contribution has been far greater than the out­
flow of capital (Table 1$). This view was summarized by 
a statement made by Mr. Richard C. Fenton, President,
Pfizer International, before Congressional hearings on 
the Voluntary Program."
First, direct investments as a whole and manu­
facturing direct investments alone both make a sub­
stantial and growing contribution to the plus side 
of the U.S. balance of payments.
Second, manufacturing direct investments in 
developed countries make a substantial and growing 
contribution to the plus side of the balance of pay­
ment 8 .
Third, direct investments have made a greater 
contribution to the plus side of the balance of pay­
ments than nonmilitary trade unconnected with direct 
investments.
Fourth, the argument that it is possible to restrict 
direct investments in the short run because returns 
are realized only in the long run is not valid. On 
the contrary, in many cases the payback in balance 
of payments terms is very short— less than a year.
Fifth, direct investments can contribute more than 
other factors to the elimination of the deficit in 
the balance of payments, but only if the President's 
voluntary program, as described by Secretary of Com- 
. merce Connor, is more clearly understood than it is 
at present time and if direct investments are posi­
tively encouraged rather than discouraged.^
All five points rely on the main theme that 
direct investment abroad, particularly in manufacturing.
U.S., Congress, Senate, Balance of Payments--1965. 
Hearings before a subcommittee of Banking and Currency, 
Senate, 89th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 2, May-August 1965.
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TABLE 15
CAPITAL OUTFLOW AND INFLOW FROM EXPORTS AND IMPORTS TO 
THE UNITED STATES BY FOREIGN MANUFACTURING 
AFFILIATES (1962-64), AS RELATED TO THE 
U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(million of dollars)
1962 1963 1964 Average1962-64
Inflow
Exports of capital equipment 167 123 198
Exports to affiliates for resale 
Other exports attributed to
1,102 1,174 1,403
direct investment 1,723 2,107 2,467
Royalties and fees 240 371 479Dividend income 1,307 1,541 1.852
Total
Outflow
4,539 5,316 6,399 5,418
Imports of finished goods from
foreign affiliates 
Capital outflow from the 1,089
1,126 1,636
United States 712 774 1,034
Reinvested earnings .561 852 65,5.
Total 2,362 2,752 3,325 2,813
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business. November I965, P- 19l December 1965, 
pT 24; and October I968, p. 26.
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generates large amounts of exports which contribute 
greatly to the positive side of the balance of payment. 
Most of the equipment used in new plants abroad is pur­
chased from the United States as are many of the raw 
materials and semi-manufactured goods. In relation to 
new expenditures on plaAts and equipment made by manu­
facturing subsidiaries abroad, the exact percentage of 
capital equipment export depends on how the comparison 
is made. When the comparison is made between exports of 
capital equipment to subsidiaries abroad and total new 
expenditures on plant and equipment made from funds 
obtained from all sources (including funds from the 
United States, local borrowing, reinvested earnings, 
depreciation allowances, etc.), the percentage of equip­
ment purchased in the United States is about 30-35 per­
cent. However, if the comparison is made only between 
exports of such equipment and actual outflow of funds from 
the United States, it is about 85 percent.^
As discussed earlier, it is argued that remit­
tance from direct investment abroad is higher each year
^U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business. September I965, November I965, and November I966,
Adler and Hufbauer, Overseas Manufacturing Invest­
ment and the Balance of Payment, p. 22.
Jack W. Behrman, Direct Manufacturing Investment. 
Exports and the Balance of Payments (New York, N.Y.; 
National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., I968), p. 11.
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than is capital outflow. Hence, foreign investment con­
tributes to the plus side of the balance of payments. In 
1967, outflow for direct investment, including reinvested 
earnings, was #4.6 billion; capital inflow from direct 
investment, including dividends, reinvested earnings, 
royalties, and fees, amounted to #7»2 billion, producing 
a surplus of #2.6 billion. Total outflow of new cppital 
and reinvested earnings for the period I962-67 was #25.1 
billion, compared to an inflow of #36.4 billion during 
the same period (Table I6). Europe was the only area 
where outflow exceeded inflow in the years 1962-67* How­
ever, part of the earnings which appear in the Department 
of Commerce publications as coming from oil-producing 
countries were really profits earned in Europe. When 
Europe and Canada, were taken as one unit , capital inflow 
equaled capital outflow during that period.
Net inflow of funds related to direct investment 
abroad resulted in a net surplus of at least #1.5 billion 
in the payments accounts each year following I962. The 
favorable contribution of net capital inflow from direct 
investment was second only to commercial trade accounts 
between I962 and I965 and was greater than the balance 
and trade account in the years I966 and 1967 (Table 17)*
Analysis of Arguments for and A.gainst the Program 
The fact that in the long run direct investment 
abroad has a positive impact on the U.S. balance of payments.
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TABLE 16
FLOWS OF CAPITAL, INCOME, REINVESTED EARNINGS, 
ROYALTIES, AND FEES, 1962-6?
(million of dollars)

























































































































11,91.8 1,813. 2,102 1,419 1,452 2,638
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Givrent
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Sources : U.S., Department of Commerce, Surveys of Current
and October I968.
—  Conunercial^trade excluding such noncommercial 
exports from the United States as: military grand aid,
Public Law 480, AID, and other non-dollar earning ship­
ments .
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is accepted by all factions--government officials, busi­
ness executives, and economists in the academic community. 
The basic argument between the business community and 
government officials who formulated and carried out the 
policy of restraint on direct investment abroad is the 
length of time it takes for investment to produce a posi­
tive effect on the country's balance of payments. Of 
course, the data used by each group and the way in which 
the indirect effects of investment abroad are evaluated 
are determining factors in measuring the length of this 
period.
To measure the effects of current investment 
abroad, or even total investment abroad, on the balance 
of payments is quite complicated because it must be com­
pared to what would happen if the foreign investments 
were not made. All the data of all exports from, and 
imports to, the United States which are directly related 
to the existence of foreign subsidiaries are needed, 
such as increases in U.S. exports in given years due to:
(a) purchases of new capital goods in the United States 
because of reinvested earnings and new capital outflow 
from home; (b) purchases of raw materials and intermediate 
products from the United States by the foreign subsidi­
aries which would not have been sold by the United States 
if the subsidiaries had not been in existence; and,
(c) the increase in exports (not only to subsidiaries but
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also those effected by the subsidiaries' existence) 
resulting from the introduction of new technology, growth 
of income, and new contacts and other channels of trade 
that would not exist otherwise.
From this increase in exports one must deduct 
the negative effect on the balance of payments in order 
to see the net effects: (a) imports from the new sub­
sidiaries in addition to the regular imports; and (b ) re­
duction in exports to the countries in which the subsidi­
aries are located or elsewhere as a result of new pro­
duction and sales by these subsidiaries. All the above- 
mentioned factors except the first would have a continu­
ous effect on the balance of payments. Because a plant 
would require replacement and repair parts, even the 
first factor could have a lasting effect on total eaqports.
Having all the data available would be ideal. 
Partial data given by the Department of Commerce, however, 
can give a sound foundation for analysis.
The following analysis will discuss and weigh 
the effects of exports, imports, and capital flows result­
ing from direct investment abroad on the U.S. balance of 
payments. Since the voluntary program was concentrated 
essentially on investment in Europe, Canada, and the more 
developed economies, this analysis will center mainly on 
these areas (on Europe and Canada in particular where 
most of the U.S. deficit was accumulated). Emphasis will
l4o
be on manufacturing investment because over 50 percent 
of the investment in these countries is in manufacturing 
and because more data are available thereon. However, 
direct investment in other industries and other areas 
will also be discussed.
Exports and Imports
After the period of the initial shipment of mach­
inery and equipment, the relationship between exports 
and direct capital investment abroad is long lasting.
It continues through shipments of semi-manufactured goods, 
raw materials, replacement parts, and finished parts for 
assembly. In addition, the subsidiaries abroad develop 
a market for other U.S. exports.
For the years 1962-64, exports by U.S. companies 
to their affiliates abroad accounted for about 40 percent 
of their total foreign exports and for an average of 28 
percent of total U.S. private exports (Table l8). Data 
supplied to the Department of Commerce by ?08 companies 
which cooperated in the voluntary program show that about 
37 percent of the total exports of these firms in the 
years 1964-6? was to affiliates abroad and that the 
aforementioned amount was about 23 percent of the total 
U.S. private exports abroad (Table 19). The 708 companies 
exported over 62 percent of total U.S. exports, and it 
can be estimated that a small percentage of the exports 
which did not go to affiliates was due to the existence
l4l
TABLE 18
EXPORTS TO FOREIGN AFFILIATES OF 
























1962 i i i 12.6 3 9 .0 18.1 27.1
Manufacturing 3.0 23.8 16.6
Other 1.9 15.2 10.5
,i ?63 2 ^ 1 3 .3 4o .o 19.2 27.6
Manufacturing 3.4 25.5 17.7
Other 1.9 1 4 .5 9.9
1964 âsl 15.4 4 0 .9 22.3 28.2
Manufacturing 4.1 27.1 18.4
Other 2.2 13.8 9 .8




































1964 4.6 13.3 34.6% 22.3 20.6%
1965 5.3 14.4 36.8% 23.5 22.5%
1966 6.2 16.2 38.3# 26.2 23.6%
1967 6.7 17.7 38.8# 26.9 24.9%
Sources ; U.S., Department of 
Business, June 1969
Commerce, Survey of Current 
, p. 32; March I967, p. 22;
September, 1968, p. 34. Unpublished data 
reported by ?08 companies to the Department of 
Commerce.
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of these foreign subsidiaries.
In addition, U.S. foreign subsidiaries bought 
goods from companies in the United States other than 
their parent companies. An estimate by the Department 
of Commerce indicates that about 20 percent of the materi­
als used by affiliates abroad originated in the United 
States and that the cost of such materials was approximately 
at one-half of the value of sales.^ For I967, sales of 
foreign affiliates were estimated at about $120 billion, 
making the value of materials and semimanufactured goods 
exported from the United States to these affiliates at 
about $12 billion. Of course, estimates of exports 
varied considerably among Europe, Canada, and the devel­
oping countries. In 1964 exports to affiliates accounted
for about 46 percent of all U.S. exports to Canada, 33
2percent to Latin America, and 21 percent to Europe.
The export content of U.S. direct investment is 
assumed by most studies to be about one-third of capital 
invested. In a study made by the Department of Commerce 
concerning 155 American firms investing abroad, it was 
found that between 25 percent and 30 percent of these 
firms'direct investment abroad was spent on U.S. capital
^U.S., Department of Commerce, U.S. Business 
Investment in Foreign Countries (Washington, D.C.; I965),
p. 67.
2U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business, December I965, p. 12.
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goods,^ Gary C, Hufbauer and Michael F. Adler suggested
in their study that the amount was somewhat lower than 
2one-third. However, their study was concentrated only 
on manufacturing investment, and the export content in
3the extractive industries is much higher. The reasons 
for a higher content of export in extractive industries 
are mainly two; The ratio of capital goods to total 
investments in such industries is higher; and, most of 
the investment is carried out in less developed countries 
which are not able to supply any capital goods. In some 
cases the amount of investment abroad is deposited in 
the subsidiary’s name in a New York bank and when pur­
chases of goods are made in the United States they are 
paid from that account. In other cases the U.S. company 
invests abroad by shipping capital equipment and other 
goods to its subsidiary and in return receives shares 
on other kinds of equity of equal value, in which case 
the dollars invested never leave the United States.
^U.S., Department of Commerce, U.S. Business Invest­
ment in Foreign Countries. p. 67»
2Hufbauer and Adler, Overseas Manufacturing Invest­
ment and the Balance of Payment, ch. 3»
3Rudolf R. Rhomberg, Domestic and Foreign Influ­
ences on the United States Balance of Payments, paper pre- 
sented to the l6th Annual Conference on Economic Outlook, 
November 14-15, 1968 (Ann Arbor, Michigan).
4Emile Benoit, Contribution of Direct Foreign 
Investment to our Balance of Payments (New York: Columbia
University, Graduate School of Business, I965).
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In an unpublished paper, Rudolph R. Rhomberg 
stated that what impressed him most when examining the 
U.S. balance of payments accounts for the period 1962-6? 
was the fact that the current account balance appeared 
to have adjusted very closely to the variations in the 
net outflows of capital, having improved somewhat more 
than the increase in the outflow of funds from I962-65 
and worsened by somewhat more than the reduction in this 
outflow from 1965-6?.^ This fact implies a very close 
relation between outflow of capital and the surplus or 
deficit in the trade account. Curtailment of such out­
flows necessarily leads to reduction in exports.
It is evident from Table 20 that the ratio of 
exports from the United States to manufacturing subsidi­
aries investment abroad is about 26 percent. The ratio 
of exports going to Canada is substantially higher than 
to Europe. However, the export data include exports to 
subsidiaries of goods for resale without further proces­
sing, which in most cases would be exported with or 
without the existence of the subsidiaries. If this type 
of export were deducted, each dollar of investment 
abroad would generate considerably less export. In 
addition, in order to measure the effect of investment 
abroad on exports, one must deduct the amount imported
^Rhomberg , Domestic and Foreign Influence on the 
United States Balance of Payments.
TABLE 20
EXPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO, AND IMPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
FROM MANUFACTURING SUBSIDIARIES ABROAD, 1962-64 
(By Selected Regions)
(million of dollars)
1961 1962 1963 1964 Average Ratio to 1962-64 Investment
Canada
Manufacturing subsidiaries' invest-
ment 3 ,0 7 6 5,312 5,761 6,198 5,383
Gross exports from United States 
to subsidiaries 1 ,4 2 6 1,615 l , 84o 1,627
For processing or assembling ( 4 8 9 ) (606) ( 6 2 8 ) ( 5 7 4 ) 1 0 . 7%
For resale without further 
manufacturing (506) (535) (659) (567) 10.5%Capital equipment for investment 
use ( 4 1 ) ( 3 7 ) (56) ( 4 5 ) 0 . 8%Exports purchased in the United 
States directly by foreign 
affiliates (376) (391) ( 4 4 6 ) ( 4o4 ) 7.5%Exports sold by affiliates on 
commission ( 1 4 ) ( 4 5 ) (50) (36) 0 . 7%
Ratio of gross exports to 
investment
Less imports to the United States 
from subsidiaries 829 844 1,227 966
30.2%
Net export 595 771 613 661
H
Ratio of net exports to 
investment 12.3%
TABLE 20 (Cont)
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( 4 2 8 )
4 ,9 2 4
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(331) 6.7%
For resale without further 
manufacturing (331) (355) ( 4o8 ) ( 3 6 4 ) 7.4%
Capital equipment for invest­
ment use ( 5 4 ) (37) (54) ( 4 8 ) 1.0%Exports purchased in the United 
States directly by foreign 
affiliates ( 3 8 ) ( 4 1 ) (71) (50) 1.0% HExports sold by affiliates on 
commission (58) (52) (69) (60) 1.2%
Ratio of gross exports to 
investment










Ratio of net export to
investment lk.2%
TABLE 20 (Concluded)





1 4 ,9 3 7 16,935ment 11,99713,250 
Gross exports from United States
13,395
to subsidiaries 2,992 3 , 4e 4 4,068 3 ,4 8 8
For processing or assembling 
Ror resale without further
(1,082) (1,370) (1,589) (1 ,347) 10.096
manufacturing 
Capital equipment for invest­
(1 , 102) Cl, 174) (1,403) (1 ,226) 9.296
ment use 
Exports purchased in the United 
States directly by foreign
(167) (123) (198) ( 1 6 3 ) 1.296
affiliates 
Exports sold by affiliates on
( 4 6 3 ) (492) (602) (519) 3.996
commission
Ratio of gross exports to 
investment
Less imports to the United States
(177) (245) (275) (232) 1.796
26.096
from subsidiaries 1,089 1,126 1,636 1 ,2 8 4
Net export
Ratio of net exports to 
investment
1,903 2,278 2,432 2 ,2 0 4
16.596
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business. December I965,
p. l 4 ; November I965, p. 19; and October I968, p. 26.
00
Average of investment is 1961-64.
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by U.S. companies from their subsidiaries abroad. As 
seen in Table 20, when this amount was deducted the aver­
age dollar invested in manufacturing abroad generated 
only 16.5 percent of export. After examining the content 
of imports and discussing it with company executives, 
however, it is clear that a high proportion of goods pur­
chased from subsidiaries are raw materials or other 
resources which do not exist in the United States or 
which are in limited supply. Therefore, the imports of 
such goods would take place whether subsidiaries existed 
or not. The ratio of exports to the investment discussed 
above is concerned only with actual exports and imports 
and does not include other exports which are indirect 
and which may result from the subsidiaries' activities 
abroad. Nor does this include displaced exports from 
the United States to the countries where the subsidiaries 
are located or to third countries.
It is recognized that production of subsidiaries 
abroad and their sales to third countries in some cases 
have displaced exports from the United States, but no 
conclusive evidence as to the extent of this effect can 
be shown. Furthermore, subsidiaries operating in foreign 
countries must have an interest in the economic develop­
ment and needs of those countries. Some governments 
attract foreign industry and give it a protected market 
on the condition that the products produced should be an
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import substitution or should be exported to other
countries in order to help the balance of payments of
the host country. In hearings before the Committee on
Finance of the United States Senate, representatives
of the Department of the Treasury argued that if only
slightly more than three percent of the sales by foreign
subsidiaries of goods they produced abroad displaced
U.S. exports, the "net export"^ factor of investment
2abroad would be eliminated.
Sales of American manufacturing subsidiaries 
abroad average $32.3 billion annually between I962 and 
1964, and rose by approximately 17.4 percent annually 
(Table 21). Of these sales, l4.1 percent was exported 
to third countries with an additional 3*9 percent going 
to the United States. The average annual exports to 
third countries by subsidiaries in Europe and Canada 
amounted to l6.2 percent (footnote to Table 21) of 
their total production. For justification of the afore­
mentioned argument of the Treasury Department concerning 
exports, at least 10.7 percent of all manufacturing 
subsidiaries' sales abroad ($3.5 billion), or 76 percent
^"Net export" factor in this context means all 
the increase in export as the result of investment abroad.
2U.S., Congress, Senate, Statement of Secretary 
of the Treasury Douglas Dillon at the Hearings before 
the Senate Committee on Finance on the Revenue Act of 
1962, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., April 2, 1962, p. 174.
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TABLE 21
SALES OF U.S. MANUFACTURING SUBSIDIARIES ABROAD 
(million of dollars)






sidiaries 9,196 10,163 11,450 10,270
Local sales (7,478) (8,350) (9,347) (8,392) ' 81.8%
Exported to the 
United States (829) (844) (1,227) (966) 9.4#
Exported to 
other countries (889) (969) (876) (912) 8.8#
Europe
Sales of sub­
sidiaries 12,020 14,015 16,500 14,178
Local sales (9,374) (10,782) (12,711) (10,956) 77.3#
Exported to the 
United States (135) (121) (208) (155) 1.1#
Exported to 
other countries (2,511) (3,112) (3,581) (3,068) 21.6#
All areas
Sales of sub­
sidiaries 27,923 31,769 37,270
(30,585)
32,321
Local sales (23,009) (26,000) (26,531) 82.0#
Exported to the 
United States (1,089) (1,126) (1,636) (1 ,284) 3.9#
Exported to 
other countries (3,825) (4,643) (5 ,049) (4,560) l4.l#
Source : U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Bus­
iness November I965, p. 19
^ Total sales of subsidiares in Europe and Canada are 
$24,448 million.
Weighted proportion of it: Europe 58.0 per centCanada 42.0 per cent 
Local sales ; Europe - 77-3 p.c. x 58.0 = 48.34 Canada - ol.o p.c. x 42.0 = 34.36
82.70 p.c.
Exported to the^United States:
Europe - 1.1 p.c. x 58.0 = 0.6 Canada - 9*4 p.c. x 42.0 = 3.9
4.5 p.c.
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Exported to other countries ;
Europe - 21.é p.c. x $8.0 = 12.5 
Canada - 8.8 p.c. x 42.O = 3.7
16.2 p.0.
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of subsidiaries' sales to third countries, would have to 
displace exports from the United States in order to 
eliminate the "net export" factor gains from investment 
abroad ($3*5 billion as presented in Table 20). However, 
if only 3 percent of subsidiaries' sales abroad displaces 
export from the U.S., it amounts to less than Ô1 billion 
which is about 29 percent of "net exports" factor gains 
from investment abroad.
The Treasury's argument is acceptable only to a 
limited extent since it misjudges the reasons for the 
increased sales of subsidiaries abroad and especially 
to third countries. In Europe it is true that large 
amounts of production by American affiliates are sold 
in third countries, but this was an original reason for 
establishing American companies in Europe--to escape the 
high tariff walls imposed on goods outside the European 
economic community. Because of the restrictions and 
high tariffs, it is questionable that American exported 
goods could otherwise be sold in this market. If the 
demand for a product exists and the tariff walls are 
high enough, some local businessman inevitably will enter 
the market and produce despite higher costs. The choice 
open to the United States has been for an American company 
to set up an affiliate factory abroad, export some capital 
equipment from the United States, and remit back part of 
the earnings, or to lose the market completely. It is
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unlikely that over 75 percent of the goods produced 
abhoad and sold In third countries replace American 
exports. American Investment in England is a signifi­
cant part of the investment in Europe, and the ratio 
of eaqports to total sales for American subsidiaries in 
England is no higher than that of British firms in simi­
lar industries.^
2Hufbauer and Adler concluded in their study that 
in the economically advanced countries the displacement 
export effect from American investment abroad would be 
minimal because someone else undoubtedly would invest 
there if a U.S. company did not. However, in less devel­
oped countries, because capital is scarce, it would take 
many years before other capital made the investment; 
therefore, export displacement from the United States 
would be significant. The authors also maintained that 
having subsidiaries abroad is not necessary to stimulate
3exports, especially associated exports. They gave the 
examples of Germany, Italy, and Japan, which have increased
Kenneth W. Dam and Lawrence B. Krause, Federal 
Tax Treatment of Foreign Income (Washington, D.C.: The
Banking Institute, 1964), pT 7̂ .
2Hufbauer and Adler, Overseas Manufacturing Invest­
ment and the Balance of Payments.
3Associated exports are products that an affiliate 
abroad is not producing but is acting as an agent for the 
parent company in order to exploit and sell products pro­
duced in the United States.
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their exports many times in the post-war period without 
the help of overseas subsidiaries. However, this fact 
does not constitute a standard: U.S. trade surpluses
during the some period, until I968, were greater. If 
Germany, Italy, and Japan had subsidiaries abroad, they 
could export even more than they do.
From the discussion in this section it is evident 
that U.S. companies with affiliates abroad use this chan­
nel to export about 38 percent of their total exports and 
that this amount is about 25 percent of total private 
exports. When imports from subsidiaries are taken into 
account the net share of export declines to about 20 per­
cent. However, a large part of these imports are raw 
materials which do not exist or which are in limited 
supply in the United States, and such imports would take 
place whether subsidiaries existed or not.
It is clear that some displacement of exports 
from the United States occurs as the result of subsidi­
ary activities abroad. However, the extent of this 
effect is difficult to measure or to prove. In the case 
of Europe the choice available to American companies was 
to increase production and displace some American exports 
or to lose the market completely. The high tariff walls 
imposed on goods coming from outside the European Economic 
Community made it necessary to invest locally in order to 
keep a share of the growing market.
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Capital Flows; Earnings, Dividends, Royalties and Fees;
Reinvested Earnings, and Capital Outflow
Direct foreign Investment outflows and inflows 
resulted In a net surplus each year from I962 through I967. 
Income repatriated to the United States Increased by 50 
percent during this period (Table 22), Unquestionably, 
direct Investment abroad earned more for the United States 
during that time than the amounts of direct Investment 
outflows, even when royalties and fees were not Included.
From Table 23 (where capital outflow and earnings 
repatriated to the United States are broken Into regions 
and Industries) It becomes clear that capital Inflows do 
not always exceed capital outflows. Capital outflow to 
Europe was greater than capital Inflow from Europe each 
year since I961, Furthermore, Investment In Europe 
Increased by 110 percent between I96I and I967, and at 
the same time earnings rose by only 35 percent. In 
Canada the rate of Increase In earnings only slightly 
exceeded that of Investment. One of the reasons that 
the Government requested the voluntary restraints was 
because of the large outflows to Europe and the more 
developed countries.
Companies cooperating with the Government In the 
voluntary restraing program have been asked to curtail 
their outflow of funds principally to Europe and a few 
other Industrial countries, but they can continue to
TABLE 22



























1962 1.7 1.2 2.9 3.0 1.2 0.6 4.8 1.9
1963 2.0 1.5 3.5 3.1 1.5 0.7 5.3 1.8
1964 2.3 1.4 3.7 3.7 1.4 0.8 5.9 2.2
1965 3.5 1.5 5.0 4.0 1.5 0.9 6.4 1.4
1966 3.6 1.7 5.3 4.0 1.7 1.0 6.7 1.4





SELECTED DATA ON DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD, EARNINGS, 
INCOME, CAPITAL OUTFLOW, ROYALTIES AND FEES,




Total turing Other Total tixring Other
Canada
investment 11,602 5,076 6,526 12,133 5-.J12 6,821
Outflows
Capital outflow 314 12 302




earnings 476 221 255Royalties and Fees 102 66 36
160 615 M l
868 453 415292 162 130
















investment 34.667 11.997 22.670 37.226 13.250 23.976
Outflows 28852 1.273 1.597
Capital outflow 1,654 712 942
Reinvested earnings 1,198 561 637
Inflows^ 4.790 1.547 3.243
Total earnings 4,235 1 ,30? 2,928
Repatriated earnings 3,044 746 2,298
Royalties and fees 548 240 308
^ Inflows includes Repatriated earnings, Reinvested 
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3 1 1  1.626 1,857 3,759 1,948 
77  ̂ 1,202 2,328 1,034 
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Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business. 1963, 1964, 1965, 19^6 , and 1967.
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invest in the developing countries. (Most of this 
investment is with funds from the United States.) 
Businessmen complain, with some justification, that it 
is improper to differentiate between the developed and 
the developing countries as there is a large amount of 
interplay between them. Reported earned income in the 
developing countries is, in many cases, from sales in 
the developed countries. Oil and raw materials are 
extracted in Latin America and the Middle East but are 
sold in Europe where the profits are made. It is the 
resale in Europe from which most of the profit actually 
is derived. However, because of tax considerations, a 
company may find it convenient to make use of its intra- 
company accounts, and the profit appears as income 
derived in one of the developing countries and not in 
Europe.
The fastest growing markets for U.S. companies 
are in the developed rather than the underdeveloped 
countries since only the more economically advanced 
countries have the level of income necessary to buy the 
goods produced by American companies. The underdeveloped 
nations do not have the foreign exchange to enable profit 
remittance; furthermore, in many cases, they have 
exchange controls which make it impossible for the 
profits to*”be taken out.
Government officials and economists accept the
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fact that inflows of repatriated earnings and royalties 
and fees are greater in any given year than are capital 
outflows for direct investment. However, their main 
argument is that the two types of flows being compared 
have little relationship to one another. The inflows 
of dividends and some of the royalties and fees result 
from investment over many years prior to a current period. 
To measure the impact of investment abroad on the balance 
of payments in a current period or in the future, one 
must relate these inflows to a given capital outflow 
currently undertaken. Of course, this point of view 
disregards the "organic approach" to investment abroad 
discussed in an earlier section of this chapter.
There is no question that total inflows as a 
result of direct investment abroad substantially exceed 
total outflows or that the surplus of these outflows in 
recent years is larger than those of the trade account. 
However, government officials are justified in pointing 
out that a comparison which is misleading is made between 
two types of flows. Curtailment of direct investment 
outflow would adversely effect only an increment of 
investment a number of years hence. The main question 
to be answered is how many years it would take before 
curtailment of capital outflow would have an adverse 
effect on the U.S. balance of payments.
164
Direct Investment Recoupment Periods as Related 
to the Balance of Payments
In this section various approaches will be 
examined in order to ascertain the length of time needed 
for direct investment abroad to repay itself in balance 
of payment terms, when such different but related factors 
as outflows of capital, earnings, reinvested earnings, 
dividends, generated exports, and generated imports are 
taken into consideration.
One of the approaches that has caused considerable 
controversy is the model approach which was developed by 
Professor P. W. Bell. In his testimony before the Joint 
Economic Committee^ in 1962, Professor Bell tried to 
calculate the number of years required for cumulative 
dividends to equal an initial amount of capital outflow.
His approach has bean used in many cases by government 
officials when called upon to justify, on economic grounds, 
the voluntary restraint program on direct investment abroad.
In 1968 the Treasury Department sponsored and
published the independent study made by Professors Adler 
2and Hufbauer, in which it was concluded that when all 
trade effects are taken into account and when it is
P. W. Bell, Private Capital Movement and the 
U.S. Balance of Payments, cited in testimony before Joint 
Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 87th Cong., 2nd sess.
2Adler and Hufbauer, Overseas Manufacturing Invest­
ment and the Balance of Payments.
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assumed that the U.S. direct foreign investment is 
defensive (if American companies do not invest, others 
■will), the following average payback periods will 
result: Canada, 1 0 .2  years; Latin America, 9*7 years;
Europe, 6.5 years; rest of world, 6.6 years; world 
total, 8.1 years. In cases where it is assumed that 
investment abroad is not defensive, the period of pay­
back , in balance of payments terms, would be between 
eight and an infinite number of years.
Although the Adler-Hufbauer study was not 
intended to be the basis for policy making, its con­
clusions have supported direct capital outflow restraint, 
and it has been used by the Treasury Department to bolster 
its case.
The assumptions and conclusions of the Adler- 
Hufbauer study have received sharp criticism from 
many business organizations. The study assumed that all 
additions to investment abroad are incremental and that 
all restrictions on capital outflow would offset only 
the marginal investment and not the total earning capacity 
of the companies operating abroad. This assumption is 
not accepted by many business leaders who advance the 
"organic" assumption that all additional investment is 
necessary in order to support the current level of total 
investment. Other assumptions were that the level of 
demand for a given product was fixed and could be supplied
l66
only by U.S. exports or by local production--not by both, 
and that all investments abroad are for facilities to 
manufacture products which are substitutes for U.S. 
exports. There are investments for the production of 
such products, but there are also investments in products 
that are never exported from the United States. A sig­
nificant weakness of the model was pointed out by Dr. Jack 
N. Behrman, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce, in 
his study evaluating the validity and accuracy of the 
model:
The study (model) also miscalculates the return to 
investment arising from remission of earnings by 
including earnings retained abroad in the outstand­
ing investment but not including it in the return 
to U.S. payments. The retained earnings did not 
actually flow out of the United States through inter­
national payment because they did not come in. They 
have to be included in both the numerator and denomi­
nator, or in neither, to obtain a balance of payments 
ratio of returns and outflows.
Another basic flaw in the model is the treatment 
of net capital expenditure abroad. The authors related 
earnings repatriated and other inflows to total invest­
ment abroad. However, in order to measure the impact on 
the balance of payments they should have related it only 
to capital outflows and should not have treated funds 
borrowed abroad as capital outflow. If capital inflows 
were related only to funds that came out of the United
Jack N. Behrman, Direct Manufacttirinjg Investment, 
Exports and the Balance of Payments (New York, N.Y.: 
National Foreign Trade Council, I968), p. 2.
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States, the repayment period, in balance of payments 
terms, would be shortened considerably.
In the following part of this section three 
models will be presented in an attempt to measure the 
recoupment period of direct investment abroad. The 
first model (Table 26) will utilize the approach developed 
by Professor Bell (and used by Adler and Hufbauer in 
their study) in which an attempt was made to calculate 
the recoupment period of total investment and manufac­
turing investment abroad based on the actual data in the 
periods 1962-64 and I965-67 by relying only on the value 
of direct investment, the earnings of such investment, 
and the share remitted to the United States. This 
approach disregards any effects of increasing or dis­
placing exports from the United States or of increasing 
imports to the United States.
Table 27 shows a calculation of the actual 
dividends, royalties, fees, and net exports in manufac­
turing for the years I96I-67 as directly related to 
total capital outflow and reinvestment for this period.
The model in Table 29 is constructed in such a way as to 
show the effects on the balance of payments when an annual 
outflow of $840 million is invested in manufacturing in 
Europe and Canada. The direct investment accumulates
^Bell, Private Capital Movement and the U.S. 
Balance of Payments Position.
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each year by an additional #840 million of capital out­
flow plus the reinvested earnings. The figure of #84o 
million was chosen because it was the actual average of 
capital outflow from the United States to Canada and 
Europe for investment in manufacturing during 1961-67*
All data about capital outflow, reinvested earn­
ings , and other outflows were taken from the Survey of 
Current Business for the years 1960-6?» and were compared 
with all capital inflows that were generated because of 
the investments during the same period.
The models omit many important factors which may 
have a great impact on the balance of payments but which 
cannot be measured. Recoupment periods of investment 
abroad as measured by the following models could be 
changed significantly if effects such as export displace­
ments, additional export, and the like were taken into 
consideration.
Tables 23» 24 and 25 given the book value, in 
U.S. dollars, of total direct investment abroad and 
earnings and remittances to the United States from these 
investments, with a breakdown for manufacturing. It 
will be observed that total direct investment in manu­
facturing 'in Europe increased by over 130 percent between 
1961 and 1967, while earnings rose by only about 60 per­
cent; for Canada, investment increased by 60 percent and 
earnings by 70 percent (Table 24). Furthermore, the
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TABLE 24
ANNUAL EARNINGS, ANNUAL INCOME, AND CUMULATIVE DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN MANUFACTURING 
(million of dollars)
1961 1962 1963 1964 1963 1966 1967
Canada
Earnings 360 460 523 563 606 628 613Income 213 221 192 269 315 354 296Direct
Investment 5,076 
Latin America
5,312 5,761 6,198 6,872 7,675 8,038
Earnings 172 173 171 243 289 342 264Income 75 71 70 98 123 147 195Direct
Investment 1,707 1,944 2,213 2,507 2,945 3,317 3,572
Europe
Earnings 530 496 627 782 839 860 847Income 326 334 303 427 532 489 361
Direct
Investment 4,233 4,883 5,634 6,587 7,606 8,876 9,781
Other Areas
Earnings l4l 178 218 262 268 274 328
Income 108 120 89 99 124 126 l4iDirect
Investment 949 1,111 1,329 1,643 1,916 2,190 2,688
World, total
Earnings 1,203 1,307 1,541 1,832 2,022 2,104 2,031
Income 722 746 656 893 1,094 1,116 1,193
Direct
Investment 11,997 13,230 14,937 16,935 19,339 22,038 24,124
Source : U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business. October I968, p. 26.
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TABLE 25
ANNUAL EARNINGS^, ANNUAL INCOME^, AND DIRECT CUMULATIVE 
INVESTMENTS^ ABROAD, BY MAJOR AREAS 
(million of dollars)
1961^ 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Canada
Earnings —  — 823 948 1,106 1,209 1,237 1,327Income —  — 476 455 634 703 756 790Direct
Investment 11,602 12,133 13,044 13,855 15,318 16,999 -----
Latin America 
Earnings 1,179 1,125 1,244 1,320 1,452 1,403Income —  " 891 956 1,011 995 1,113 1,190
Direct
Investment 9,189 9,474 9,891 10,204 10,836 11,448 —  —
Europe
Earnings 844 996 1,115 1,176 1,161 1,139Income —  — 526 507 659 678 729 849
Direct
Investment 7,742 8,930 10,304 12,129 13,985 16,209 —  —
Other areas
Earnings —  — 1,387 1,518 1,606 1,755 1,852 2,149Income —  — 1,151 1,211 1,370 1,497 1,447 1,689Direct
Investment 6,134 6,689 7,411 8,242 9,285 10,055 -----
World, total
Earnings —  — 4,235 4,587 5,071 5,460 5,702 6,017Income —  — 3,044 3,129 3,674 3,963 4,045 4,518Direct
Investment 34,667 37,226 40,686 44,430 49,424 54,711 —  —
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business, October I968, p. 26.
1 Earnings is the sum of the U.S. share in the net 
earnings of subsidiaries and branch profit.
2 Income is the sum of dividends, interest, branch 
profits remitted to the United States.
3Direct investment is the book value of U.S. equity 
and debt ownership of foreign subsidiaries, in which more than 
25 percent of the share capital is owned by American interests.




REMISSION PARAMETERS FOR MANUFACTURING 
AND TOTAL INVESTMENT





Canada 0.096 0.440 0.054 0.042 16.2
Latin America 0.100 0.408 0.059 0.04l 16.4Europe 0.130 0.559 0.059 0.071 11.1Other areas 0.197 0.493 0.104 0.093 8.1
World total 0.117 0.488 0.060 0.057 12.8
1965-67
Canada 0.089 0.993 0.042 0.047 16.0
Latin America 0.102 0.520 0.049 0.053 14.2
Europe 0.112 0.616 0.043 0.069 12.1
Other areas 0.151 0.448 0.084 0.067 10.5
World total 0.106 0.551 0.048 0.058 13.4
Total Direct Investment, 1962-64
Canada 0.078 0.548 0.035 0.o43 17.8
Latin America 0.124 0.806 0.024 0.100 9.8
Europe 0.110 0.573 0.0&7 0.063 12.7Other areas 0.223 0.827 0.039 0.184 , 5/8
World total 0.125 0.709 0.037 0.088 10.4
1965 -.67Canada 0.082 0.596 0.033 0.049 16.4
Latin America 0.129 0.790 0.027 0.102 9.6Europe 0.082 0.649 0.029 0.053 15.9Other areas 0.209 0,805 0.041 0.168 6.2
Woihld total 0.116 0.729 0.031 0.085 10.9
Sources: Derived from data presented in Tables 23, 24, and 25.
1 iij-ii the after-tax rate of return on investment.
^ "a" is the remission to the United States as a percentage 
of total after-tax earnings.
3 "(l-a)r" is retained earnings as a proportion of direct
investment
4 "àr" is remitted earnings as a proportion of direct investment.
5 equation: 1 = z + zx + zx^ + zx^ ... + zx”
z = ar, X  = = (1 + (l-a)r)
where n is the recoupment period in years.
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amount of investment in Europe between I96I and 1966 was 
larger than the combined investment in Canada and Latin 
America. The share of investment in Europe grew from 
22 percent of total in I96I to 30 percent of total in 
1966. However, income return of this investment grew 
only from 1? percent to 19 percent of total income (Table
25).
For the model in Table 26, which was calculated 
from Tables 23, 24, and 25, various parameters were cal­
culated for the two periods 1962-64 and I965-67 for manu­
facturing and total investment. As discussed earlier, 
the main aim was to find the length of time which was 
required for cumulative remission to pay back an original 
investment. Reinvested earnings are also taken into 
consideration. A lag of one year for return earnings 
was assumed because of the time required to build a 
plant which would function properly (the formula for the 
calculation is given in the footnote to Table 26).
The rate of return on investment (r) has been 
declining for manufacturing investment since the early 
1950's. In the Adler-Hufbauer study^ the average rate 
of return for U.S. manufacturing investment throughout 
the world was 15«9 percent for the period 1950-53,
13.3 percentfor 1954-57, and 11.8 percent for I958-6I.
^Adler and Hufbauer, Overseas Manufacturing 
Investment and the Balance of Payments.
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The "r" used In Table 26 was 11.7 percent for the period 
1962-64 and 10.6 percent for 1965-67» For American 
manufacturing investment in Europe the rate of return 
declined from I8.I percent in the period 1950-53 to 
16.0 percent during 1958-61, to 13 percent for 1962-64, 
and to 11.2 percent for 1965-67» The principal effect 
of such a decline on the balance of payments is that it 
would take longer to recoup an original outflow of 
capital.
The recoupment period for investment in manu­
facturing abroad has widened since 1950: It was an
average of 10.1 years for the period 1950-53, 12.8 years 
for 1962-64, and 13»4 years for I965-67» In Canada it 
rose from 10.1 years for the period 1950-53 to l6.2 years 
during 1962-64 and declined slightly, to I6 years, for 
1965-67, mainly because of the larger proportion of 
earnings returned to the United States in this period 
(one of the requirements of the voluntary program).
The recoupment period in Europe also has increased since 
the 1950's. From 1958-61 it took 9»8 years for original 
investment to return to the United States in the form of 
dividends, but for I965-67 it increased to 12.1 years.^ 
Despite a higher proportion of earnings remitted to the
Recoupment period; prior to I962 are cited from 
Adler and Hufbauer, Overseas Manufacturing Investment and 
the Balance of Payments.
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United States in the last-mentioned period, the longer 
period for recoupment resulted mainly because of the 
decline in the rate of earnings.
Recoupment duration for total direct investment 
abroad is about two and one-half years shorter than it 
is solely for manufacturing investment. The reason for 
the shorter payback period, in balance of payment terms, 
is that the rate of return and the rate of repatriation 
are higher for total direct investment.
The model in Table 27 was constructed in such a 
way that it would measure the effect of direct manu­
facturing investment in Canada and Europe on the balance 
of payments. This model takes into consideration 
exports, remitted income, reinvested earnings, and royal­
ties and fees when related to total new investment (capital 
outflow from the United States and reinvested earnings) 
during the period and not to accumulated investment from 
previous years. Cumulative direct investment in Europe 
and Canada for I96I-67 was #6.1 billion, of which $0.7 
billion was reinvested earnings computed from the actual 
rate of reinvestment fot this period. Actual dividends, 
royalties, fees and net exports for the six years also 
were computed and are directly related to total outflow 
and reinvestment. Compared to the #5.4 billion outflow 
for this period, cumulative net inflow was #3.1 billion, 
and the cumulative deficit amounted to #2.3 billion in
TABLE 27
ESTIMATED EFFECT ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF NEW CAPITAL OUTFLOW TO









































1961 350 350 350
1962 467 18 835 22 58 80 817 80 -737
1963 515 42 1,392 53 137 190 1,332 170 -1,0621964 759 69 2,220 89 231 ; 320 2,091 590 -1,501
1965 1,155 111 3,486 142 368 510 3,246 1,100 -1,1461966 1,445 174 5,105 223 579 802 4,691 1,902 -2,789
1967 695 255 6,055 328 847 1,175 5,386 3,077 -2,309
-nI\J1
Source; Derived from data presented in Tables I6, 23-26.
^ The table makes use of actual data on capital outflow and the parameter values 
for manufacturing subsidiaries on rate of return on investment, proportion of earnings 
distributed and reinvested, rate of payments of fees and royalties per dollar of invest­
ment and value of net export to subsidiaries computed in Tables 22 and 26. In aggre­
gating the data, the parameter values are weighted in accordance with the value of new 
capital outflow in manufacturing going to each region over the period I96I-67. The 
weights are 75 per cent for Europe and 25 per cent for Canada.
(continued)
Footnote to Table 27 (concluded)
lilie relevant parameter values used etre computed as follows:
Column 1 taken from Table 23.
Capital outflow weighted: Europe 75%
Canada 25%
Earnings averages : I96I-67 Europe 12.1# 12.1# x 75 = 9*1
Canada 9.2% 9.2# x 25 = 2.3
11.4#
Proportion of earnings remitted (as of total earnings):
Europe 58.5% 58.5% x 75 = 43-9
Canada 48.2% 48.2% x 25 = 12.1
56.0%
Rate of return on investment wbich is remitted as dividend: 6.4#
Rate of return on investment which is reinvested: 5.0# ^
These two figures are multiplied by the cumulative increment to outstanding investment ^  
of the previous year to obtain the figures in columns 2 and 4.
Rate of return on Royalties and fees (taken from Tables 16 and 23);
Europe 3.7% 3.7% % 75 = 2.8
Canada 2.1% 2.1% x 25 = 0.1
2.9%
Net Export (Table 20) Europe 14.2# l4.2# x 75 = 10.6
Canada 12.3% 12.3% x 25 = 3.1
13.7%
The sum of these two rates is multiplied by the pre\T.ous year’s outstanding investment 
(Column 3) to yield the data in column 5.
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1967 after a decline from #2.8 billion the previous year. 
The decline in 19&7 can be attributed, to an extent, to 
the voluntary program. (It is clear from the model in 
Table 27 that if capital outflow continues at the same 
rate as in the middle 1960*s the cumulative return will 
"catch up" only after several years.) However, in the 
sixth year, total capital inflows already exceeded 
capital outflows by a considerable amount. These inflows 
continued to grow at an accelerated rate.
The model in Table 27 relates dividends, net 
exports, and royalties and fees only to the capital 
outflow of the given period. However, the additional 
investment in manufacturing also included other sources 
of capital. In order to take into consideration inflows 
which resulted from total investment in manufacturing, 
a model was constructed on similar lines in Table 28.
From this model it is evident that the annual inflow of 
capital resulting from investment abroad made during 
the period I96I-68 exceeded substantially the annual 
outflow in the sixth year. Cumulative inflows exceeded 
cumulative outflow in the eighth year.
Another method of examining the effect of invest­
ment on the balance of payments is the model used in 
Table 29. The model was constructed to show how many 
years it would take for investment to repay itself in 
balance of payments terms when direct investment outflow
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TABLE 28
ESTIMATED EFFECT ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENT OF OUTFLOWS AND 
INFLOWS RESULTING FROM MANUFACTURING INVESTMENTS IN 
























1961 9,331 700 700 350
1962 10,195 864 1,564 467 45
1963 11,395 1,200 2,764 515 lOOi
1964 12,785 1,390 4,154 759 177
1965 14,478 1,693 5,847 1,155 266
1966 16,551 2,073 7,920 1,445 374
1967 17,864 1,313 9,233 695 507
1968 19,324 1,460 10,693 561 591
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Survev of Current
Business. October. 1969. o. 30 
presented in Tables I6, 23-27.
; Derived from data
^ The table makes use of actual data on capital out-
flow and the parameter values for manufacturing subsidiaries 
on rate of return on investment, proportioned of earnings 
distributed and reinvested, rate of repayments of fees and 
royalties per dollar of investment and value of net export 
to subsidiaries computed in Tables 26 and 27. In aggregating 
the data, the parameter values are weighted in accordance with 
the value of new capital outflow in manufacturing going to 
each region over the period of I96I-68. The weights are 75 
percent for Europe and 2$ percent for Canada.
2 Reinvested earnings were eliminated from outflows 
and inflows.
 ̂ Capital outflow for the years I965-68 includes funds 
borrowed abroad, but because no breakdown is available the 
























1962 116 161 817 161 -656
1963 260 361 1,332 522 -810
1964 459 636 2,091 1,158 -933
1965 690 956 3,246 2,ll4 -1,132
1966 971 1,345 4,691 3,459 -1,232
1967 1,315 1,822 5,386 5,881 -105
1968 1,533 2,124 5,947 7,405 1,458
TABLE 29
ESTIMATED EFFECT OF A FLOW OF #840 DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MANUFACTURING 
IN EUROPE AND CANADA ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(million of dollars)


























1 840 840 -840 -8402 840 1,722 115 24 53 -648 -1,488
3 840 2,648 237 50 110 -443 -1,9314 840 3,620 363 77 169 -231 -2,162
5 840 4,621 496 105 232 -7 -2,1696 840 5,692 633 134 296 223 -1,939
7 84o 6,817 778 165 364 467 -1,4728 84o 7,997 937 198 436 731 -741
9 840 9,237 1,096 235 512 1,003 26210 84o 10,539 1,266 268 589 1,383 1,64511 840 11,900 1,444 306 674 1,584 3,22912 840 13,341 1,631 343 761 1,897 5,126
H05o
Source: Tables 22-27»





Computed by adding retained earnings (5 percent of cumulative 
investment in preceding year) to total investment in the pre­
ceding year and the new outflow of investment.
13»7 percent of cumulative investment in the preceding year. 
2.9 percent of cumulative investment in the preceding year. 6.4 percent of cumulative investment in the preceding year. 
Column3 plus 4 plus 5 minus column 1.
I8l
accumulates each year by an additional #840 million 
plus the amount of reinvested earnings. All the para­
meters were derived from Tables 22 through 27» (The 
main difference between this model and the one presented 
in Table 27 is the assumption that capital outflow would 
continue at the same level as the I962-67 average and 
how it would affect the balance of payments in the future.)
In the first year there was only capital outflow, 
and the effect on the balance of payments was completely 
negative. It remained negative until the end of the 
fifth year, even when all new exports, royalties and 
fees, and remitted earnings of such investments were 
considered. The cumulative impact on the balance of 
payments remained negative until the end of the eighth 
year. The explanation for this is that the European 
countries and 6anada accumulate liquid dollar claims 
against the United States until the end of the fifth 
year. After five years the annual inflow exceeds the 
annual outflow, and by the end of the ninth year the 
cumulative impact on the U.S. balance of payments becomes 
positive. Thereafter, returns continue at an increasing 
rate. The main conclusion which may be drawn from this 
model is that the effects of direct investment in manu­
facturing on the balance of payments are negative in 
the short run and, at an increasing rate, are positive 
in the long run.
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Besides the problem of measuring indirect effects 
of investment abroad, the models shown in Tables 27 and 
29 also present an additional difficulty--that capital 
inflows are computed as parameters of the part of direct 
investment abroad which consists only of capital out­
flow and reinvested earnings but the earnings returned 
to the United States which are related to investment of 
funds borrowed outside of the U.S. are completely dis­
regarded.
Another method of measuring the impact of direct 
investment abroad on the balance of payments would be 
to relate inflow of repatriated earnings and reinvested 
earnings which resulted from an increase in total invest­
ment abroad to capital outflows from the United States. 
The book value of direct investment abroad increased 
by #24.6 billion between the beginning of I962 and the 
end of 1967, but only slightly less than two-thirds of 
it was as a result of capital outflow from the United 
States (Table 32). Furthermore, an increasing part of 
the capital outflow from the United States includes funds 
borrowed abroad, but in the balance of payments accounts 
they appear as foreign assets in the United States and 
as capital outflow.
With the advent of the Voluntary Program in I965, 
the United States incorporated companies with affil­
iates operating abroad began borrowing funds in 
foreign capital markets and using the proceeds of 
such borrowings to finance investment in their
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affiliates. Initially, borrowing abroad by the U.S. 
company is a balance of payments inflow, and the 
liability to the foreign lender is reflected as a 
foreign asset in the United States. When foreign- 
borrowed funds are transferred to a foreign affili­
ate, they are included in direct investment capital 
outflows, i.e., are reported with funds sent directly 
from the United States.^
Taking into consideration reinvested earnings, 
as inflow and outflow, and the funds borrowed abroad, 
it is evident that actual capital outflow from the 
United States for investment abroad is only about 65 
percent of the increase in value of total investment.
When these adjustments were incorporated into the model 
presented in Table 26, all recoupment periods were cut 
by approximately one-third. The recoupment period of 
U.S. manufacturing investment in Europe was eight years, 
and for the world as a vdiole it was about 8.3 years.
For total investment abroad the recoupment period in 
Europe was 9»5 years and for the world as a whole, about
7.5 years.
The models in Tables 30 and 31 are constructed 
in such a way as to measure the resultant effect on the 
balance of payments from manufacturing investment in 
Canada and Europe, taking into account most of the 
indirect effects which were omitted from all previous 
models. The models take into consideration not only 
the increase in direct investment resulting from U.S.
Emil L, Nelson and Frederick Cutler, "The Inter­
national Investment Position of the United States in I967," 
Survev of Current Business (Washington, D.C.: Department
of Commerce, October I968), p. 22,
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U.S. capital outflow, but also the actual amounts of 
reinvested earnings and borrowing abroad used in direct 
investment during the period I962-67. In addition, two 
estimates have been made of the amount of capital goods 
exported from the U.S. to subsidiaries abroad as the 
result of the additional investment and the amount by 
which U.S. exports have been displaced by the sales of 
subsidiaries in the producing, or third countries. There 
are many difficulties inherent in an attempt to build a 
model which takes into account direct and indirect effects 
of direct investment abroad on the balance of payments.
The available data published by the Department of Com­
merce lack much of the information needed to measure 
the direct effects and do not include the figures needed 
to measure the indirect effects. Data on borrowing 
abroad used for direct investment have been available 
only since I965, and only for total investment in all 
industries. Therefore, an estimate has been made of 
the amount of borrowing used for manufacturing investment 
in Europe and Canada. There is no way to measure 
empirically the amount of export displaced as the result 
of direct investment abroad, but it is agreed that such 
displacement occurs, at least in the short-run. However, 
most businessmen will argue this point using the justi­
fication that investment in Europe is the result of 
export displacement. The high tariff wall imposed by
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the Common Market and other regional agreements have 
made it necessary for American companies to invest in 
these countries in order to keep part of the growing 
markets. Nevertheless, two estimates have been made 
in an attempt to measure such displacement; one is that 
it amounts to 3 percent of subsidiaries sales ; and the 
other is for 6 percent of such sales. One more estimate 
had to be made in order to measure the amount of initial 
capital goods exported from the U.S. when an American 
company invests in a plant abroad. As discussed earlier 
(page 143) the amount most often agreed upon by econo­
mists, businessmen and government officials is about 
30-35 percent of the increase in investment. However, 
the amount for investment in manufacturing, especially 
in Europe, is lower. In the following tables two esti­
mates have been made; one is 20 percent of the increase 
in investment and the second is for 6 percent of the 
increase in expenditures on plant and equipment.^ Six 
percent of the increase in expenditures has been chosen 
because it is the figure computed by a Treasury Department
The annual increase in U.S. direct investment 
abroad is the net change in the value of investment from 
one year to the previous one. However, there is a cer­
tain amount of depreciation each year which is reinvested. 
Expenditures on plant and equipment include the direct 
investment capital outflow from the U.S., reinvested 
earnings, borrowing abroad used for direct investment, 
and the corporation's internally generated overseas depre­
ciation reserves.
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sponsored study.^ Another indirect effect on the balance 
of payments is the amount borrowed abroad by U.S. cor­
porations to be used for direct investment. Such borrow­
ing may tend to reduce purchases of other U.S. securities, 
such as stocks, Government bonds, etc. There is no pos­
sible way to measure such activity nor would the amount 
involved be significant enough to change the result of 
the models presented in Tables 30 and 31*
The average annual increase in direct investment 
abroad was $1422 million during the period 1962-67»
To finance this investment U.S. companies used $?42 mil­
lion capital outflow from the U.S., $5?8 million of 
reinvested earnings and $109 million in borrowing abroad. 
When considering all related direct and indirect effects 
on the balance of payments the recoupment periods in 
relation to outflow of capital from the U.S. is between 
3.4 and 5*4 years (Table 30). The two year spread in 
the recoupment period is due to the two different esti­
mates made on capital goods exports and export displace­
ment, the lower limit being when capital goods export 
is the higher and exports displacement is low, and the 
upper limit being when they are reversed.
In Table 31 an attempt was made to measure the 
cumulative effects of the factors presented in the data
^Adler and Hufbauer, Overseas Manufacturing 
Investment and the Balance of Payments.
TABLE 30
ESTIMATED EFFECT ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF OUTFLOWS AND INFLOWS 
(CONSIDERING REINVESTED EARNINGS AS OUTFLOWS AND INFLOWS) 
RESULTING FROM MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT IN 









Outflow Reinvested Used in 









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)A B A B
1962 864 465 400 " — 90 172 774 692
1963 1200 515 639 46 99 240 1055 9141964 1390 579 616 195 126 268 1069 927
1965 1693 1100 577 40 168 338 1485 13151966 2073 1200 64o 233 204 4l4 1636 14261967 1313 575 595 143 198 262 972 908Annual Average










and Fees Net Inflow
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)A B A B
1962 170 59 64 128 99 25 171 117
1963 235 85 73 146 137 35 249 1761964 272 95 84 168 158 4o 291 207
1965 332 115 90 180 193 48 368 2781966 406 l4l 99 198 236 60 462 3631967 257 89 107 214 150 38 249 142
Annual Averagefnr Period 279 97 86 172 162 41 299 214
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Sources ; Table 30
Column 1 : Table 23.
Column 2 : Table 23.
Column 3 : Table 23.
Column 4 : U.S. Department of Commerce, Survev of Cur­
rent Business, September I968I pp. 22-44, 
and estimate.
Notes
Column 5 : A.
Column 6 : 
Column 71
Column 8 :
Computed as 6 percent of the expendi­
tures on plant and equipment each year,
B, Computed as 20 percent of increase in
new investment each year.
A, Columns 2 plus 3 minus 3A.
B. Columns 2 plus 3 minus 3B.
19.5 percent of investment during year. 
(Computed from Table 20)
Exports (not including capital export)
Europe 16.3# 16.3# x 75 = 12.2
Canada 29.4# 29.4# x 25 = 7.3
19.5#
6.8 percent of investment during year. 
(Computed from Table 20)
Imports
Europe 3.1# 3.1# x 75 = 2.3
Canada 17.9# 17.9# x 25 = 4.56.8#
Column 9 • A. 3 percent of subsidiaries sales during
year.
B. 6 percent of subsidiaries sales during 
year.
Column 10: 11.4 percent of investment during year
includes 6.4 percent of repatriated earn­
ings and 5 percent of reinvested earnings. 
(Parameter computed in Table 27)
Column 11: 2.9 percent of investment during year.
(Parameter computed in Table 27)
Column 12: A. Columns 7 plus 10 plus 11 minus 8
minus 9A.
B. Columns 7 plus 10 plus 11 minus 8 
minus 9B.





ESTIMATED EFFECT ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF A FLOW OF #1313 DIRECT 















































































Year Estimated Displaced Exports
(8)
Estimated Capital Goods 












A B A B
1 —  — -- — 147 282 — « «
2 86 172 294 564 279 162 41
3 172 344 44l 846 338 324 824 258 516 588 1,128 837 486 123
3 344 688 733 1,410 1,116 648 1646 430 860 882 1,692 1,393 810 205
7 516 1,032 1,029 1,974 1,674 972 245
H03
Source: Table 30.
Notes: See footnote to Table 30, all data and computed paramibers are the same as
in Table 30. However, the data presented in this table is the annual 





















1 -1,166 -1,031 -1,166 -1,031 -1,166 -1,031 1,166 -1,0312 - 720 - 450 - 806 - 536 -1,886 -1,481 -1,972 -1,567
3 - 274 131 - 446 4l -2,160 -1,350 -2 ,4l8 -1,6084 172 709 86 451 -1,988 - 64i -2,504 -1,157
5 608 1,288 264 939 -1,380 579 -2,240 - 2186 1,054 1,864 624 1,434 - 326 2,443 -1,616 1,216
7 1,501 2,346 985 1,830 1,115 4,789 - 631 3,046 Hv£»ONotes : continuation - Table 31
2Column 13 : A. Columns12. 4 plus 7 plus 8a minus 9A minus 10 minus 11 minus
B. Columns12. 4 plus 7 plus 8a minus 9B minus 10 minus 11 minus
C. Columns12. 4 plus 7 plus
8b minus 9A minus 10 minus 11 minus
D. Columns12. 4 plus 7
plus 8B minus 9B minus 10 minus 11 minus
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in Table 30, During the first year the only factor to 
offset part of the capital outflow was the exported 
goods resulting from new investment; all other effects 
started the second year. The recoupment period in this 
table in one extreme (14b) is the middle of the fifty 
year when cumulative flows become positive. In the 
other extreme (l4C) the recoupment period would not be 
until the middle of the eighth year. In the other two 
cases the recoupment period would be about 6.5 years.
From the discussion and the models contained in 
this section it is possible to estimate that the recoup­
ment period for investment abroad in balance of payments 
terms is between 5 and 7 years. When only outflow of 
capital from the United States and reinvested earnings 
are compared to the inflow of repatriated earnings the 
period of recoupment is between 8 and 10 years. However, 
when other direct effects of investment abroad such as 
exports, imports, and royalties and fees are taken into 
consideration the recoupment period is shortened sub- 
stantially--to approximately seven years. Furthermore, 
when indirect effects of investment abroad are also taken 
into consideration, the recoupment period is further 
shortened to 5 to 6 years. It should be remembered that 
these figures are based essentially on data for manu­
facturing in the developed countries. Nevertheless, in 
at least two exan^les the recoupment period was related
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to total investment in all areas, making the recoupment 
period appear to be slightly shorter. Of course, one 
can find examples of specific industries in specific 
areas where the recoupment period is either longer or 
shorter.
There are additional factors which cannot be 
quantified or measured and which in the aforementioned 
models prolonged the recoupment period, but their 
adverse effects on the balance of payments would exist 
or even be greater if no direct investment abroad were 
made. Investment in public utilities and trade do not 
replace any exports from the United States; on the con­
trary, such investment encourages export of capital goods 
in the case of utilities and develops new markets in 
the case of trade. However, the voluntary program asked 
for restraint on all investments without giving special 
consideration to these industries. Furthermore, curtail­
ing investment in distributive and utility industries 
abroad can cause not only the loss of additional exports 
but possibly can lose existing markets for exports as 
well.
Investment in raw materials all over the world 
is necessary in order to supply the domestic economy 
with this vital requirement. The importation of raw 
materials would continue whether or not American companies 
invested abroad in the extractive industries. However,
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even though the importation of raw materials would con­
tinue if American companies did not invest or if they 
curtailed investment to a large degree, the United 
States would forego part of the exports to build plants 
as well as the income generated by such investment.
All of the models presented are based on the 
incremental approach (discussed on pp. 98-IOO), to the 
extent that the organic (rather than the incremental) 
concept is correct, the net inflow of Tables 27-31 
would be increased by the amount of annual earnings on 
past investment which would have been lost had the cur­
rent new investment not been made. This would reduce 
the time it takes for the cumulative flows to become 
positive.
Foreign Borrowing and Direct Investment 
The voluntary program of capital restraing was 
aimed at reducing the adverse impact of foreign direct 
investment on the U.S. balance of payments, not to cur­
tail or reduce foreign investment. Actually it was 
designed to shift the financing of investment abroad.
The restraints on capital outflows were limited mainly 
to Europe and a few developed countries where liquid 
liabilities were accumulating as the result of the bal­
ance of payments deficits.
The book value of direct investment at the end
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of 1967 was $59»3 billion~-70 percent more than the 
amount at the beginning of I962 (Table 32). Over 40 
percent of this total was investment in manufacturing, 
which was the fastest growing area of investment and 
which accounted for almost 50 percent of the total growth 
in direct investment abroad.
Although the restraints on capital outflows were 
aimed primarily at the developed countries, expenditures 
on foreign plants and equipment increased greatly between 
1964 and 1967; and this occurred mostly in the developed 
countries. In addition, American companies expanded 
through the acquisition of existing foreign companies, 
with the price paid for such acquisitions averaging 
$0.5 billion per year during those three years. Total 
annual expenditures on plants and equipment increased 
from #6.2 billion in 1964 to $9,2 billion in I967 
(Table 33). However, at the same time foreign direct 
investment outflow from the United States declined from 
#3.5 billion in I965 to #3 billion in I967 (Table 11).
This was made possible because U.S. companies turned 
increasingly to foreign financial markets to finance thier 
investment. During the years 1965-67, about #1.2 billion 
in long-term funds was borrowed abroad for direct invest­
ment by the U.S. companies which participated in the 
voluntary program. In addition, approximately #2 billion 
also was borrowed by affiliates of the participating
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TABLE 32
BOOK VALUE OF DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD, 1962-6? 
AND CAPITAL OUTFLOW 
(million of dollars)
All Areas Canada Europe
Book value
Beginning of I962 











Capital outflow 16,069 3,456 7,929
Retained earnings and other 8,531 3,434 2,211
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business, October , 1968, p. 26 .
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TABLE 33
PLANT AND EQUIPMENT EXPENDITURES BY FOREIGN AFFILIATES
OF U.S. CORPORATION BY AREA 1964-67












































Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business. March I969, p. l4 ; October I967, P^ 17*
197
companies. Other additional funds wore derived from 
the rising depreciation of the foreign affiliates.
U.S. capital outflow financed only 40 percent of the 
total expenditures on plants and equipment.^ Thus, 
borrowing abroad was the main reason that tho U.S. 
companies which participated in the voluntary program 
were below the target ceilings (although tho ceilings 
wore gradually lowered).
With respect to encouraging companies to borrow 
abroad in order to reduce outflows from the United 
States, the voluntary program was quite successful, and 
its impact on the balance of payments in the short run 
was positive. However, the economic cost to the com­
panies involved in the program, the long-run impact on 
the balance of payments, and the effect of the borrowing 
on foreign capital markets remain to be seen.
During the years 1965-68, interest rates in 
Europe were higher than those in the United States--a 
fact that increased the cost of operating in Eruope. 
Furthermore, many European investors who held U.S. 
Government or private securities sold them in the United 
States and bought new securities in Europe in order to
Statement of Charles E. Fiero, Director of the 
Office of Foreign Direct Investment, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, concerning a Review of Balance of Payment 
Policies at the Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter­
national Exchange and Payments, Joint Economic Committee, 
91st Cong., 1st sess., January I969, p. 142.
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benefit from the higher interest rates* to the amount 
that such substitution took place, it is an offset to 
the gain of borrowing abroad. The accelerated growth 
of American firms which borrowed in Europe caused a 
further increase in interest rates, making it more 
expensive for the local businessman to borrow for their 
own needs. The increasing interest rates made it almost 
impossible for the developing countries to borrow in 
Europe or in the United States.
The most important point is that substituting 
borrowed money for direct outflow does not save foreign 
exchange in the long run; furthermore, the favorable 
impact on the balance of payments of borrowing abroad 
is only short term. Companies that borrow abroad must 
pay interest which would reduce direct investment income 
inflow to the United States by the end of the first year. 
Repayment of the indebtedness on maturity would increase 
capital outflow in the future. It has been assumed by 
the Government that the current temporary gains in the 
balance of payments would provide more time for working 
out fundamental improvements in the payments balance 
and that in the future it would be strong enough to 
repay the additional burdens. However, for each addi­
tional year that the voluntary restraints (or later man­
datory controls) have been in existence, the debt to 
foreigners has increased, and it grows more difficult
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to eliminate those restraints because of a fear of 
large outflows to pay the outstanding debt.
Alternative Possibilities to Voluntary or 
Direct Controls
Devaluation of the Dollar
Devaluation of the dollar or increasing the 
price of gold has been discussed in the igGO's as one 
possible solution to the world liquidity problem and the 
U.S. payments deficit. The reason given for such a move 
in order to improve the U.S. payments position has been 
that other countries would not necessarily follow the 
full amount of devaluation; thus, the competitive posi­
tion of the United States would be improved.
A higher rate of inflation in the United States 
(compared to that in Europe during the period I965-68), 
decline in balance of trade surpluses, increase in U.S. 
short-term liabilities, and lower gold reserves were the 
main reasons given in favor of devaluation. Under the 
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund 
the United States may devalue unilaterally up to 10 
percent; however, such a move probably would be ineffective 
since other countries would follow suit, and the problem 
of would liquidity would not be solved for more than 
a few years. Any larger increase in the price of gold 
(devaluation) would be contrary to the U.S. international
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agreement and surely would lead other countries to 
devalue their currencies--an event which would benefit 
mainly the gold-producing countries of Russia and South 
Africa. In addition, such action would almost certainly 
rule out the dollar as a key currency in future inter­
national arrangements. The countries which trusted in 
the United States and kept a large portion of their 
reserves in the form of dollars would be the main losers, 
and countries and individuals who hoarded gold in anti­
cipation of a rise in price would be the main beneficiaries. 
More important is the fact that such action would only 
postpone the crisis for a few years because the supply 
of gold is not flexible and does not meet the increase 
in demand for liquidity as world trade increases. Thus, 
it would only increase gold speculation in expectation 
of a repeated action in the future.
Devaluation usually is carried out when a coun­
try's balance of trade is in disequilibrium. However, 
the U.S. deficit problem stems basically from the trans­
fer and capital accounts, not from the current account.
In 1964 and I965 when the U.S. surplus on the merchandise 
account was very high (the highest since 194?), the defi­
cit in the balance of payments was more than $2.5 billion 
each year. In I968 the U.S. merchandise trade balance 
shrank to the lowest point singe World War II, but the 
balance of payments, measured in the "liquidity" basis
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or the "official reserve transaction," showed a surplus. 
The elimination of the trade surplus was caused by a 
surge of imports resulting from a rapid increase in pri­
vate and governmental demands due to the war in Vietnam, 
Therefore, even if devaluation were possible, because 
of the large demand at home and strong pressures on 
existing resources, it is not a certainty that devalu­
ation would solve the payments deficit problem.
For the U.S. balance of paymehts to gain from 
devaluation, the prices of exports in U.S. dollars would 
have to remain stable in relation to those of other coun­
tries and exports would have to increase by at least the 
same percentage as the devaluation. Concurrently, 
imports would have to decline because of the higher 
prices (in U.S. dollars) of imported goods. However, 
since the middle of I965, the U.S. economy has operated 
at relatively full capacity, and devaluation during 
this period would only have added to inflationary pres­
sure on the economy.
The effect of devaluation on American companies 
operating in the United States and abroad would be mixed, 
favorable, and unfavorable. However, unfavorable effects 
would outweigh the favorable effects. If the United 
States were the only nation to devalue (which would be 
unlikely), the cost of investment abroad would rise at 
least proportionately to the percentage of devaluation.
given amount of export from the U.S.TT « Ky companies with
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foreign affiliates would earn less in foreign exchange, 
and the prices in U.S. dollars for imported raw materials 
(which is the majority of the exports of the foreign 
affiliates) would increase. The favorable effect would 
be that exports from the United States would be more 
competitive, and earnings of these companies, from their 
investment abroad, would be exchanged for more dollars.
In the case that other countries were to follow the exam­
ple of the United States and competitive devaluation 
developed, no country (except the major gold producers) 
would gain, and it is likely that most countries would 
impose restrictions on trade and investment. In such 
an event, the effect of devaluation would be very unfavor­
able for American companies with investment abroad or 
for that matter to all American companies with international 
trade relations.
Settling the War in Vietnam 
As a result of the continuing build-up of mili­
tary expenditures in Vietnam and declining surpluses in 
the balance of trade (for which the war has been partially 
responsible) the deficit in the balance of payments con­
tinued to grow despite the restrictions of the voluntary 
program on capital outflows during the years I965-67.
The surpluses in the balance of trade were not large 
enough to cover the continuation of reduced foreign aid,
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military expenditures in Europe, lower outflows of 
capital, travel, and most important, the increasing 
foreign exchange costs of the war in Vietnam.
The Department of Defense estimates that defense 
expenditures entering the balance of payments accounts 
as a result of the war in Vietnam have averaged about 
$1.3 billion annually for the major Asian countries 
since the beginning of I963 (Table 34).
TABLE 34
U.S. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ENTERING THE INTERNATIONAL 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS BY MAJOR AREAS,










1964 1.5 0.7 0.3 0.4 2.9
1963 1.4 0.8 0.2 0.4 2.8
1966 1.5 1.3 0.2 0.4 3.4
1967 1.6 1.9 0.2 0.3 4.2
1968 1.6 2.1 0.3 0.3 4.3
Source : Statement of Hon. Robert C. Moot, Assistant
Secretary of Defense, at the Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on International Exchange and Pay­
ment, Joint Economic Committee, 9Ist Cong.,
1st sess., January I969, p. I08.
The aforementioned #1.3 billion figure includes estimated 
expenditures made outside Vietnam but related to the conflict
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there; however, it does not include indirect foreign 
exchange costs such as increased imports in order to 
supply the increasing need for military goods.
In a study prepared by economists, Leonard Dudley 
and Peter Passel, it was concluded that the real foreign 
exchange cost of the war has been between #3.6 and #4 
billion annually since the beginning of 196$.^ In the 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Exchange 
and Payments in January of I969, Mr. Passel agreed, more 
or less, with the direct costs given by the Department 
of Defense, but he argued that if the secondary and 
indirect effects were taken into consideration, the 
impact on the balance of payments would have been much 
higher.
Two important effects which should be taken 
into consideration are the following:
1. Greater purchases of foreign goods to be 
used as inputs in U.S. defense production.
2. Deterioration in the U.S. net exports, due 
to both war stimulated inflation and to 
supply bottlenecks in those sectors of 
production most affected by the increased
Leonard Dudley and Peter Passel, "The Weir in 
Viet-Nam and the U.S. Balance of Payments," The Review 
of Economics and Statistics. November I968 (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, I968).
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spending.^
The large increase in imports since 1964 is 
partially due to higher imports of raw materials and 
intermediate goods by private industry for use in the 
production of military supplies. It is quite difficult 
to calculate the share of imports for military purposes 
that go to aid the war in Vietnam, but in the study 
discussed, the estimate (based on input-output relation­
ship) was about $1.1 billion annually (Table 35)» Other in­
direct factors are the diversion of some production from 
export to military use, inflationary pressures, and man­
power shortages which caused price increases and deteri­
oration in price competitiveness of U.S. exports. The 
impact of these factors is estimated to be about $1.3 
billion annually (Table 35).
TABLE 35
TOTAL CURRENT ACCOUNT IMPACT OF THE WAR 
IN VIETNAM, 1965-67 
(billion U.S. dollars)
Component of Deficit AlternativeEstimate
Best
Estimate
Direct foreign expenditures 1.6 1.6
War material import content 0.6 1.1
Indirect impact on trade position 1.4 r a  ‘
Total 3.6 4.0
Source: Statement of Peter Passel, Hearings before theSubcommittee on International Exchange and Pay­ments, Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong.,1st sess., January 1969» p. 114.
U.S. Congress, A Review of Balance of Payment Policies. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments. Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st sess., January I969, p. 110.
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From the foregoing analysis one can conclude that 
the decline in the U.S. balance of trade surplus is, to 
a large extent, a result of the war in Vietnam. It 
affects the balance from two directions: increase in
imports and decline in exports from the amounts they 
could be if the war were not in progress.
The Department of Defense disputes the accuracy 
of the figures and the basic assumptions presented, 
maintaining that there is no way to estimate the indirect 
cost of the war. However, whether or not the estimates 
of indirect foreign exchange costs of the war are accurate, 
all exports, including those of the Defense Department, 
agree that they exist and that the total impact of the 
war on the balance of payments is higher than the direct 
cost of $1.5 billion. There are some offsetting inflows 
of foreign exchange which occur as the result of defense 
expenditures and the existence of the "feedback" effect.
In some cases they may run as high as 40 percent of 
total expenditures. Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Robert C. Moot, agrees that the direct and indirect for­
eign exchange cost of the war is between $2 billion and 
$3 billion annually.^
Even if the lower figure of about $2.5 billion is 
the adverse impact on the balance of payments, it is still
^Ibid., p. 127.
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higher than the average balance of payments deficit since 
1964, However, settling the war in Vietnam would not 
automatically solve the payments problem of the United 
States; the adjustment would take several years and 
would be gradual. The initial impact of the voluntary 
program on the balance of payments was positive and helped 
to keep the deficits smaller than they would have been 
otherwise. In addition, the United States had a persistent 
deficit on its international accounts long before the 
added foreign exchange cost of the war in Vietnam. Never­
theless , the end of this conflict would be the largest 
single contribution to improving the balance of payments 
position, and it could be to such a magnitude that volun­
tary or mandatory controls of direct investment abroad 
would no longer be necessary.
Monetary and Fiscal Policies
Economic and social costs are always involved 
when using monetary and fiscal policies, thus raising 
the problem of determining to what extent they should 
be used. When such measures can be used harmoniously 
for domestic and balance of payments economic goals, no 
problem arises, but when the steps that must be taken are 
not compatible with all goals, the domestic priorities 
of economic growth and full employment must come first.
The monetary and fiscal actions that can be taken
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in the United States are limited and are not flexible 
because of the institutional arrangements. Until policy 
makers recognize a problem and decide what measures to 
take, long periods of time elapse. They then must con­
vince the Congress (as in the case of imposing the sur­
charge tax) that such measures are necessary; often, if 
the measures are finally imposed it is too late for them 
to be effective. Monetary policies which are easier to 
apply also depend on many factors which create a real 
problem for the Federal Reserve. First, there is a lag 
between the time the action is taken and its effect on 
the economy. Therefore, all action must be dependent on 
the right forecast of economic development and, in addi­
tion, should be coordinated with fiscal actions. Other­
wise the effects of monetary actions on the economy may 
be somewhat harmful--as was the case in I968 when the 
erroneous official forecast of economic developments, 
based partially on exaggerated estimates of the impact 
of the fiscal program (tax surcharge and budget restraint), 
lead to an excessive rate of credit expansion, inflationary 
pressure, and indirectly to deterioration in the balance 
of trade. Second, the control of the Federal Reserve on 
the credit flow is partially limited. About 35 percent 
of total credit flow in the United States is through 
nonfinancial institutions such as insurance companies 
and pension funds which are not under the control of the
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Federal Reserve. Therefore, any policy decision must 
take into account the fact that the credit flow cannot 
be controlled. And last, most of the monetary actions 
taken would affect the economy on the aggregate, but there 
are some sectors, such as construction, which would be 
affected most at times when it was intended that they 
should be affected the least.
From the above discussion it is clear that using 
fiscal and monetary policies for domestic goals is quite 
limited and difficult. It would be unwise for a nation 
such as the United States, where foreign trade is only 
about 3 percent of gross national product, to pursue for 
balance of payments purposes monetary and fiscal policies 
which are not in line with domestic needs and goals.
In 1964 and I965 the country's balance of payments was 
in deficit and the voluntary program was introduced.
During most of this period the rate of unemployment 
was high (around 5 percent), prices were relatively 
stable, and there was unused productive capacity. With 
such conditions, to follow a policy of monetary and 
fiscal restraints would have been disastrous for the 
domestic economy even though it may have been desirable 
for balance of payments purposes. For the period since 
mid-1965, the unemployment rate declinéd, prices advanced 
more rapidly, and pressure on resources became considerable. 
The source for these developments was the Government's
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stimulative budget due to the soaring military expendi­
tures resulting from the war in Vietnam. During this 
period the appropriate fiscal and monetary policies for 
domestic and external purposes coincided, but because 
of the indecisiveness of Congress to act promptly and 
the fear of the Federal Reserve of "over-kill" actions, 
the policies applied were late and were not strong enough. 
The effects of these combined policies lead to inflationary 
pressures in the economy and a rapid deterioration in the 
merchandise trade balance.
For the U.S. Government to pursue monetary and 
fiscal policies merely for balance of payments purposes 
as an alternative to voluntary controls is unthinkable. 
There would be times as in I966-68 when these policies could 
serve both the balance of payments and domestic economic 
goals, but at other times when these goals are not com­
patible, to sacrifice the goals of the domestic economy 
for the problematic 3 percent in external trade would 
be rather foolish. For the U.S. companies that invest 
abroad such a policy would be more harmful than the 
voluntary controls. For most of the companies investment 
abroad is only a share of domestic investment, and a 
deflated economy at home would create more hardship and 
loss of earnings than the additional costs and difficul­
ties resulting from the voluntary program. Besides, a 
restrained monetary policy at home would cause an increase
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in domestic and foreign interest rates which would mean 
higher costs of borrowing and production.
Monetary and fiscal policies and their proper 
combination in order to attain economic domestic goals 
will continue in the future. However, with the current 
international monetary system of fixed exchange rates 
and full convertibility, the problem of whether or not 
to employ monetary and fiscal policies because of the 
balance of payment problems would depend on the relative 
importance which U.S. authorities give to the balance 
of payments in comparison with domestic economic problems,
Changing the International Monetary System 
The current system of fixed exchange rates, in 
existence since 19^5» has contributed greatly to the 
increase in international trade, travel, and capital 
flows. This system worked well in the past and served 
a useful purpose, but the continuation of U.S. and Bri­
tish balance of payments deficits and repeated inter­
national monetary crises in the past few years suggests 
that some fundamental adjustments are necessary. The 
combination of fixed exchange rates, free convertibility, 
and imperfect harmonization of the national economic 
policies of the member countries cannot work we11.^
1George Hlam, Toward Limited Exchange-Raj?e Flexi­
bility. Essays in International Finance, No. 73» March 
1969 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1969).
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As the number of voluntary and mandatory controls 
on trade and capital movements increase, the advantages 
of fixed exchange rates in encouraging such movements 
are lost, and the need for a change in the existing system 
becomes apparent.
The problem of a gradual increase in the supply 
of international liquidity, as needs arise, has been 
solved by activation of the SDR's; but in order to elimi­
nate the growing number of trade and capital movement 
controls and to bring the balance of payments of the dif­
ferent countries into equilibrium a reformed international 
monetary system is needed.
The way in which the various suggested new or 
revised monetary systems would work and the pros and 
cons of such systems were discussed in Chapter III.
The system which may be accepted by most inter­
national economists, bankers, government officials, and 
others is the limited flexible exchange system. Most 
U.S. economic professors as well as the Joint Economic 
Committee of the Congress favor a "wider band" plan in 
which the margins around par value would be greater than 
the existing margins.^
The Economist of London also reached the conclusion
Fritz Machlup, The Transfer Gap of the United 
States, Reprints in International Finance, No. II, Octo­
ber 1968 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1968), p. 238.
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that the only solution to balance of payments crises of 
nations would be the adoption of a flexible exchange 
system or at least a limited flexible system such as 
the "wider band" or "crawling peg." The Economist attri­
butes most of England's domestic economic troubles to 
the current fixed exchange system and advocates a more 
flexible system which would put greater harmony between 
domestic and balance of payments policies.
Britain is one of several countries which have con­
stantly had to try to check their expansion at pre­
cisely the wrong economic moments, because of balances 
of payments worries which the fixed exchange rate 
system has ruled can be tackled only by attempts at 
internal squeeze. Often such internal squeezes have 
not worked, and have left the economy still bloated 
with overdemand and still in balance of payments 
deficit. . . .  The proper international financial 
framework would be one which permitted all countries 
to make their own choice about the degree of 
utilization of internal resources they wished to 
aim for solely by reference to other internal fac­
tors. . . .  But, if an entirely sensible system is 
regarded as politically impossible, by all means 
let the world turn to one of the second best systems 
. . . such as the devices for so-called "crawling
pegs" or "wider margins.
The United States should have used more fiscal 
and monetary actions in the past few years in order to
U.S., Congress, Next Steps in International 
Monetary Reform. Report of the Subcommittee on International 
Exchange and Payments, Joint Economic Committee, 90th Cong., 
2nd sess., 1968, p. ?•
A. F. W. Plumptre, Flexible Parities, the Case for 
Smoother Exchange Rate Adjustment, paper presented to 
Economic Seminar in Washington, B.C., November 13, I968.
^The Economist. March 15, I969, p. 20.
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stop the increasing rate of inflation and deterioration 
in the competitiveness of American exports. However, 
because of the institutional set-up of the country and 
the need for congressional approval for many such actions, 
these measures came too late and were not strong enough.
In addition, the business community, the strength of labor 
unions, and social unrest prevented the Government from 
applying many necessary policy measures. Under a system 
of more flexible exchange rates such domestic considera­
tions would not have as much effect on the balance of 
payments position, and the Government would be able to 
act more freely to achieve its domestic goals.
Of course, a more flexible exchange rate system 
such as "wider band" or "crawling peg" would not solve 
the inflation problem of any one country, but neither 
can the current system.
None of the balance of payment policy actions 
taken by the U.S. Government under the current fixed 
rate system between I965 and I968 worked well (the 
voluntary restraint program was successful in the sense 
that all ceilings were observed and capital outflow was 
kept at a lower level than it would have been with the 
program, but the balance of payment deficit was not elim­
inated). H^e size of the deficit increased each year, 
occasioning the introduction of more and more voluntary 
and mandatory controls. The primary aim of the governmental
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policy was to increase the surplus in the balance of 
trade; however, the position of this surplus deteriorated 
each year until recently when it almost vanished. The 
war in Vietnam and congressional reluctance to approve 
fiscal measures are partly to blame, but these factors 
were foreseeable when this policy was formulated. For 
the United States to continue its domestic social pro­
grams, to continue engagement in the war in Vietnam, and 
to stop inflation would be impossible. However, adopting 
a new system of limited flexible exchange rates would 
help to relieve the additional pressures exerted by the 
adverse balance of payments position.
The effect of a more flexible international 
monetary system on American companies investing abroad 
as compared with the existing voluntary or mandatory 
controls would be quite favorable. The added costs 
involved because of the risk factor due to the fluctu­
ating and less predictable exchange rate would be offset 
by a partial removal of trade barriers, tariffs, and 
border taxes which are currently imposed because of 
balance of payments considerations.
The need to invest abroad because of current 
trade barriers would not be so great, and exports from 
the United States by these companies would keep their 
share of the foreign market. The allocation of funds 
to be invested abroad would be dependent upon market
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forces and not on an arbitrary decision of government 
bureaucrats which is based on an arbitrary past year 
and which is usually discriminatory against new companies 
that intend to invest abroad, regardless of the profita­
bility of the new investment.
The introduction of wider band or sliding pari­
ties would enable the Government to eliminate all con­
trols imposed on direct investment outflows and movement 
of goods, and plans such as voluntary restrictions would 
not be necessary.
In order to devise a new and more flexible 
international monetary system which would not be a radi­
cal change from the current system, the following plan 
is recommended. The new system would continue to have 
a par value with wider bands, and freely fluctuating 
rates would be within the limits of the bands. The 
Federal Reserve and the Central Bank would be required 
to enter the market when the exchange rates reached the 
outer limits. Such a system would still require the 
holding of foreign reserves, but to a lesser amount.
In order to provide international liquidity when needed, 
the S D K ’s were activated. In a case when a nation’s 
balance of payments position continued to deteriorate 
through a prolonged period, it would be allowed to 
devalue on a larger scale and to establish a new par 
value as is done today under the Articles of Agreement
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of the International Monetary Fund. Such a ayatem would 
enable the United States to dispose of its increasing 
number of controla--voluntary and mandatory--(if this 
system had existed during the mid-1960's, these controls 
would not have been necessary), and the balance of pay­
ments would be in equilibrium.
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
Conclusions
The position of U.S. authorities which maintains 
that restraints on capital outflow can to a large extent 
solve the problem of deficit in the balance of payments 
was challenged by the conclusion of the fourth chapter. 
The average recoupment period in balance of payment terms 
was an estimated five to seven years, with the returns 
on investment abroad greatly exceeding the original 
flow after that length of time. A sudden curtailment 
of investment outflow for two or three years would 
partially improve the nation's balance of payment posi­
tion for a short time; however, any longer period of 
adherence to a policy of capital restraint would hurt 
the balance of payments permanently and to a much greater 
extent than it temporarily had helped. The policies of 
voluntary and mandatory restraint are now in their sixth 
year and the initial effect from 1965 has already begun 
to have an adverse impact on the balance of payments. 
(Even according to estimates of the Treasury Department
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if this policy is to continue for another 2-3 years 
they would adversely effect the balance of payments.
The policy of the voluntary restrain# program, 
which was supposed to have been temporary, became long 
term and finally became mandatory. From the program's 
inception the business community did not accept it as 
voluntary as there was always the implied threat of 
mandatory control in the event that its guidelines wore 
not cooperated with fully. And, as anticipated, even 
with full cooperation the voluntary restraint became 
mandatory. In fact, it has become clear that the longer 
the policy remains in duration, the more difficult will 
be its elimination, partially because of the balance of 
payments adjustments which already have taken place 
under the controls.
Although government officials pointed to the
Hufbauer-Adler study to justify the direct Investment
capital outflow restraints, one of those authors reassessed
his position concluding that the short-term effects of
controls on capital outflow are uncertain and that the
long-term effects most likely are harmful.
For the use of investment controls to be justified, 
the short-term costs of control must be smaller than 
the benefits and, in addition, there should be no 
harmful long-range effects. Deeper analysis indi­
cates that the short-term effects of the recently 
enacted mandatory controls are uncertain; they may 
be politically helpful or economically harmful.
There is less ambiguity about the long-term effects.
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In the long run the mandatory controls seem likely 
to do more harm than good to the U.S. balance of 
payments.1
The reasons for the introduction of the "volun­
tary restraint program" and later the program of "man­
datory control" were chiefly politically motivated. Gov­
ernment expenditures abroad (other than foreign aid) 
and tourist expenditures in foreign countries have been 
by f^r more responsible for the balance of payment defi­
cit than investment abroad has been. However, the restraints 
on direct capital outflow are less sensitive in the poli­
tical sense.
The requirements that companies repatriate most 
of their earnings and the encouragement of U.S. companies 
to borrow abroad cannot go unchallenged indefinitely.
American companies abroad, after all, are subject to the 
laws of the host countries, and those countries may 
resent a unilateral American regulation. Some European 
governments already are considering the implementation 
of an Interest Equalization Tax similar to that which 
has been in effect in the United States for the last 
seven years.
A more basic economic objection to any voluntary 
or mandatory program is the fact that allocation of funds
Michael P. Adler, "The High Cost of Foreign 
Investment Restraints," Columbia Journal of World Busi­
ness . Vol. Ill, No. 3, May-June 1968, p. 7%»
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to be invested abroad is dependent on arbitrary deci­
sions made by government bureaucrats based on an arbi­
trary past year and not on the free market forces. The 
program discriminated against new companies which were 
planning to invest abroad but which had not done so in 
the past. The profitability of a company and its con­
tribution to the balance of payments was not a factor 
in deciding which companies could invest abroad or in 
deciding on the size of sums that would be allowed for 
foreign investment. The quota based on past investment 
abroad by necessity gave to some companies advantages 
which were not given to their competitors.
As stated previously, when the "voluntary pro­
gram" of controls on direct investment abroad was intro­
duced by the President on February 10, 1965, it was 
intended to be temporary in nature mainly for the pur­
pose of "buying time" while other steps could be effec­
ted to equalize the balance of payments. The program 
was designed to moderate--not to halt--the outflow of 
U.S. capital and to shift to foreign sources for a por­
tion of direct investment financing.
Business leaders were congratulated many times 
for their cooperation with the Department of Commerce 
guidelines. The participating companies as a group 
succeeded in holding their capital outflow below the 
targeted ceilings, with their total contributions to the
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balance of payments exceeding projections or expecta­
tions , ̂
Depreciation reserves and borrowing by foreign 
affiliates theretofore had been an important part of 
financing new investment abroad, but because of the 
voluntary restraints those sources of financing increased 
considerably. In addition, U.S. companies borrowed 
directly from abroad large amounts of funds which were 
accounted for as part of direct investment outflows from 
the United States. Total capital expenditure for plant 
and equipment by affiliates of U.S. companies was $7*4 
billion in I965, $8.6 billion in I966, and $9*2 billion 
in 1967; but outflows of new funds from the United States 
for direct investment declined from $3*5 billion in I965 
to $3*0 billion in I967(including funds borrowed abroad 
and actually used abroad to finance direct investment—  
excluding funds borrowed abroad net outflows would be 
$3*3 billion in 1965, $*29 billion in I966, and $2.6 
billion in 1967)*^ Inflow of funds to the United States 
resulting from direct investment abroad increased from 
$4.9 billion in I963 to $5*7 billion in 1967* Despite 
this excellent performance by the business community,
U.S., Department of Commerce, Office of the 
Secretary, Press Release of April I967, G-67-91, Wash­
ington, D.C.
2U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business. March I968, p. 22.
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which was repeatedly acknowledged by government offi­
cials, balance of payment deficits continued, and more 
severe mandatory controls thus were introduced in I968.
After examining the balance of payments data 
for 1965-68, it is obvious that a main cause of the 
vanishing trade surplus and the deficit was the war in 
Vietnam. The impact of the war on the balance of pay­
ments *as twofold; the direct foreign exchange costs 
which resulted from the war and such indirect costs as 
government budget deficits, skilled manpower shortages, 
and increased demand which caused inflationary pressures 
and deterioration in price competitiveness of U.S. 
exports.
Although the performance of the business commu­
nity under the voluntary restraint program was outstand­
ing, the program never achieved its basic goal of elimi­
nating the balance of payments deficit. Investment by 
U.S. companies abroad continued to grow; the outflow 
of capital from the United States declined; and the 
companies financed an increasing portion of their invest­
ment abroad from sources other than capital outflow. 
Nevertheless, the program as a whole cannot be regarded 
as a success, but rather as a failure. The controls 
were promised to be temporary but were extended repeatedly 
with additional restricted conditions which finally 
became mandatory. The persistent balance of payments
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deficit continued, and the program never achieved its 
promised results. The success of a temporary program 
is measured by its early termination. However, if such 
a program becomes self-perpetuated and the problem which 
it was intended to solve becomes even more aggravated, 
the program must be considered as unsuccessful and a 
solution must be found elsewhere.
The program was not based on sound economic 
theory or sound empirical economic data. All the 
accounts of the balance of payments are interrelated, 
and it is therefore impossible to take action on one 
item without affecting the others. Curtailment of 
capital outflows would have an immediate effect on exports 
of capital goods and a future effect on exports of replace­
ment parts, and raw materials. In addition, it would 
reduce the inflow of income in later years. Borrowing 
abroad has only an initial short-term positive effect 
on the balance of payments; interest rates, usually 
higher than in the United States must be paid regularly, 
and the debt must be paid back upon maturity. Therefore, 
indebtedness abroad does not improve the nation's pay­
ments position: It only postpones the necessary solu­
tions for a short time and makes it more difficult to 
cope with the problem when the time does come.
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Suggestions
The policies of voluntary capital restraint on 
direct investment abroad which have been pursued by 
the U.S. Government since the beginning of I965 have 
not solved the problem of deficit in the country's 
balance of payments. The deficit not only has not dis­
appeared, but the size of it has increased. Therefore, 
the restrictions imposed on direct investment abroad 
should be eliminated gradually, and a different solu­
tion to the deficit problem should be found. A gradual 
phaseout of restrictions is needed in order to avoid a 
massive outflow of U.S. funds to repay foreign debts or 
to finance previously postponed investment plans. During 
the duration of the continued restrictions, the nature 
of the controls should be changed to a special invest­
ment tax. Such a tax should be imposed on a graduate 
scale with the rate varying inversely to the over-all 
positive contribution of each company to the balance of 
paymuants in a ratio to the size of its foreign operations.
In the short run the most significant step that 
can be taken and one which would contribute most to the 
reduction in the size of the balance of payments deficit 
is the termination of the war in Viet Nam. The effects 
on the balance of payments would be twofold: reduction
in direct foreign costs resulting from the war and 
reduction in such indirect effects as inflationary
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pressures at home and deterioration in the competitive 
position of U.S. exports abroad.
In the long run a more flexible international 
monetary system as suggested in the fourth chapter would 
enable the government to pursue economic policies which 
would achieve domestic goals as well as equilibrium in 
the international payments balance. Pursuit of prudent 
monetary and fiscal policies would have to be continued 
in order to prevent deficits in the balance of payments 
in the coming years. However, balance of payments con­
siderations would not have as much weight as they do 
today when a choice of domestic policies must be made 
compatible with full employment and economic growth.
APPENDIX I
The Concepts of "Balance"
I. "Basic Transaction" Balance 
Goods and services
United States Government grants and loans
Private long terra capital, United States and foreign
Direct investment
Other (except foreign holdings of United States Govern­
ment bonds and notes)
Remittance and pensions
Balance on "Basic" transactions
settled by:
Special Government transactions
United States private short term capital (net)
United States private short term commercial and brokerage 
liabilities, net.
United States liquid liabilities, including United States 
Government non-marketable, convertible securities 
Errors and omissions
United States monetary reserves; gold, convertible cur­
rencies and International Monetary Fund position.
lie Balance on "Regular Type Transactions," and "Liquidity? 
Concept
Balance on "Basic" transaction (I)
United States private short term capital 
United States private commercial and brokerage liabili­
ties, net 
Errors and omissions
Balance on Regular type transactions 
settled by:
Special government transactions
Balance on all transactions other than changes in United 




United States liquid liabilities including United States 
Government non-marketable, medium term, convertible 
securities
United States monetary reserves assets (gold, convertible 
currencies, and IMF position)
III, "Official Settlement" Concept
Balance on Regular type transactions (II)
United States liquid liabilities to :
Foreign commercial banks
International non-monetary institutions 
Private non-bank foreigners 
Advances on United States military exports 
United States Government non-marketable, non-convertible 
securities
Balance settled by "Official Transactions" 
settled by:
Advanced repayment of United States Government loans 
Liabilities to official foreign monetary institutions 
Changes in United States monetary reserves (gold, con­
vertible currencies, IMF position)
Sources : Report of the Review Committee for
Balance of Payments Statistics, The Balance of Payment 
Statistics of the United States. The Bureau of the Budget, 
Washington, D.C., 1965» pp. 104, IO5, 107» 110.
Howard S. Piquet» The United States Balance of Payments 
and International Monetary Reserves. American Enterprise 
Institute, Washington, D.C., I966, pp. 45, 46, 48.
APPENDIX II
1967 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
AND THE PRESIDENT'S NEW PROGRAM
In his statement on January 1 , I968, President 
Johnson said:
The time is now come for decisive action designed to 
bring our balance of payments to- or close to- 
equilibrium in the year ahead. The need for action 
is a national and international responsibility of 
the highest priority.^
The President issued an executive order which
transformed the previously voluntary Direct Investment
2Program into a mandatory one. The new program was 
expected to yield payments improvements totaling approx­
imately $3 billion in I968. The new Mandatory Program 
was established not because of an uncooperative business 
community: On the contrary, the cooperation with the
Department of Commerce in the Voluntary Program was 
excellent. However, the increase in the balance of pay­
ments deficit in I967 needed further improvement which
U.S., Department of the Treasury, Maintaining 
the strength of the United States Dollar in a Strong 




could be achieved only by such a new program.
Developments in 1967 
In 1967 the U.S. balance of payments deficit 
increased to over #3.6 billion, more than twice as much 
as in the two previous years. Also, the gold loss in 
1967 reached almost #1.2 billion, of which #900 million 
occurred during the month of December.
On the basis of "official reserves" transactions, 
the deficit for I967 showed erratic movement due to swap 
arrangements between the United States and foreign gov­
ernments and to large movements of funds from foreign 
commercial banks into central banks and back into com­
mercial banks. In I966, because of the extremely tight 
credit conditions in the United States, the country 
enjoyed an inflow of liquid funds from foreign banks-- 
an occurrence that produced a surplus of #0.2 billion 
on the 'bfficial reserves" account. In I967 the credit 
conditions eased in the United States, and foreign banks 
reduced their foreign assets in this country by substan­
tial amounts. This reduction had the effects of return 
flows of dollars into foreign official holdings and a 
sharp deterioration in the "official reserves" balance.
By the end of I967 the deficit on this basis was running 
at an annualrate of #2.9 billion.
One of the most disappointing aspects of the balance
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of payments for I967 vas the performance in the trade 
accounts. The trade surplus increased only slightly 
from its depressed level of I966, In the first quarter 
of 1967, the surplus rose to #4.1 billion on adjusted 
annual rate in comparison to #2.4 billion in the last 
quarter of I966. In the second quarter of I967, it 
advanced even further to #4.6 billion. However, it 
declined somewhat in the third quarter and very sharply 
in the last quarter of I967. The main factor contributing 
to the increase in surplus in the beginning of 1967 
was that imports leveled off because of slacking demand 
in the domestic economy in the first half of the year, 
but it began to rise sharply toward the end of the year. 
Exports also leveled off due to the decline in economic 
activity in Western Europe. For I967 as a whole the 
improvement in the trade surplus which had been expected 
by the United States in the beginning of the year never 
did materialize. Domestic economic situations such as 
the large increase in expenditures for Vietnam, large 
government deficit, increase in wages and costs, and 
inflationary pressures were the main factors that aggra­
vated the problem.
In the first three quarters of I967 the net out­
flow of U.S. private capital was running at an annual 
rate of #5.1 billion--much higher than in I966 or any 
other year since the War except in 1964 when it reached
232
a peak of #6.5 billion. The large outflow of portfolio 
investment in I967 was due to a sharp increase in new 
issues of foreign securities in the United States, 
mainly an issue of nearly #250 million in bonds sold 
by the World Bank and àn issue of special bonds for 
about #90 million sold by the State of Israel.
Net outflow of capital funds for direct invest­
ment declined from the rates in I965 and I966. On an 
annual rate, the outflow for direct investment reached 
#3.2 billion, of which #0.4 billion had been financed 
abroad; thus, the net outflow was around #2.7 billion 
in comparison to #3.1 billion in I966 and $3.4 billion 
in 1965.
The decline in direct investment outflow abroad 
was partly a result of the cooperation of the business 
community with the Voluntary Program, but there are some 
reasons to believe that this was not the only factor in 
reducing direct investment abroad. Other reasons are 
because the outflow in 1964 and I965 was exceptionally 
high and because the rate of return on U.S. direct 
investment has been slowing down and appears to have 
diminished considerably in recent years (Chart l). The 
slowdown in economic activity in Europe for the last two 
years has also been an important factor in reducing the 
rate of U.S. investment and decline in profits. A very 
important fact (especially in I967) is that the voluntary
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CHART 1
U.S. RETURNS ON INVESTMENT ABROAD
Percent
_  _ Manufacturing investment 
in Western Europe
_____ Total investment 
in all areas




1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Source: Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business, October 1969» p. 30,
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program was instrumental in inducing U.S. companies to 
borrow more foreign funds in order to expand their activ­
ities in Europe and other developed nations.
The decline in direct investment outflow in 19&7 
came mainly as a result of reduction of investments in 
Canada and Latin America. The outflow to Europe rose 
slightly, but the largest increase came in New Zealand, 
Australia, South Africa, and the oil-producing countries 
in the Middle East and Africa.
The President's New Program 
The nations that have benefited the most from the 
U.S. deficit are the West European countries which run a 
surplus comparable to or somewhat larger than the U.S. 
deficit. The United States has sought to formulate a 
program that would eliminate its deficit, especially the 
deficit with Europe. A most important task for the United 
States was to select the measures that would be most 
effective in reaching the balance of payments objectives 
and which at the same time would allow an expansion of 
world trade and domestic economic growth in the United 
States. In his policy statement of January 1, I968, 
announcing the new program, the President kept these 
objectives in mind, and the new program was built on 
the foundations of the voluntary program which it replaced.
The new program deals with several accounts in
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the balance of payments, but its principal emphasis is 
on cutting the flow of direct investment abroad through 
the employment of mandatory controls. The authority 
for such controls was given to the President by the 
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917* Other parts of the 
program are the following: additional restraints on
banks and other financial institutions lending abroad, 
restricted travel abroad, reduced government expenditures 
abroad, and some measures to increase exports.
An ideal situation would be for the United 
States to solve its problem through a gradual long-term 
approach without interference to domestic growth and 
the free movement of goods, capital, and people between 
countries. With a Gross National Product of over $800 
billion and foreign assets of over $110 billion which 
earn about #6.0 billion annually, the United States 
possesses the resources and strength to carry out such 
an approach. In the long run the nation is strong.
The short-term situation, however, requires immediate 
corrective action in order to give the long-term measures 
tame to work toward equilibrium. In the short run the 
new program of immediate action called for specific 
quantitative targets which would reduce the deficit by 
#3.0 billion in I968. Of this amount, direct investment 
cuts would account for #1.0 billion. Federal Reserve 
programs for #500 million, reduction in net government
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expenditures abroad for #300 million, restraint on travel 
abroad for #300 million, and the steps relating to non­
tariff barriers for #500 million. Together with these 
targets some money was appropriated for promotion of 
U.S. exports and the encouragement of foreign investment 
and travel in the United States.
The Federal Reserve program which became effective 
on January 1, I968, put a ceiling on foreign credit of 
103 percent of the amount outstanding at the end of 1964, 
and the banks were asked not to renew maturing term 
loans to the developed European countries. Also, the 
banks were requested to give credit only for financing 
export or loans to underdeveloped countries. The other 
governmental programs were aimed at reduction of expen­
ditures abroad by curtailing travel to countries outside 
the Western Hemisphere and by cutting government expen­
ditures required to maintain troups in Europe and 
reducing the personnel in other agencies abroad. The 
measures affecting private travel abroad have not been 
adopted, but other plans have been put into effect. In 
order to implement this program the President urged 
Congress to enact the proposed income tax surcharge and 
stressed the need for an effective voluntary program of 
wage-price restraint.
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The Direct Investment Program
The program provides three basic limitations on direct 
investors: (l) annual limits are placed on their new
direct investment - capital outflow plus reinvested 
earnings - in foreign subsidiaries on branches; (2 ) a 
minimum share of total earnings from their direct 
investment must be repatriated - generally equal to 
the same percentage that they Repatriated during
1964-66; and (3) their short term financial assets 
held abroad must be reduced to the average level of
1965-66 and held at or below that level.
The mandatory program covers all countries, which 
are divided into three groups with different ceilings 
for each group. The ceilings were set in such a way that 
they would achieve the policy objectives of the United 
States.
2The first group (Schedule A countries ) includes 
all of the developing countries where direct investment, 
including reinvested earnings, may not exceed 110 per­
cent of the 1965-66 average invested by any investor.
The ceiling of 110 percent was set to maintain the invest­
ment at about the level of 1967»
The second group (Schedule B countries ) includes 
developed countries which were judged by the United States 
to be in need of high-level capital inflow in order to
^Economic Report of the President, I968, p. 173•
2Schedule A countries: Latin America, Far East
less Japan, Africa less Libya and Republic of South Africa, 
Other Western Hemisphere.
3Schedule B countries: Australia, Japan, Libya,
oil-producing nations of the Middle East, and the United 
Kingdom.
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continue their economic growth and financial stability 
and for which there was no source other than the United 
States to supply them with necessary capital. For these 
countries, direct investment, including reinvested earn­
ings, could not exceed 65 percent of the average of
1965-66.
For the third group of countries (Schedule C 
2countries ), principally Continental Europe, a moratorium 
was imposed on any new capital outflow from the United 
States, but reinvestmënt of earnings in these countries 
was authorized at the same percentage of the average 
earnings which they have reinvested in the years 1964-66. 
However, the maximum allowable reinvestment of earnings 
could not exceed 35 percent of the investor's average 
base period of direct investment.
For all three groups, direct investors must have 
repatriated at least the same percentage of earnings as 
the average repatriated in 1964-66 plus any excess of 
total earnings over the amount which could have been 
invested under the authorized ceiling. All short-term 
assets other than direct investment, above the average 
of 1965-66, must have been brought home. The regulation 
applied to all "direct investors" who directly or indi­
rectly owned, who have voting power in, or who received
^Schedule 0 countries: Common Market, Other Europe
less United Kingdom, Republic of South Africa.
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Income of more than 10 percent from a company abroad.
This did not apply to investment of less than #100,000 
in any year. The program was to be administered by the 
Department of Commerce, with final authority in the hands 
of the Secretary of Commerce.
Based on direct investment statistics some pre­
liminary calculations have shown that the net direct 
investment and reinvestment earnings in I965 and I966 
averaged about $900 million in Schedule "A" countries, 
$2.1 billion in Schedule "B" countries, and $1.2 billion 
in Schedule "C" countries. The new program implied that 
the maximum net capital outflow for direct investment 
plus reinvested earnings in I968 would amount to about 
$1.0 billion for the less-developed nations, approxi­
mately $1.4 billion in the second group, and $0.3 billion 
in the developed countries of Western Europe--or a total 
of approximately $2.7 billion in comparison to $4.2 bil­
lion in 1966. U.S. investors would be able to continue 
borrowing abroad to finance additional needed investment.
With the formulation of the new program it was 
emphasized that the controls would not be static but 
would be adapted to new developments as they arose.
One change occurred in March of I968 when ceilings of 
capital outflow to Canada were changed and more capital 
was allowed to move there.
As expected, most of the business community was
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oppOMod to the new mandatory program, claiming, and 
rightly ao, that all companioa had cooperated with the 
Department of Commerce in carrying out the voluntary 
program. All during the 1960'a, direct inveatmont 
income exceeded by far the amount of funda that went 
into direct investment. In 196? direct investment income, 
not including royalties and fees, exceeded investment 
outflow by about $2.0 billion, and the cause of the bal­
ance of payments deficit was due primarily to the weak­
ening of the trade surplus, the deficit in the Government 
budget, and a rise in U.S. Government outlay abroad because 
of Vietnam.^ The argument continues that the program 
would reduce exports and, more importantly, that it would 
reduce the future earning potential of the United States 
abroad. A large part of direct investment is for new 
sources of raw materials which cannot be extracted in 
the United States or for which the cost of doing so 
would be prohibitive. Of course, all business leaders 
realize that something must be done in order to reduce 
the deficit. They are willing to accept controls only 
as a short-term, "Last resort" measure which they feel 
should be accompanied by a more effective monetary and 
fiscal policy in the domestic economy.
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